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UNITED JEWIS H o rzGANI- Cert. to CA 2 
ZATIONS OF WJLLIAMSBURGH, (Oakes, Kellher; Frankel 
ET AL. dissents) /J _/}_ 
~~~~J~J 
v. ~·~ ~ ~s /3v.,Hc_,-s,-to 
HUGH L. CArUY , ET AL. Federal/c' ivil 
I. SU!-1111ARY: The question is whether a New York state redj std ct· --
ing plan (undertaken after the Department of Justice had disapproved 
~
the previous plan as possibly discriminatory) which was specjfically 
2/Pursuant to extensions granted by Marshall, J. and Blackmun, J. 
-2-
drawn to create districts with at least a 65% black majority, is 
unconstitutional in the fac e of a challenge by the Hasjdic community 
asserting that the plan discriminates against them, as an ethnic 
voting bloc and as whi~es. 
II. FACTS: Kings County New York has a 65% white and 35% non-
white (black & Puerto Rican) population. Most of the non-whites live 
in Bedford-Stuyvesant. However, by dividing up this area and pa;ring 
the divisions with larger, surrounding white areas, it has been pos-
sible to fix it so that the non-whites were in the minority in 8~/c 
of the SenPl.te and 77% of the Assembly districts, (the exceptions 
being right in the heart of the ghetto). 
New York sought to redistrict in 1972 but, for reasons not 
challenged here, the USDC (D. D.C.) determined that the reap-
portionment plan must be approved by the u.s. Attorney General 
pursuant to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. That approval was 
R ~n~ withheld , apparently because the New York plan perpetuated the 
~~ status quo outlined above+fand New York had to come up with a 
~~~new plan before they could hold another election. 
fq'1V 
~ Although the A.G. made no formal recommendations as to the 
new plan, the New York officials "got the feeling" through 
informal contacts that they should carve out some districts with 
l/The stated reason for disapproval, a model of non-information, was 
that "we cannot conclude .• · • that (this plan) will not have the 
effect of abridging the right to vote on account of race or color .. · 
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at least 65% no11-white majorities. This they djd, giving Kings 
County 3 of 10 Senate districts and 7 of 22 Assembly districts 
' h h't . 't' 1/ h' 1 db th A G w1t non-w 1 e maJOrl-les. T lS pan was approve y e .. 
In the process they cut in half the Hasidic community which, 
under the old plan and the pre-1972 setup, had been contained in 
a single district. Prior even to the A.G.'s approvai of the plan 
the Hasidin} (petrs here) sought a temporary restraining order :in 
U.S.D.C. (ED N.Y. -- Bruchhausen, J) which was denied. Subsequently 
the DC denied a preliminary injunction holding that petrs' suit 
was "untenable" because only political subdivisions could bring 
uctions under the Voting Rights Act. [See 42 u.s.c. § 1973(c)J 
CA 2 rejected this reasoning by the USD0holding, in .effect, 
that the n~medy nfforded to states and political subdivis:i ons by 
§ 1973(c) is not exclusive and private parties may seek traditional 
injunctive relief (but may not sue pursuant to § 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act) citing Allen v. Bd. of Education, 393 U.S. 544, 549-50 
(1969) • However, they did hold that § 5 bars a suit against the 
A.G., a holding which petrs do not protest. 
Next CA 2 turned to the standing question. They held that 
~----.__) 
petrs lacked standing as meniliers of an ethnic bloc noting that 
--------.; 
1/The SG poin1. s out that the percentage of non-white dominated 
districts is now approximately equal to the percentage of non-
white population in the county, i.e. 30 - 40%. 
\ 
-4-
there were so many ethnic blocs in Kings County that to suffer -
them all the right to protest would create havoc. Petrs do not 
speciiicall~rotest this holding here~ though they still seem to complain about it. 
I L 
Ho~ever, CA 2 found standing for petrs as representatives 
........... 
of the white community especially where, as here, the white 
voters are members of a racial-political minority in the districts 
in question. 
On the merits CA 2 noted that th~re was no showing that the 
voting strength of white voters had been unduly diluted (see the 
percentages quoted above). Thus the question became whether 
districting on racial lines is per se unconstitutional. CA 2 
agreed with petrs that the redistricting had in fact been performed 
solely along racial lines. However, they concluded that the Voting 
\
Rights Act contemplated such cc·l 0r-oriented actiC1~r:_ the only 
effective way to correct past discrimination. They thus concluded 
. ,.
that redistricting done solely on the basis of race is not per se 
unconstitutional. 
Judge Frankel dissented pointing out that it was unclear what 
the "wrong" was which was being corrected or whether the 65% quotas 
would in fact right that "wrong." No hearings were held or fjnd-
ings made as to whether the non-whites were in fact injured by the 
old system or benefitted by the new. 
He then stated that such a race-oriented quota system is 
"odius" in our society and argues that non-whites, a minority of 
~
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35~ have no constitutional right to a majority in 35% of the 
districts (with the prGsumed consequence of having 35% of the 
----~ 
legislators from the county being non-white). 
III. CONTENTIONS: Petr cites City of Richmond v. U.S., 
No. 74-201 (d e c. 6-24-75) in which a majority held that "voting 
changes taken with the purpose of denying the vote on the grounds 
of race or color" are invalid no matter what their actual effect 
might be. Petr also contends that Beer v. U.S. (No. 73-1869 set 
for reargument this Term) presents similar issues. Finally petrs 
argue, as did Frankel, J., below, that there has been no finding 
of any past discrimination which required correction and no 
rational relationship between the form of the remedy and the 
nature of the discrimination it allegedly corrects. 
The SG essentially tracks the arguments of the majority belm\r. 
IV. DISCUSSION: Contrary to petrs' contentions the plan 
challenged here seems to have the same result as the plan approved 
in City of Richmond, supra. That is, non-whites have majorities in 
a percenta ge of districts which is roughly equal to their percentaqe 
of the total population. City of Richmond, Slip Op. p. 12. 
Query, however, if the rule is that minorities are entitled 
representation in the legislature according to their percentage 
representation in the community (which is the basic thrust of this 
case & City of Richmond) does it not follow that, if 45% of the 







The point is that the ruling of this case is that minorities 
are now entitled to more than minorities have ever gotten in the 
}A past. Here they apparently were actually gerrymandered into a 
U\ more favorable position than the natural order of things would 
have ordained~ CA 2 approved it as a correction of past wrongs, 
but as petr points out, nobody has proved that such "wrongs" will 
be corrected by this action. A d{fficult case but probably settled 
by the dictum in City of Richmond. 
There is a response. 
10/6/75 Bradley Op in Pets App 
1/Nobody specifically admits that this is the case, but it seems 
to be the tacit basis of CA 2 1 s decision. 
,, ' .... 
. - .. 
Discuss, join 3. 
I have read the CA 2 opinion and the papers. There 
are excellent XKKJXX lawyers on both sides, and they have succeeded 
in presenting a difficult case in all its complexity! 
I would suggest xkx that you read Judge Frankel's 
dissent, Petition 32a-50a, and then read the Brief for 
Respondents in Opposition 3-10. That is about 25 pages of 
reading, but I believe it is necessary for you to get a real 
feel for the issues. Judge Frankel gives the best argument 
~ 
for striking down the dt istricting plan, while the Rx~BHK&Hxxx 
Respondents present a clear and cogent argument that the plan 
is just fine. 
There seem to be two real issues. First, do these ..__ _______________ _
plaintiffs have standing? They are whites, and members of 
an ethnic group. As ethnics, they have been split into ~tve~~\ 
... voting districts where previously they had been in one. 
But k this doesn't harm them socially in any way, i since the 
division is purely on paper and they still have a community. 
So t~ has to be But HXBH even before 
the split they were all in a district that had a 61.5 %nonwhite 
majority. After the split (which really results in four districts, 
two for Senate and two for Assembly elections), xkex they are in 
three districts with nonwhite majorities ranging from 65% to 
88.1%, and in one district with a white majority of 65.3%. So 
it's kind of difficult to say that the have been hurt as voters, 
------------vofers - ------- --
whether looked at as ethnic HBxexx or as white voters--either way, 
f 
-.z.-
they were in the minority before and in the miHBix1qr: 
xmXHXI!l minority now (except in the one district with a white 
majority). 
question becomes 
Assuming standing, the ~HexxiBHxBREI!lme whether there 
was anything impermissible about what the State did. What 
they did, basically, was sit BBR down and (1) assume block 
voting along racial lines (which had a~paxaxx apparently been 
the case in the past), (2) look at the percentages of whites 
and nonwhites in the whole Kings County, and (3) draw district 
lines so that nonwhites of voting age would be in a majority -- ·- ........_______ -------~------- -- --
in a percentage of the total number o districts ~~XBximaxi 
~ ~~--------------- - --
approximately equal to their percentage of the total population 
---......____ - --..__... ---... ...... -- -- --
in the County. (At the latter stage, apparently, they allowed -- ~---
for census figures that showed a lower percentage of nonwhites 
above voting age than the percentage of whites above voting age. 
Because of this, they drew the lines to insure supermajorities 
(i.e., above 65%) of nonwhites in certain districts, in order to 
insure axxx at least a majority of nonwhite voters in thffie 
districts. The plaintiffs, of course, contend that the iii 65% 
figure was just pulled out of the air because the State officials 
"got the feeling" that was the figure the Justice Department 
would accept. That appears ludicrous to me, but we may find 
from the full record that it's true.) 
. was 
The aim of the line drawing xax apparently~o attempt to 
insure election of nonwhite candidates from some of the districts. 
The question is whether 
context of this case . 
.....____.-._~ 
system is permissible in the 
City of Richmond does not control. In Part II of that 
-3-
opinion the Court said that the change from at-large election 
to ward elections, in conjunction with Richmond's annexation, 
saved the annexation under § 5 because it kept it from having 
the effect of denying or abridging the xigkx blacks' right 
to vote. It is true that the wards there were drawn so that 
a percentage of them would have substantial black majorities, 
and that that percentage corresponded very xaga roughly to the 
percentage of blacks ~n the city after annexation. Thus, the 
e- ..... /~v\ 
Court did H condone drawing lines with racial purposes in mind. 
--------....___ - - ------------------------
The difference x between Richmond and this EKe case, however, 
is the question presented to the Court by the line-drawing. 
In RiEkamaRi Richmond, the question was whether, given the 
wards as drawn, the Court could say that the annexation 
dicl hot have. 
plan as a whole ... Athe effect of denying or abridging kaiEkx 
black voting x rights. Here, the question is whether the 
line-drawing was necessary to correct past wrongs, and if so 
whether that necessity justified it. Given that difference, 
I do not believe Richmond makes consideration of this case 
redundant. 
As to the answer to the question presented by the line-
drawing in this case, I remain quite confused. Plaintiffs 
claim that it was unjustified because there has been no finding 
of prior discrimination that the line-drawing was to remedy. 
' - ---
Respondents try to get around this argument by pointing to the 
1972 redistricting that failed to pass the AG, claiming that 
that redistricting was discriminatory against blacks, and 
arguing that there was no way to "remedy" that discrimination 
J 
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without considering racial composition of the districts 
to be created by the 1974 plan. The problem with Respondents' 
argument is that the 1972 lines never KHR went into effect, 
so one can't point to their discriminatory effect at all. Thus, 
the 1974 lines challenged here were not drawn to remedy any 
discriminatory effect of the previously proposed plan, and we 
must look somewhere else for the previous discrimination. It 
is true that district lines in Kings County ap~eaxxa appear to 
have been drawn from time xmmemaixaix immemorial with the 
purpose of keeping blacks from having majorities in any districts, 
or many districts. But I am not so sure that this "common 
knowledge" has been reduced to a finding anywhere in this 
litigation, and even if it had I'm not sure it would be relevant. 
came 
This challenged redistricting Eam about simply BREKX because 
·-- ---------------------------------------------------------the AG refused to approve the previous one. The ground for that 
disapproval, under the Act and as given, was that the AG could 
not say that the plan did not have a discriminatory effect. The 
1 AG did not say that it did have one, either. And he certainly mi 
made no judgment as to previous districtings in Kings County. 
So, all his disapproval required the County to do was come up 
with a new plan that did not discriminate against nonwhites. 
His disapproval can hardly be pointed to as justification for 
quotas of any sort. ( But on the other hand, one doesn't want to 
tie the AG's and a State's hands in working out a plan that will 
not have a discriminatory effect against nonwhites, and it may 
be easiest for them at times to sit down with figures and 
drawing paper and play the percentages as they did here. It is 
. . -
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XEHxxaikx~ certainly difficult for me, at least, to think of 
some way they could avoid a discriminatory a£££E effect 
against nonwhites without paying attention to the percentage 
figures for various districts ) 
Phil 
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LFP/vsl 
July 26, 1976 
No. 75-104, United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh vs. 
Carey (Governor of New York), NAACP, et al. 
This memorandum, dictated after a preliminary look at 
the briefs, is intended only as an "aid to memory" that will re-
fresh my recollection when I return to a more careful study of 
the case prior to argument and decision. When an opinion is 
expressed or intimated, it is wholly tentative. 
* * * * 
This is a rather complex "redistricting" case : from New 
York that has been in the courts for some time. It is here on 
certiorari to CA2 where the 1974 legislative redistricting of 
Kings County, following disapproval by the Attorney General under 
the Civil Rights Act of 1965 of a 1972 plan, was sustained by a 
majority of CA2 (Oakes), with a dissent by Frankel. 
The two opinions, majority and dissenting, of the Cir-
cuit Court, and the briefs filed by petitioners (the Miller, Cassidy 
firm) and by the respondents-intervenors (NAACP) provide a compre-
hensive -- if at times confusing -- account of this case and its 
• • 
No. 75-104 2. 
issues. The other briefs, including that filed on behalf of 
Governor Carey, are not helpful. In view of the thorough opinions 
and briefing, however, I will not attempt in this memorandum to 
record for myself a coherent account of the history of the case, 
its relevant facts, or the various arguments. In brief sum-
mary, the case is as follows: 
The Situation and the suit 
Portions of New York, unlike most states outside of the 
South, are subject to Section V of the Voting Rights Act. Commen-
cing in 1970, the State of New York and the Attorney General (De-
partment of Justice) have been "sparring" -- and litigating -- over 
the effect of the Act on certain redistricting, including Kings 
County. The 1972 New York plan was disapproved by the Attorney 
General. Responding to this disapproval, a special emergency 
session of the New York legislature in May 1974 adopted a new plan, 
which was approv~d by the Attorney General. This case presents an 
attack on the constitutionality of that plan. 
The district lines at issue here were largely influenced, 
if not in effect dictated, by the Justice Department. Judge Oakes, 
for CA2, noted: 
These lines were drawn, Richard s. Scolaro, 
the executive director of the Joint Committee 
on Reapportionment testified below, to comply 
with Justice Department criteria, informally 
discussed over the telephone and in person, 
that there be three senate and two assembly 
No. 75-104 
districts with "substantial nonwhite 
major it'ies." Because the assembly dis-
trict in which the entire Hasidic community 
was located under the 1972 apportionment had 
a nonwhite population of 61.5 per cent and 
the Justice Department indicated this was in-
sufficient, Mr. Scolaro "got the feeling," 
although the number was not specifically 
referred to, that a 65 per cent nonwhite 
majority would be approved. Under the 1974 
reapportionment plan devised and approved 
the Hasidic community was divided almost 
in half, placed in Assembly Districts 56 
and 57 and Senate Districts 23 and 25. 
Assembly District 56 as redrawn contains 
88.1 per cent nonwhite population, Assembly 
District 57 contains 65.0 per cent nonwhite 
population, Senate District 23 contains 
71.1 per cent nonwhite population, Senate 
District 25 contains 34.7 per cent nonwhite 
population. 
3. 
This suit was instituted by petitioner as representative 
of the Hasidic community of Kings County, described as a closely 
knit community of Jewish citizens most of whom escaped Nazi per-
secution, and have lived in what is called the Williamsburgh area 
since they immtgrated to this count!Y· The complaint avers that 
it was unconstitutional to dilute the vote of the Hasidic community 
by dividing it in half. The Court of Appeals correctly resolved 
this issue by holding that no specific ethnic or racial group is 
entitled to preserve community political integrity. This aspect 
of the case was resolved by CA2, and is not pressed on this appeal. 
The Questions Presented 
The best statement of the question presented is found in 
., 
No. 75-104 4. 
petitioners' brief, as follows: 
1. Whether the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments were violated by a deliberate racial 
gerrymander under which election lines were 
drawn on a racial basis to secure ten districts 
with white voting populations at 35 percent or 
less. 
2. Whether such a gerrymander was rendered 
constitutional by the fact that it was carried 
out under the instructions of the United States 
Department of Justice, purporting to implement 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 
3. Whether a racial gerrymander can be 
viewed as "corrective action" to remedy past 
discrimination if there has been no affirmative 
finding by any court or government agency that 
there was past voting discrimination which 
required correction and if there is no rational 
relationship between the form of the remedy and 
the nature of the discrimination it assertedly 
"corrects." 
Petitioners' brief argues, as a separate issue, each of 
these questions. The NAACP respondent .' s brief presents the opposing 
arguments. The issues are important and far-reaching, and not with-
out considerable difficulty. At this time, I will merely comment 
on them quite briefly. 
It is asserted by petitioners, and not denied, that this 
is "the first case in which there is absolutely no factual dispute 
as to the legislature's dominant purpose or motive." As CA2 stated 
the central issue is whether an apportionment "specifically drawn 
to ensure nonwhite voters a 'viable majority'" is permissible under 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. It is thus conceded, in 
effect, that although the plan was not directed in any way against 
No. 75-104 5. 
the Hasidic community as such, that community was divided -- and 
placed in separate state senate and assembly districts -- solely 
because they were white. Absent such a division, these new districts 
would not have had at least 65 percent nonwhite voting population 
prescribed as the goal for the redistricting. 
As petitioners put it rather starkly 
If the petitioners' skin were black, 
brown, red or yellow, the apportionment 
challenged here would never have reached 
this Court. Any federal judge mindful of 
his oath to enforce the Constitution would 
instantly strike down a districting scheme 
which was flagrantly designed to keep 
blacks, Chicanos, Indians or orientals at 
not more than 35 percent of an election 
district. 
Petitioners then present "three alternative grounds" for 
the alleged invalidity of the legislation: 
1. As the broadest ground, it is argued that "there is 
never any justification for race-consciousness in the electoral 
process." Petitioners conced= that the court has sustained race-
oriented legislation with respect to public education and employ-
ment "to undo the effects of past discrimination" or to prevent 
its perpetuation. But "no seniority builds up in voting" and "no 
established attendance or assignment patterns develop over the 
years of racial discrimination as they do with regard to public 
school students and teachers." Hence, it is argued that once racial 
gerrymandering has been shown, the cure "is fair non-racial apportion-
ment -- not districting designed to maximize the voting power of 
No. 75-104 6. 
blacks, Puerto Ricans, or any other minority." 
2. Petitioners' second argument assumes, arguendo, that ' 
there may be some situations where racial redistricting is sup-
portable to correct "past discrimination." It is argued, however, 
that there has been "no finding by any judicial or administr.ative 
body [in this case] that there was racial discrimination in the 
drawing" of past district lines in Kings County. As noted, the 
record shows that in one of the districts at. issue in this case, 
nonwhites numbered 61.4 percent of the total population under the 
1972 reapportionment, suggesting no discrimination in voting against 
this large nonwhite majority. 
3. The third alternative argument (the most narrow of 
the three) is related to the particular quota system urged by the 
Department of Justice and adopted by the New York Legislature. 
Even if one accepts that (i) race-oriented legislation may be 
justified in some electoral districting and (ii) there was in fact 
past racial discrimination in Kings County that warranted some 
compensatory racial remedy, petitioners argue that "the record 
as well as human experience -- is devoid ••• of any justification 
for the remarkable 'quota' remedy undertaken by the New York 
Legislature." This is the focus of Judge Frankel's dissent. There 
had been no finding by the legislature or a court -- that the 
remedy 
65 percent quota was a necessary or an appropriate/for the objections 
raised by the Attorney General. Judge Frankel concluded that :."hhere 
No. 75-104 7. 
is no semblance of justification" for the 65 percent quota. 
Petitioners here rely on Milliken v. Bradley for the 
proposition that the remedy in a racial discrimination case de-
signed to correct past segregated conduct may not substantially 
exceed in scope the constitutional violation found to have been 
committed. This concept goes back to Swann. 
Respondent's Answers 
The brief on behalf of the NAACP undertakes to answer 
the foregoing contentions, relying heavily on the purpose of the 
Voting Rights Act and on the perceived rationale of several of 
our reapportionment cases including, particularly, White v. Regester, 
412 u.s. 755. 
The NAACP argues that the 1974 lines, adopted to conform 
to the Attorney General's views, were not unfair to whites. Although 
the lines drawn resulted in five new districts with nonwhite majorities, 
"white candidates were elected in four of these districts." It was 
emphasized that the racial mix of the population necessarily had 
to be considered, under the Civil Rights Act and the Attorney 
General's view in drawing the new lines. 
Respondent NAACP noted, correctly I think, that there 
was certainly no showing of past discrimination against whites, 
and no past exclusion of them from access to the political processes, 
such as were noted in White v. Regester with respect to the black 
population. 
No. 75-104 8. 
The respondent-intervenors defend the appropriateness 
of the 65 percent quota remedy by reference, not so much to spe-
cific discrimination or intentional exclusion of blacks as by 
reference to general black-white ratios: in various districts in 
New York prior to 1974. These ratios indicate that the non-white 
community had been fragmented in many instances, and paired with 
larger white areas, in a way that substantially diluted the black 
vote. 
Comment 
The briefs in this case, as well as the opinion of CA2, 
are rather "long" on arguments and "short" on the citation of 
relevant authorities and legal analysis based thereon. 
Subject to rereading the major decisions of this Court 
that may be relevant (e.g., Regester, City of Richmond, Whitcomb), 
and to advice from my clerk, I am inclined to think that the Voting 
Rights Act -- if not our prior decisions -- dispose of petitioners' 
first, sweeping assertion that "there is never any justification 
for race consciousness in the electoral process." 
Petitioners' second and third arguments present more 
difficult issues, as is made clear -- at least to me -- by Judge 
Frankel's dissenting opinion. If indeed there is no finding by 
any judicial or administrative body that there was racial discrimina-
tion in drawing former district lines in B~ooklyn (Kings County), 
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is there justification for the lines being drawn deliberately to 
place the white voters at a serious percentage disadvantage? In 
answering this question, to what extent is the view of the Attorney 
General on the Voting Rights Act relevant? Is it, as argued by 
respondents, determinative? I would have thought that it is 
certainly relevant, as the Act applies to Kings County, but this 
would not necessarily answer a Fourteenth Amendment attack on the 
ground that -- as applied -- the Act was violative of the equal 
protection rights of the whites. 
The third argument, that won Judge Frankel's vigorous 
endorsement, is still more narrowly focused. Is there anything 
in the record that supports the necessity for, or rationality of, 
the 65 percent quota system in relation to the legislative purpose? 
Indeed, if the legislative purpose is a "legitimate one," is there 
a reasonable relationship between the purpose and the "classification" 
(the 65-35 minimum ratio) adopted? 
I add, for the benefit of my clerk or clerks, that my own 
"bias" is against "quota systems" as either a constitutionally 
required, or a socially justifiable, resolution of most race 
discrimination cases. In the voting area particularly, the under-
lying assumption that blacks and whites votes as separate blocs is 
-- in my opinion fallacious and unsupported by the most relevant 
empiric data. See, e.g., petitioners' brief, p. 29-33. Moreover, 
I agree with petitioners that blacks also can be -- and in many 
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instances have been -- effectively represented by whites and 
vice versa. These generalizations are supported by my own ex-
perience and participation in campaigns in Richmond. There is 
evidence (some of which I have personally seen) that black 
citizens tend to vote more as a "bloc" than do white citizens, 
but this does not mean that if a white is elected to office --
despite the bloc voting against him -- he will ignore or 
fail to represent the black constituents. One usually may safely 
count on a politician to make conscious appeals to --certainly 
not to ignore -- any major, identifiable group of voters among 
his constituen9y. A well organized minority often is far more 
influential in the political process than is the unorganized, 
disparate, and often relatively disinterested white majority. 
More fundamentally, in the long view our democratic 
processes will be strengthened by bringing the races together, 
not by creating and perpetuating a consciousness of continuing 
apartheid. 
Despite these generalized (and perhaps irrelevant) ob-
servations, I would like for the clerk assigned to this case to 
identify more precisely than I have the most relevant Supreme 
Court authorities, and indicate to me the directions in which 
these authorities point. There is, I believe, no controlling 
decision but perhaps the guiding principles can be distilled from 
these precedents. 
-• BENCH MEMO 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
o .. +..~ .,., 1'17b 
t jz 1 I ; 
From: Dave Martin 
No. 75-104, United Jewish Organizations of 
Williamsburgh, Inc., et al. v. Carey, et al. 
I began my consideration of this case in much the 
same frame of mind that I detect in your "aid tcjnemory" 
memorandum. I think quotas are generally wrong, even if 
they are ostensibly benigft. Moreover, to talk about any 
reapportionment plan (I am thinking in particular here of 
the 1972 plan) as diluting a racial group's voting( strength 
or effectiveness comes very close to assuming, and perhaps 
implicitly encouraging, racial blo~ voting. Naturally 
there is some reality to bloc voting, but it is wron~ 
to build public policy on the assumption that i4will 
continue and even become more entrenched. See Wrisht 
v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 66 (Douglas, J., dissenting); 
cf. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. ~ 399, 402 (invalidating 
Louisiana's requirement that a candidate's race be printed 
on the ballot next to his or her name). 
I have concluded, however, that reversal here would 
be a mistake. New York was clearly conscious of race in 
drawing the 1974 lines, but it is unrealistic ~ to 
think that such consciousness could ._ have been com-
pletely purged. Moreover, although the legislature 
was conscious of race, there is really no claim that it 
exercised its consciousness in an invidious attempt to 
disadvantage whites. The purpose was not to harm whites. 
Nor was the effect to harm whites, if we focus--as we 
should--on the reapportionment plan as a whole and not 
jut on the districts where New York admittedly labored 
to create a 35% white population. 
-2-
In addition, I do not think the issues have come 
to us framed in the most relevant form. The parties and 
CA2 assumed that a Swann/Milliken analysis governs. I 
tend to think that the more traditional reapportionment 
cases, particularly Whitcomb v. Chavis, provide the relevant 
standards. 
I conclude that xka CA2 should be affirmed, or 
perhaps that the xxixa writ xk should be dismissed as 
improvidently granted. I do not think this is the kind 
of quota case the Court thought it was when it granted 
review. 
Before I focus specifically on the three claims 
petitioner has presented, it is appropriate to review 
the 
New York was acting in response to the AG's 
objection to its 1972 a~~xs apportionment. Assuming 
for the moment that that objection amounted to a 
finding of improper racial gerrymandering, one might 
well argue that the way to correct the problem is simply 
to draw the lines with an eye that is color-blind. In 
fact, petitioners suggest exactly this, that the cure 
"is fair non-racial reapportionment--not districting 
designed to maximize the voting power of blacks, Puerco 
Ricans, or any other minority." 
3 
~ realistically 
If I thought color-blind districtingA~xxsi~x 
possible, then I might well join petitioners in striking 
down the 1974 plan on the broadest ground they xsggexxx 
urge. But I do not think that color-blindness is a 
realistic expectation in aixxxi£xxRgx the reapportionment 
~~~s re.~ 
A from, say, 
drawing is taken over by •judges--or even then, unless 
the judge appoints a special master from ssxxsfxx a 
distant city who knows nothing of the local community and 
is denied aR~ access t~nformation ~p showing 
gross population figures. 
Reapportionment is undeniably a political process. 
~ 
There are • nearl~infinite number of ways to draw up 
districts with equal popu~ion. Each variatio~ill have 
ixxx8Kftxae different political, racia~, and ethnic 
implications. Legisla~ are bound to know something 
--~ \r ~\v jo\,--
about the communities affected~ and they are bound to 
have a t least a rough awareness of those political, 
""" 
racial, and ethnic implications before any plan is 
enacted. 
In Gaffney v. Cummings, k93 412 U.S. 735, the 
Court had to face a contention that distticts~hould 
4 
be drawn with an eye that is "party-blind." The context 
is a bit different from the one we have here, but I 
think the Court's recognition of the realities applies 
~ C4"Ascioi/S'-'&v 4)r v'-a.. 'l M irs"'-£ . 
We are quite unconvinced that the reapportionment 
plan offered by the three-member Board violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment because it attempted to reflect 
the relative strength of the parties in locating and de-
fining election districts. It would be idle, we think, to 
contend that any political consideration taken into ac-
count in fashioning a reapportionment plan is sufficient 
to invalidate it. Our cases indicate quite the contrary. 
See White v. Regester, supra; Burns v. Richardson, 
supra; Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra; Abate v. Mundt, 
supra. The very essence of districting is to produce a.' 
different-a more "politically fair"- result than would be 
reached with elections at large, in which the winning 
party would take lOOo/o of the legislative seats. Politics __ 
and political considerations are inseparable from district-
ing and apportionment. The political profile of a State, 
its party registration, and voting records are available 
precinct by precinct, ward by ward. These subdivisions 
may not be identical with census tracts, but, when over-
laid on a census map, it requires no special genius to rec-
ognize the political consequences of drawing a district 
line along one street rather than another. It is not only 
obvious, but absolutely unavoidable, that the location 
and shape of districts may well determine the political 
complexion of the area. District lines are rarely neutral 
phenomena. They can well determine what district will 
be predominantly Democratic or predominantly Repub-
lican, or make a close race likely. Redistricting may pit 
incumbents against one another or make very difficult 
the election of the most experienced legislator. The · 
reality is that districting inevitably has and is intended_ 
to have substantial political consequences. 
It may be suggested that those who redistrict and re: 
apportion should work with census, not political, data 
and achieve population equality without regard for 
political impact. But this politically mindless approach 
may produce, whether intended or not, the most grossly 
gerrymandered results; and, in any event, it is most 
unlikely that the political impact of such a plan would 
remain undiscovered by the time it was proposed or 
----adopted, in which event the results would be both known 
and, if not changed. intended. 
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If it is unrealistic to expect reapportionment --
to proceed without awareness of racial consequences, 
then it is surely wrong to strike down a plan that 
marked by such awareness--even though, admittedly 
resulted from a processAKR£X£X8H£RX~SRK~i~HKRHKKXNRK j 
, that awareness here was robably far more explicit 
RXBiXX~XHXHX~ £XXXHX~ii~iXXXRRRXX H~XXXXHKHR ~XX 
than is common. Ob~viously this does not mean that 
v 
~ abandon~ all review of reapportionment plans, but 
it counsels x~me caution and restraint in reviewing 
xkax~iaRK equal-population plans when they are 
challenged as unconstitutional under the Fourteenth 
or Fifteenth Amendment. 
The cases support this view. It requires quite 
-----------------------a ~ trong showiqg to have a plan invalidated (a~ng 
reasonably equal ~O£ulati6n among districts) by a 
~
court on constitutional grounds. (Cases under §5 
of the Voting Rights Act are a different matter.) 
I set out the most important cases below. The best 
general discussion I have found is Justice Stevens' 
-.---"_..;,. 
dissent in Cousins v. City Council, 466 F.2d 839, 847 
... 
(CA7 1972). It is 14 pages long, but it is well worth 
reading. 
The first significant case involved an outrageous 
redrawing of municipal boundaries. Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339. ----------------------------------------~~~ 
~xaxkaaxaaaRxaxaaaaxaxw The case arose on the pleadings , 
and the court held that the plaintiff had alleged enough 
to get to trial. There has been ongoing debate ~ about 
whether Gomillion announced a standard looking to 
~islative purpose or t~essary effect--but the -
results there were so extreme xkax (all but four 
blacks were districted out of Tuskegee's city limits; 
all whites remained~inside) that it did not make much 
difference. The standard announced was that .. action 
of this sort is invalid if it "fences out" particular 
groups. 
That standard, however, is not very helpful for 
the usual legislative districting case. First, Gomillion 
was an extreme case. The result was so blatantly segre-
gative that it fairly cried out for invalidation. More 
importantly, Gomillion involved a city's boundaries, 
not legislative districting. Those outside the boundaries 
had no vote whatever on city affairs. For state legis-
lative apportionment, RHMaxax by contrast, a group 
fenced out of one district is simply fenced into another. 
7 
a.!:s LI±t E s iza!'§ly • a 
A 
3 
Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, presented 
a like question in the legislative setting. RlaiRxiffxsx 
~~~tTJ 
«~HRset sa~e1 ~Athe Congressional districts on Manhattan. 
Plaintiff's counsel argued that all the Court had to 
determine was whether the lines were drawn with racial 
considerations in mind and whether the effect was to 
l.u. ~) 
create racially segregated districts. If so~the lines 
were unConstitutional. The facts aff~xaea tended to show 
that the lines were thus drawn. But the «~HXkxxeaaxake 
xesaixsx~fxaixi three-judge DC divided confusingly. Th~ 
Court read the rhree opinions as meaning that the 
DC did not find that the New York legislature "was either 
motivated by racial considerations or in fact drew the 
~ Y+ 0.~ ~ ~·~~. 
districts on racial lines." ~· at 56. A. Later it phrased 
the test a bit more narrowly: did the lines amount to 
a "contrivance to segregate"? Id. at 57. Justices 
Douglas and Goldberg dissented, saying the lines could 
only be explained in racial terms. Justice Douglas 
eloquently marshaled the arguments against racial line-
drawing. Id. at 66~~ri~ht predated Reynolds v. Sims, -
377 u.s. 533 . .,>--.-------------?--::::: 
8 
It '' Once one person, one vote was established, the Court 
each 
might conceivably have stopped there. As long as all 
carrieg 
vote"" ... II · •·--~numerically equal ~SMHX force, 
:s 
and as long as the iituation,.._Anot as outrageous 
as Gomillion, ix one could make a strong claim that the 
RaHXK court's role is at an end. 
~~~(Jw.~ 
The most any..-~ould 
do would be to fiddle with district lines with 
arguable negative impact on this group or that--but the 
negative impacts would be so arguable that there would 
be no gall cause for court intervention. Cf. Wright -
the black 
v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. at 58 (noting that/plaintiffs 
wanted more even dispersal of minority votes among 
d~ tricts, whereas intervenors--Adam Ciayton Powell and 
others--supported concentration).* (Sa 'iR •iii!'[doo•!Ei8'8 
-'= .... t\ 6£ 6 GE1fll:~ fJ8U81! C U!i88P-;V" 
Whatever the merit of that position, it did not 
catch on. The Court continued to hold out the prospect 
of xexiRN invalidation where a plan wax had the effect 
~ t,flftfi'"" 
of 'diluting'' the voting power of given graps .A -e usually 
arose in cases attacking multi-member districts. Fortson 
v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, and Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 
73, keiaxxkaxxaxxxaxexwaxxRaxxxa~Hixea approved multi-
member districts in the xxaxaxaRR Georgia and Hawaii 
plans, but they indicated that ~laRKXWaHlBXBHXXRX such 
9 
districts would be invalidated if they were employed 
"to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial 
or political elements of the voting population." 
Fortson, 379 U.S., at 439; Burns, 384 U.S., at 88. 
analytical 
There were a lot of/problems «~R«&XRiRgxass~xi~s 
aaaxgefiRiki~RK buried in that deceptively simpl~ 
formulation. They all came home to roost in Whitcomb 
"£~1'[;;. ... 
v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 1~ ~ADC had carefully analyzed 
voting a~ patterns and housing patterns and concluded 
that the multimember districts in Marion County, Indiana 
did have the proscribed effect. [This case hits close I 
Indianapolis 
to home. I grew up in MaxiSRX~SHRk~/and my father was 
until 1962. 
a legislator from Marion County/] This Court reversed. 
It became clear that the Fortson/Burns doctrineJksxaexea 
~~~.,..~) 
ie£xxxkexassxxs~eRxksxaxfiR«iRg~bordered on saying that 
a x•m r m»& group's voting power was cancelled or minimized 
if its candidate lost. 
The Court elaborated on the/Ytest and narrowed 
ftsubstantially. First it put to one side cases where 
it was ~x~&Rxkkakx shown that multimember districts 
"were conceived or operated as purposeful devices to 
further racial or economic discrimination." Id. at 149. -
~H Absent such a showing, plaintiffs would hwe to prove 




~s is ~ 
The the crucial passageJ: ~ ~: 
Nor docs the fact that the number of ghetto residents 
who were legislators was not in proportion to ghetto pop-
ulation satisfactorily prove invidious discrimination 
absent evidence and findings that ghetto residents had_ 
less opportunity than did other Marion County residents 
to participate in the political processes and to elect legis-
lators of their choice. We have discovered nothing in 
the record or in the court's findings indicating that poor 
Negroes were f!Ot allowed to register or vote, to choose 
the political party they desired to support, to participate 
inTts affairs or to be equally represented on those occa-
sions when legislative candidates were chosen. Nor did 
the evidence purport to show or the court hnd that 
inhabitants of the ghetto were regularly excluded from 
the slates of both major parties, thus deriying them the 
chance of occupying legislative seats . .,_, 
:JJ .. ~ 1119. -~ ( f;~ 
~ 
~The Court continued, disowning some of the possible 
implications of the earlier cases: 
lt this IS the proper view of this case, the failure of the 
ghetto to have legislative scats in proportion to its pop-
ul tion emerges more as a functwn of losing elections 
t~n o uilt-in 1as against poor Negroes. T e voting 
power of ghetto residents may h ave been "cancelled out" 
as the District Court held, but this seems a mere 
euphemism for political defeat at the polls. 
On the record before us plaintiffs' position comes to 
this: that although they have equal _ opportunity to _par-
ticipate in and influence the selection of candidates and 
leg!slfLtors, and although the ghetto votes predominantly 
Democratic and that party slates candidates satisfactory 
to the ghetto, invidious discrimination nevertheless re-
sults when the ghetto, along with all other Democrats, 
suffers the disaster of losing too many elections. But 
typical American legislative elections are district-oriented, 
head-on races between candidates of two or more parties. 
As our system has it, one candidate wins, the others 
lose. Arguably the losing candidates' supporters are ~ 
without representation since the men they voted for have 
been defeated; arguably they have been denied equal 
protection of the laws since they have no legislative voice 
of their own. This is true of both single-member and 
multi-member districts. But we have not yet deemed it 
a denial of equal protection to deny legislative seats to 
losing candidates, even in those so-called "safe" districts 
where the same party wins year after year. 
ry 
. The mere fact 
that one interest group or another concerned wit~ the 
outcome of Marion County elections has found Itself 
outvoted and without legislative sea~s o_f its own p~o­
vides no basis for invoking co~1stltutwnal_ remedies 
where, as here, there is no indicatiOn that this se ~~t 
of the population is being denied access to the poht~-
~~ 
Id!l.,d ISL/ -; ... -'~'--1$1, 
/ 
s~-.:,CL~ 
'.Mr sa 7 ,Jssues arose in White/. Regester, 412 
7 
that multimember districts are not per se invalid, but 
that \lA~/ 
1the Court~ entertained claims that such districts 
were used invidiously to cancel out or minimize the 
voting strength of racial groups. It restated the tests: 
~ 
' To sustam 
such claims, it is not enough that the racial group al-
legemy 01scnminated against has not had legislative seats 
in proportion to its voting potential. The plaintiffs' b~r­
den is to produce evidence to support findmgs that the 
·Poiitical processes leading to nomination and election 
were not equally open to participation by the group in 
question==-that its members had less opportunity than 
did other residents in the district to participate in the 
political processes and to elect legislators of their choice. 
Id. at 765-66. ---
For constitutional cases, these remain the tests. 
Indeed, where the claim is that single-member districts 
are invalid, the tests must be, if anyth~ng, more stringen5 
~~ 
~ ~Ain such cases the reviewing court has no alternative 
plan to offerlthat is a as easily managed as one sj._,,, 




In the case before us, I do not see any 
possibility that petitioners can prevail under such 
a test. It is not conceivable that it could be proved 
..., 't 
that white voters have had less opportunity than others 
to participate in the political processes and to elect 
legislators of their choice. (I am assuming here that 
petitioners' only relevant claim is as white voters, not 
as Hasidim. ~XE They seem to have abandoned the claim 
based on standing as Hasidim, and irleeed they would have 
had a hard time sustaining it since what they want is 
• color-blind and "ethnic-blind" districting.)1l---+-H--
Petitioners' only hope under Chavis xis to - ~ 
br_i _n_g_ t_h_e_ c_a_s_e_ u_n_d_e_r_ t_h_e_ f_i _r _s_t _b_r_a_n_ch of{ @.avis ' tes t.;:r' 
, t::fie test:: f'l:le to one siae in that:: eas::z That is, they 
would have to show that the districts here "were conceivecA 
or operated a~urposeful devices to further racial or 
economic discrimination." 403 U.S., at 149. They have 
succeeded, I think, in proving that the districts were 




but they have not shown that/tk.e~ were meant "to 
further racial or economd:c discrimination." There was 
no showing that the legislators wanted to harm whites, 
part of 
if that is/what is meant by the test. But more i~axkaREi~ 
importantly, the Kings County redistricting, viewed as 
INMte.. ~ e.~Pc.c.t ~~o(' -ft:, ~-k... \(Okfr. 
a whole) cannot be said to kerm wltits@S• Even if one 
for the moment racial "! k~;~e.. ~ -.-...br~) 
. :J 
assumes/bloc voting (an assumption .. whic~I ' 1 )9 
whites have x~lia majorities in 68-70% of the districts 
even though they K~XR~k comprise only about 65% oLthe 
31 
Kings County population. See CA2's opinion at n. 21, 





e pattern of 
formed the basis 
The 1974 
15 
The only way to think that there has been a harmful 
~t on white ~ers is to focus attention only 
on those whites who now find themselves in the districts 
deliberately engineered to have 65%-r:onwhites. That 
J.{ "' is too narrow a focus. The whole county should be 
considered. In that light, I do not think one can say 
amounted to a "purposeful device to fut:ther racia 
that the districting fHXKRRXX~fHXKHXRX~fHXKR&Xfeatxxa~iai 
•.. discrimination" against whites. 
With this background in mind, let me turn to 
the three specific questions raised by petitioners. 
If I am right that Chavis sets the standards here, then 
the questions (as well as the lower court opinion) are 
a bit off the 
~ r+'.q ~ -tL.. (~ ~ 
mark. ~"-act as though t' 1 al 
Swann/ Milliken questions are the crucial ones--as 
though race is a permissible ~xixexi~R consideration 
only when used in a aarefully circumscribed way to 
remedy a past wrong clearly established. That test 
..,..,..A.., l...t.. it 
~~perfectly sound for most contexts, but, fo]the 
reasons outlined above--especially the impossibility 
of eradicating race consciousness from the districitng 
process--it will not work in the reapportionment area. 
The Court should stick with Chavis. 
16 
As i!is 
the terms in which it presents itself, I 
still would hold for respondents. 
petitioner's arguments 
l..Ee. s-z J 
seriatim, as they are set forth at ~~g~xi~f your 
~. 
aid- to-memory/\ ec l!'wiil'' aptat.E:btgx~~.E::k.E:~~x~x 
to 
ng 
o race not 
1. Petitioners argue that there is never any 
justification for race-consciousness in the electoral 
process. I have argued above that it is largely unavoid-
able, seYimsggzzlliiMw:tlftlift:H!!IItirlK551RI unless the lines are 
drawn by friili:tiaalxxna judges or special masters. The 
more important question is whether such oonsciousness 
r ~-------------------~----
is invidious, and I think it is the #x~kaxix g~iiiaR 
tv-<> re. ~-t--{'; ~ 
Chavis test (or some~variant adjusted to apply to a plan 
17 
that already provides for simgle-member districts) which 
forms the standard for judging invidiousness~ There 
was no invidious race-consciousness here. 
Moreover, I think the Court should scrutinize 
very carefully the basic premise upon which petitillners 
build their entire case, even though it has never been 
squarely challenged by any of the other parties. The 
petitioners argue that this case is different from 
all others ever to come before the Court in that this 
is "the first case in which there is absolutely no 
factual dispute as to the legislature's dominant purpose 
or motive." I simply cannot agree. 
aimBKXXHRxixei~x~Rxxkexxexxim~RJX~f It is clear that 
the New York legislature was not ~-.... ·?ij~acting of its 
"I-t WtlS 
own free will in drawing the 1974 lines. A 'FAsa¥ uere 
acting to oveccome the AG's objections to the 1972 lines. 
MoreoverJthe legislative reports indicate that the 
legislature did not agree with the AG that the 1972 lines 
had a proscribed effect. But petitioners rely on the 
testimony of one individual and one individual alone 
as the basis for their assertion that this case "involves 
a blatant instance of an overriding racial quota." Reply 
18 
Brief at 7. The individual is Richard Scolaro, executive 
director of the legislative committee on reapportionment. 
He is apparently not a legislator. He did testify that 
the "sole reason" why he ran a district line through 
the Hasidic community was his understanding that the AG --
wanted a given number of 65% nonwhite districts. 
This Court, however, should not let one staff .. 
member's testimony determine conclusively the intent -
of the entire legislature of the sovereign state of 
New York. 
Inquirees into congressional motives or 
purposes are a hazardous matter. . •• 
What motivates one legislator ~x to make 
a speech about a statute is not necessarily 
what motivates scores of others to enact it, 
and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to 
eschew guesswork.,. 
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-384. 
See also Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-225. 
The unique setting of this case, wheee New York is 
fOSI+ltMJ 
basically sympathetic to petitioners"~srr4 has meant 
.3'o~ ~.Jos~ 
that New York has not~raised anyA?bjection to the Gout's 
presuming intent from isolated remarks by staff members. 
presumed 
But this does not make a/finding of legislative intent 
any the less a monumental undertaking for this Court. 
We~es • s ~en though Scolaro may have been xkux motivated 
solely by the AG's ostensible 65% requirement, I cannot 
believe that all the ~egislator~ who voted for the 
all 
plan likewise abandonedxaR~/other considerations 
when they cast their votes. Surely they reviewed the 
lines to make sure that they did not trench too deeply 
on other interests the legislature wanted to serve. 
And since the 1974 lines rs? 71 Y are not too terribly 
different generally from the 1972 lines, I should think 
that whatever motives prompted adoption of the 1972 
lines also went into approval of the 1974 lines. In 
other words, it is xxgx~x an oversimplification, even 
in the unusual circumstances of this case, to say that 
a 65% quota was the legislature's gnly motive in 
adopting the 1974 plan. 
2. Petitioners argue that even if race conscious-
ness is sometimes permissible, it must be done only 
upon a solid administrative or judicial finding of a 
past wrong. They claim that the jH AG's objection 
cannot serve as such a finding, because kaxxxaxaax~Rl~ 
~ lt..."f+e~r ~\M ~' b~J·ec:..-H~ I4'4S so ~l..tl \\r.-&-te{. :r"' ;+ 
...,.~; use sue'R a Hlila s l!a• •• aafiii, j'ne AG pointed x~xxka 
whether the plan 
the 
has axaix£ximiaax~x~Afurpose or effect of abridging 
the right to vote because of race or color. Then he 
stated: "we have concluded that the proscribed effect 
may exist in parts of the plans in Kings and New york 
counties~ (emphasis added). 
That is not a very ringing declaration of a 
past wrong. But in context I think it has k to be 
taken as an administrative finding that calls for 
remedial action. I would not tax the AG too heavily 
for his namby-pamby wording. After Georgia v. United 
states, 411 U.S~526, this is all he has to say in -
order to explain his objection. ~i ift a delieal!eq 
~o:s:ttieii; tiPII' '(I %1e!'e fzzltls posttiort, I tge n"'ii'6 
-l, _ lila u .. ... '* - =· -il There is no need to call New 
;" efC~f, 
York official~Aa bunch of 




racists, even i~~~s~cm;._ .• ?_.l_.]~i•rL 
:.-:~~~lit~t the 
1972 plan I@Al~ was horribly discriminatory in purpose 
and effect. He has to deal with the officials in other 
contexts, so he has every incentive to use the mildest 
language possible. 
22 
his determination is 
final Rights Act Baxi~all~ 
provides for"review"(really a de novo action concerning 
the same questions) only in the district court for the 
District of C~lumbia. Only the state can invoke that 
review, and it chose not ~o do so. That iX&XXftH&8RX 
decision was ostensibly prompted more by time pressures 
than by acquiescence in the AG's finding (although here 
too there is room for skepticism as to the real motiva-
tion ) does not make the AG's objection any the less final. 
Even if the odds are low that the AG's action would have 
been sustained upon a proper challenge--and I do not 
concede thatJl -the fact remains that it was not challenged. 
We must, I think, treat it as a fully valid finding -..... -
of racial dis crimination. 
Petitioners have largely forsworn their claim that 
the present suit is an appropriate forum for~eviewing 
the AG's decision, but their reply brief at 5 n.l demonstrates 
that they are not quite giving up. To the extent that 
this remains a live issue, the Court should affirm the 
DC's and c*'s judgment dismissing the suit against the 
AG, and make clear that this case is not appropriate 
for reviewing the AG's objection or the standards he 
employed. The sole question here, unless this Court's 
Voting Rights Act cases are to be drastically reconsidered, 
is whether the 1974 lines violate the constitutional 
rights of white voters .X If tr plit t tz foi~ '2. (~\.1\S 
relevant (and my Chavis analysis suggests it really is 
not), then we do have~a solid, final, cureently nonrevi~-
able administrative finding of a constitutional wrong ·- -
to be corrected. 
3. Petit.oners' narrowest argument, tracking 
Judge Frankel, is that even if there was a finding of 
~rong, nothing in the finding justifies the exxxaaKHiRg~ 
extraordinary remedy of a rigid 65% nonwhite quot •• 
Wt. ~ l.c-of.c ~ ~ ~ 
Again I think the focus is too narrow. 
~~~s .. 
~applied only to ~Senate districts and two assembly 
districts. 9xkexx Other districts varied axamaxi~all¥ 
in percentages. This is not a school case, and again 
t ;$ ~+ ~~--I .de ftee ehiiK wann/Milliken treatment ,_e:tJ to evel!y ,~-~ ....,;t ~ fD every ~I ,~ e.vu1 ;l.'.rfric;f lik.l... 
• asp as b a£ tho pI ah 19 app1 OfJPikatg. In the reapportionment 
context>the kind of numbers game played here, given 
the AG's unchallenged objection, was not unacceptable. 
• 
... 
~.Justice Harlan wrote a x~ea separate opinion 
'"'" ~'1. I. 
H8kiHgxxkaxA He noted thepl · hR&t -ilfti:Be 11 'evident 
malaise among the members of the Court' with prior 
• 
decisions in the fieMd of voter qualifiCations and 
'(o 3 v. S..., o.Jt I &r:" 
reapportionment. 11 M 7 5 7 s "-,A He went on: 
The reapportionment • opinions of this court 
provide little help. They speak in conclusory 
terms of 'debasement' or 'dilution' of the 'voting 
power' or 'representation' of citizens without ex-
planation of what these concepts are. • .. 
A coherent and ~listie notion of what is 
meant by 'voting power' might have restrained 
some of the extreme lengths to which this Court 
has gone in pursuit of the will-o'-the-wisp 
of 'one man, one vote.' 
He hit the heart of the problem. But unfortunately he 
did not go on to axxi£Hia.Kexax£ixxsw suggest what a 
coherent concept of voting power would be. We Hre still 
caught in the problem. 
f2 
[-f'o~~ 1 1 cnd~]_ 
I think the Court made a mistake iR years ago 
applying ~ 
in xxaR.s:iaxiRg the "dilution" conceptjfx8mxxkexRx to 
the voting power of groups within districts of equal 
population. Dilution is a fairty clear concept when 
applied to individuals in districts of markedly differant 
i' A-v~fot/.e! 
population, for there _,a clear base-line referen7\ 
;t-
one person, one vote. When _.~is applied to groups, ~ 
the concept becomes hopelessly fuzzy. There is no 
clear baseline. Any number of configurations of 
\district lines coul~ be drawn, with different implications 
for group "effectiveness." Does concentration enhance 
effectiveness? Or are certain kinds~f diffusion, wheeeby 
the group becomes the swing vote, the best? Moreover, 
although nobody wants any group to be totally without 
effectiveness, it is not clea~ust what level of effective-
ness constitutes anyone's due. 
In an attempt to give the dilution concept some 
clear content (i.e., .K8xaefiRexaiiuxeax diluted in 
comparison to what?), some courts have come close to 
saying either that black voting power must be maximized, 
or that some kind of proportional representation must 
be guaranteed: blacks are to have a clear majority in 
a percentage of districts equivalent to their population 
percentage. If one enters the'Uilution" quagmire, then 
perhaps such standards affortl the only solid ground--the 
only baseline--available. But they require one to assume 
that race (or race-related issues) will always be the 
determinative factor when individuals decide for whom 
to vote--a grotesque assumption. Perhaps some day this 
Court should reconsider ,. 
.. -f3 
the application of the dilution concept to groups affected 
~~ s~ ~ff'(i~6"\ 
by reapportionment. Jltl&AVD uld confine constitutional 
policing to cases as extreme as Gomillion,~peraaps 
retaining review of multimember districts (a narrowly 
circumscribed phenomenon) under the Chavis standards. 
And of course, reasonable population equivalency should 
See note 3 infra. 
2. In this respect, the plan co~ conceivably 
be sustained under the following language from Gaffney: 
' 
But neither we nor the district courts have a constitu-
tional warrant to invalidate a state plan, otherwise within 
' tolerable population limits, because it undertakes, not to 
minimize or eliminate the political strength of any group 
, or party, bu,t to recognize it and, through districting, pro-
vide a rough sort of proportional representation in the 
I --
legislative halls of the State. 
Hswexex~ I would not, however, rely on this notion in 
owr ,-~.e~ Fair, 
...... ,\context. A ('roportional representation of par'ties 
is~ a mild proposition; of races, muc~ore problematic. 
q 
f4 
3. The 1972 district lines did at least raise 
some substantial question about the legislative 
motivation. See the map in the NAACP brief, p. 23. 
When the AG is working with a concept as amorphous 
as "dilution of group voting power," it seems quite 
possible that burden of proof will make a big difference. 
That is, in constitutional cases where the burden is 
on the plaintiffs, "fishy" configurations like the 
1972 lines will usually be sustained. Under the Voting 
it is conceivable that 
Rights Act, with the burden on the state,/"fishy" 
configurations will often fail, even if the substantive 
standard remains the same. 
I think, parenthetically, that it would have 
better if reapportionment had never been held to 
the practices or procedures required to be 
submitted for review under §5 of the Voting Rights Act. 
L :s~ u~ ~4-.,~J 
This Court)• een~tl!MiH~ tsb:g ~et in Allen v. Board of 
It ~~~~-to -+..A .sk:t-1-~ 
:\'h- .. ~ of.o .., ~ vo of.i 
arguable iRxex~xexaxiaR reading of the legislative 
history. At the cited page, the Court pulled in the 
Reynolds v. Sims "dilution" language and applied xi it 
to group voting power, without any recognition of the 
analytical difficulties involved. Mr. Justice 
~'S se.J, '(t • 
Harlan, t\ 
f5 
• '"' ~ -t1eA1, 
~~~Y:~ii'~§~·,~~. had the better of the argument\~in showing 
that Congress did not intend the 1965 Act to apply 
to reapportionment or changes from _... district to 
at-large voting. But he went unheeded. 
xfxxkixxiRXHX~XHkaxi~RXiKXX~XBHXXHX It is 
probably too late to turn around that act of iHxex~xeaxxio 
statutory construction. For one thing, Congress has 
reenacted the Act twice since Allen, fully embracing 
the implications of Allen. Moreover, subsequent cases 
in this Court a££H~xea entrenched the interpretation 
even more deeply. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 
(annexations); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 
(reapportionment). And even the cases from the last 
decidedly 
two terms are still/speaking the language of .. "dilution" 
and "effectiveness" of a group's voting power. Cit¥ 
of Kichmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358; B~ 
v. United States, No. 73-1869 (March 30, 1976). 
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No. 75-104 
Vnited Jewish Organizations 
of Williamsburgh, Inc., 
t:U~ 
J~ 
et p.-1., Petitioners, 
v. 
Hugh L. Carey et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit. 
[November -, 1976] 
MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits a state or 
politic~J subdivision subject to § 4 of the Ac,t from imple-
mentin~ a l~gishttive reapportionment unless it h~ obtained 
··a declaratory judgmept from the District Court for the Dis-
!trict of Columbia, or a ruling from ·the Attorney General ~ "': 1C •~ 
of the Upited States, that the reapportionment "does not t::A-.t:i:,J A• ...( 
'have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying l'1t, 
'Or abridgipg the right to vote on .account of race or oolor ...• " 1 -..:4 , ' ~--··~4( 1 ~ection 5 of the Voting Rights Act, ~2 U. S. C. § 1973c, provides in !' 
·pertment part: ~--C.~I ~ 
1'Whenever .•. a State or political subdivision with respect to which J . 
'the prohibitions set forth in sectjon 1973b (a) ,of this title based upon ,.,.. 4.,C ~ 
determinations made under the second sentence 'Of section 197ab (b) of ~ • 
thi~ title are in e~~ct shall e~act or ~eek to adminis~er any voting qual!fi- -, "-I'~ , 
catlon or prereqmstte 10 votmg, or standard, practice, or procedure w1th 
respect to vot$g different from that in force or effect on November 1, 
1008, ... such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia for a. declaratory 
judgment that such qualification , prerequisite, standard, pract.ice, or pro~ 
cedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying 
or abridginf!l the right to vote on 1\Ccount of race or color, and unless and 
until the cQurt enters sue}} judgment no person sha.ll be denied the right 




z, UNITED JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS v. CAREY 
. The question presented is whether, in the circumstances of 
this case, the use of racial criteria by the State of New York 
in its attempt to comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights 
'Act and to secure the approval of the Attorney General 
violated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. 
I 
Kings County, N. Y., together with New York (Man-
hattan) and Bronx Counties, became subject to §§ 4 and 5 
of the Act, by virtue of a determination by the Attorney 
General that a literacy test was used in these three counties 
as of November 1, 1968, and a determination by the Director 
of the Census that fewer than 50% of the voting-age residents 
of these three counties voted in the presidential election of 
1968.2 Litigation to secure exemption from the Act was 
unsuccessfuV and it became necessary for New York to 
ard, practice, or procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, 
standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without. such proceeding 
if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has 
been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of 
such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney 
General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such 
submission, except that neither the Attorney General's failure to object 
nor a declaratory judgment entered under this section shall bar a subse-
quent action to enjoin enforcement of such qua.Ji.fication, prerequisite, 
standard, practice, or procedure. Any act-ion under this section shall be 
heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with 
the provisions of section 2284 of Title 28 and any appeal shftll lie to 
the Supreme Court." 
A legislative reapportionment is a "standard, practice, or procedure with 
respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 
1968," within the meanh1g of § 5. Beer v. United States, 44 U. S. L. W. 
4435, 4436 (1976); Georgia v. United States, 411 U . S. 526 (1973) ; 
Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 569 (1969) . 
~See 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (b) . 
3 The State of New York brought an action to obtain a statutory 
exemption for the three counties under § 4 (a) of the Act, seekmg a 
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secure the approval of the Attorney General or of the United 
S'tates District Court for the District of Columbia for its 
1972 reapportionment statute insofar as that statute con-
cerned Kings, New York, and Bronx Counties. On Janu-
ary 31, 1974, the provisions of the statute districting these 
counties for congressional, state senate, and state assembly 
seats were submitted to the Attorney General. In accord-
ance with the regulations governing his § 5 review, the At-
torney General considered submissions from interested parties 
criticizing and defending the plan.• Those submissions in-
cluded assertions that voting in these counties was racially 
10 years preceding the filing of the suit "for the purpo::;e or with the 
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or 
color." 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a). After several years of litigation, the 
District Court for the District of Columbia denied the exemption and 
ordered the State to comply with the filing requirements of § 5. This 
Court summarily affirmed. New York on Behalf of New York Co·unty v. 
United States, 419 U.S. 888 (1974). See 510 F. 2d, at 516. 
4 Section 51.19, 28 C. F. R. provides: 
"Section 5, in providing for submission to the AttornPy General as a.n 
alternative to seeking a declaratory judgment from the U. S. District. 
Court for the District of Columbia, imposes on the Attorney General 
what is essentially a judiCial function. Therefore, the burden of proof on 
the submitting authority is the same in submitting changes to the Attor-
ney General as it. would be in submitting changes to the District Court 
for the District of Columbia, The Attorney General shall base his decision 
on a review of material presented by the submitting authority, relevant 
information providffi by individuals or groups, and the results of any 
investigation conducted by the Department of Justice. If the Attorney 
General is satisfied that the submitted change does not have a racially 
discriminatory purpose ot· effect, he will not object to the change and will 
so notify the .submitting authority. If the At.torney General determines 
th.at the submitted changE' has a racially discrimina.tory purpose or effect. 
he will enter an objectiOn and will so notify the submitting authority . 
If the evidence as to the purpose or effect of the change is conflicting, 
and the Attorney GE-neral is unable to re:solve the conflict. within the 
60-day period, he iihall , consistent with the abovt>-describt>d burdt>n of 
proof applicable in the District Court, entPr an objection and so notify 
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polarized and that the district lines had been created with 
the purpose or effect of diluting the voting strength of 
nonwhites (blacks and Puerto Ricans) ;5 On April 1. 1974, 
the Attorney General concluded that, as to certain districts 
in Kings County covering the Bedford-Stuyvesant area of 
Brooklyn, the State had not met the burden placed on it 
by § 5 and the regulations thereunder to demonstrate that 
the redistricting had neither the purpose nor the effect of 
abridging the right to vote by reason of race or color.6 
Under § 5, the State could have challenged the Attorney 
General's objections to the redistricting plan by filing a 
5 The record in this Court contains only part of the materials submittro 
to and considered by the Attorney General in his review of the 1972 plan . 
Included in the present. record are a memorandum submitted on behalf 
of the NAACP and letters from sPveral prominent black and Puerto 
Rican elected officials, all opposing the plan. Not included in the record 
are materiaJs defending the plan submitted by the reapportionment com-
mittee of the New York legislature, the state attornpy genPral, and sev-
eral state legislators. Brief for the United States, at 8, and n. 9. 
The NAACP, the Attorney GPneral, and the court bPlow classified 
Puerto Ricans in New York together with blacks as a minority group 
entitled to the protections of the Voting Rights Act. Hereinafter WE' 
use the term "nonwhite" to refer to blacks and Puerto Ricans , although 
small numbers of other nonwhite groups (such as orientals) are also 
included in the nonwhite population statistics. 
u The basis for the Attorney General's conclusion that. "the proscribed 
effect may exist" as to certain state assembly and senate districts in Kings 
County was explained in his letter to the New York state authoritie- as 
follows: 
"Senate district 18 appears to have an abnormally high minority con-
centration while adjoining minority neighborhoods are significantly dif-
fused into surrounding districts. In the less populous proposed assembly 
districts, the minority population appears to be concentrated into dis-
tricts 53, 54, 55 and 56, while minority neighborhoods adjoining those 
districts are diffused into a number of other districts. . . . [W]e know 
of no necessity for such configuration and believe other rational alterna-
tives exist." 
The Attorney General also objected to the congressional districting in 
Kings County and to the statE' legislativE' districting in New York County, 
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declaratory judgment action in a three-judge court in the 
District of Columbia. Instead, the State sought to meet 
what it understood to be the Attorney General's objections 
and to secure his approval in order that the 1974 primary 
and general elections could go forward under the 1972 
statute.7 A revised plan, submitted to the Attorney General 
on May 31, 1974, in its essentials did not change the number 
of districts with nonwhite majorities but did increase the 
size of the nonwhite majorities in those districts. Under the 
1972 plan, Kings County had three sta.te senate districts 
with nonwhite majorities of approximately 91 ro, 61%, and 
53%; un~~~r~vi_s~lan, but theJ:e w~e~ain t~e 
districts with nonwlllte majorities, but now all three were 
between 0% and 75% nonwhite.8 As for state assembly 
districts, both the 1972 and the 1974 plans provided for 
seven districts with nonwhite majorities. However, under 
the 1972 plan, there were four between 85ro and 95% non-
white, and three were approximately 76ro, 61%, and 52%, 
respectively; under the 1974 plan, the two smallest nonwhite 
majorities were increased to 65% 1¥1d 67.5%, and the two 
7 The State was also under pressure from a private suit to compel 
enactment of new district lines consistent with the views of the Attorney 
General. NAACP v. New York City Board of Electiom, SDNY 72 Civ. 
1460. See 510 F. 2d, at 517 n. 6. 
8 The 1972 percentages are taken from Table 3, accompanying the 
memorandum in support of the motions to dismiss of the applicants for 
intervention, record at 265, except for the 61% figure, which is for a 
dist.rict only partially in Kings County. That figure is taken from the 
Brief for the United States, App., at 53, and represents the black and 
}>uerto Rican population rather than all nonwhites. The 1974 percent-
ages arc taken from the Interim Report of the Joint Committee on 
Reapportionment, record at. 179-180. (The "record" is the printed 
appendix submitted by the parties.) 
The 1974 plan created nonwhite majorities in two state senate districts 
that were majority white under the 1972 plan (the 17th anji the 23d), 
but created white majorities in two districts that were IIUljority nonwhite 
under the 1972 plan (the 16th and the 25th). See Brief for the United 
States, App ., at 53. 
75-104-0PINION 
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in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioners also 
fl,lleged that they were assigned to electoral districts solely 
on the basis of race, and that this racial assignment diluted 
their voting power in viohttion of the Fifteenth Amendment. 
Petitioners sought an injunction restraining New York offi-
cials from enforcing the new redistricting plan and a declara-
tory judgment that the Attorney General of the United 
States had used unconstitutional and improper standards in 
objecting to the 1972 plan. 
On June 20, 1974, the District Court held a hea.ring on 
petitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction. On July 1, 
1974, the f\.ttorney General informed the State of New York 
that he did not object to the implementation of the revised 
plan. The Attorney General moved to be dismissed as a 
party on the ground th~t the relief sought agajnst him could 
be obtained only in the District Court for the District of 
Columbia and· only by a State or political subdivision subject 
to the Voting Rights Act; the State and the intervenor 
NAACP moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that 
it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
The District Court granted the motions to dismiss the com-
plaint, reasoning that petitioners enjoyed no constitutional 
right in reapportionment to separate community recogntion 
I 
as Hasidic Jews, that the redistricting did not disenfranchise 
petitioners, and that racial considera.tions were permissible 
to correct past disorimination.12 377 F. Supp. , at 1165-1166. 
A divided Court of Appeals affirmed. The majority first 
held that the Attorney General must be dismissed as a party 
because the court had no jurisdiction to review his objection 
to the 1972 plan:18 After agreeing with the District Court 
12 Petitioners' motions for a preliminary injunction and summary judg-
ment were ' denied. 
18 Although petitioners did not present this que!ltion for review, they 
argue that the Attorney General is properly a party to this suit because 
he allegedly c~tused the st.ate uffic1als to deprive petitioners of their con-
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that petitioners had no constitutional right to separate com~ 
munity recognition in reapportionment-a holding not chal-
lenged by petitioners here 14-the Court of Appeals went on 
to address petitioners' claims as white voters that the 1974 
plan denied them equal protectio11 of the laws and abridged 
their right to vote on the basis of race. The court noted 
that the 1974 plan left approximately 70%- of the senate and 
assembly districts in Kings County with white majorities; 
given that only 65ro of the population of the county was 
white, the 1974 plan would not underrepresent the white 
population, assuming that voting followed racial lines. 510 
F. 2d., at 523, and n. 21. Petitioners thus could not claim 
that the plan canceled out the voting strength of whites 
as a racial group, under this Court's decisions in White 
v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (19'73), and Whitcomb v. Chavis, 
403 U. S. 124 (1971). The court then observed that the 
case did not present the question whether a legislature, 
"starting afresh," could draw lines on a racial basis so as to 
bolster nonwhite voting strength, but rather the "narrower" 
question whether a State could use racial considerations in 
drawing lines in an effort to secure the Attorney General's 
approval under the Voting Rights Act. 510 F. 2d, at 524. The 
court thought this question answered by this Court's decision 
in Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544,569 (1969), 
where a change from district to at-large voting for county 
supervisors was held to be covered by ~ 5 of the Act. The 
court below reasoned that the Act contemplated that the 
Attorney General and the state legislature would have "to 
Brief, at. 5 n. I. In view of our disposition of the case, we do not reach 
this issue. 
14 In their brief in this Court, petitioners state: "[We do not] conten<l 
that there is any right-constitutional or statutory-for permanent recog-
nition of a community in legislative apportionment. Our argument is, 
rather, that the history of the area demonstrates that there could b~ 
and in fact was-no reason other than race to divide the community at 
~his time." Brief for Petitioners, il.t 6 n . 6. (Emphasis in original.) 
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think in racial terms"; because the Act "necessarily deals 
with race or color, corrective action under it must do the 
same." (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted . .) The 
court held that 
"so long as a districting, even though based on racial 
considerations, is in conformity with the unchallenged 
directive of and has the approval of the Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States under the Act, at least absent 
a clear showing that the resultant legislative reappor-
tionment is unfairly prejudicial to white or nonwhite, 
that districting is not subject to challenge." 510 F. 2d, 
at 525.15 
We granted certiorari, 423 U. S. 945 (1975). We affirm. 
II 
Petitioners argue that the New York Legislature, under 
the compulsion of the Attorney General, has violated the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments by deliberately revis-
ing its reapportionment plan along racial lines. They argue 
that whatever might be true in other contexts, the use of 
racial criteria in apportionment and districting is never per-
missible and that, in any event, there is no finding of past 
discrimination the residual effects of which require or justify 
as a remedy that white voters be reassigend in order to 
increase the size of black majorities in certain districts. Our 
difficulty with this argument is that it fails to appreciate 
Js The dissent. would have found a constitutional violation in "the 
drawing of district lines with a central and governing premise that a set 
number of districts must have a predetermined nonwhite majority of 
65% or more in order to ensure nonwhite control in those districts." The 
dissent pointf'd out that neither the Attorney General nor the State of 
New York would take responsibility for the 65% "quota ," and argued 
that there was no showing of i~ pre-existing wrong which could justify the 
use of a "presumptively odious" racial classifieation. 510 F . 2d, at. 525. 
52& (Frankel, J.). 
I 
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the role of the Voting Rights Act in this case.1" This is not 
81 case, as petitiOll'ers w:o~ld have 1t, of '7tffirmative action" 
or "benign discrimination"; nor is it even a case of "remedial" 
discrimin~ttion designed to eliminate the effects of past dis-
crimination. It is rather a case involving the applicf.\,tion 
of the screening procedures of the Voting Rights Act to 
ensure that a change in voting procedures-here a new re-
apportionment statute-does not qiscriminate against racial 
minorities. The Attorney General's objection to tpe 1972 
plan and New York's consequent changes in that plan were 
aimed at ensuring that discriminatory voting laws would not 
be implemented in the first place, not at curing the effects of 
past discrimination. 
In upholding the Voting Rights Act as a valid exercise 
of congressional authority under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, we recognized the ineffectiveness of case-by-case litig~t­
tion in combating "widespread and persistent" voting dis-
crimination and the need for "sterner and more elaborate 
1 
measures" to countera.ot the "unre:rnit!Jng and ~ous )~ 
d,dian~e _o{_the Constitution." "SSuth Carolina V: Ka z :;n-
bach, 383 U:~ "Smr,"~8 (1966). One of the "stringent  
new remedie$" we upheld was the screening by federal au- ~ . J _ 
thorities req'\}ired by § 5 before States subject to the Act - ~ -'1 ~ 
were permitted to implement new voting regulations. Rec- J ~ _ ... _ 
ognizing § 5 as "an uncommon exercise of congressional ~- · 
power" which might not be appropriate in less exceptional ~~ 
circumstances, we sustained it nonetheless, as a "permissibly W. 1 ~ _ . _ 
decisive" response to 11the extraordinary strategem of con- ..(...... 
111 The United States and the Stat<' of New York have urged us to hold 
that. wholly aside from the Voting Rights Act it is constitutionally per-
missible for a legislature to draw district lines deliberately in such a way 
as to achieve a proportion of majority white and of majority nonwhite 
~ 
districts roughly approximating the proportion of each racial group in the . 
countywide population. J 
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 751-754 (1973), but we do not need 
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triving new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of 
perpetuating voting discrimillation in the face of adverse 
federal court decrees." ld., at 334-335. (Footnote omitted.) 
In Allen v. State Board of Elections, supra, on which the 
Court of Appeals relied below, we held that a change from 
district to at-large voting for county supervisors had to be 
submitted for federal approval under § 5, because of the 
potential for a "dilution'' of minority voting power which 
could "nullify their ability to elect the candidate of their 
choice .... " /d., at 569. When it renewed the Voting 
Rights Act in 1970 and again in 1975, Congress was well aware 
of the application of § 5 to redistricting. In its 1970 ex-
tension, Congress relied on findings by the United States 
Commission on Civil Rights that the newly g~ned voting 
strength of minorities was in danger of being diluted by 
redistricting plans that divided minority communities among 
predominantly white districts.17 In 1975, Congress was un-
17 The findings of the Commission's 18-month study, contained in its 
1968 report, Political Participation, at 21-39, were endorsed in a state-
ment submitted in the course of the Senate debates by ten out of seven-
teen Senate Judiciary Committee members, who proposed and success-
fully supported the critical amendment that extended § 5. The findings 
were repeatedly referred to during tne Senate and House he.o1.rings held 
in 1969 and 1970 in connection with the extension. E. g., Hearings on 
H. R. 4249, H. R. 5538, and Simihr Proposals (Voting Rights Act. Ex-
tension) before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 3-4 (1969) (statement of Rep. McCul-
loch); id., at 17 (testimony of Howard Glickstein, Acting Staff Di-
rector, United States Commission on Civil Rights); id., at 150 (testimony 
of Thomas E. Harris, Associate General Counsel, AFL-CIO); Hearin~ 
on S. 818, S. 2456, etc. (Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965) 
before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 47 (1969) (testi-
mony of Frankie Freeman, Member, United States Commission on Civil 
Rights); id., at 132 (testimony of .Joseph L. Raub, Jr., General Counsel, 
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights); id., at 427 (statement of Howard 
Glickstein); id., at 516-518 (testimony of David Norman, Deputy Assist~ 
:ant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U. S. Dept.. of Justice. 
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mistakenly cognizant of this new phase in the effort to 
eliminate voting discrimination. Former Attorney General 
Katzenbach testified tha.t ~ 5 "has had its broadest im-
pact . . . in the areas of redistricting and reapportionment," 
and the Senate and House reports recommending the ex-
tension of the Act referred specifically to the Attorney Gen-
eral's role in screening redistricting plans to protect the op-
portunities for nonwhites to be elected to public office.18 
In Beer v. United States, 44 U. S. L. W. 4435 (1976), the 
Cou~t considered the question of what criteria a legislative 
reapportionment must ~atisfy under § 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act to demonstrate t~at it does not have the "effect" of 
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race. 
Beer established that the Voting Rights Act does not permit 
the implementation of a reapportionment that "would lead 
to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with 
respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise." 
/d., at 4438. This test requires that, in jurisdictions with 
a history of voting by racial blocs, the reapportionment must 
not decrease the percentage of districts where members of 
racial minorities protected by the Act are in the majority. 
See id. Where this requirement is not met, clearance by the 
Attorney General or the District Court for the District of 
Columbia cannot be given, and the reapportionment cannot 
be implemented. 
The refl,pportionment at issue in Beer was approved by 
this Court, because New Orleans had created one councilmanic 
district with a majority of black voters where none existed 
before. But had there been districts with black majorities 
under the previous law and had New Orleans in fact de-
creased the number of majority black districts, it would have 
18 Hearings before a SubcommittPP of the Senate Judiciary Committeo, 
94th Cong., 1st Sess., 124 (1975) (testimony of Nicholas Katzenbach); 
S. Rep. No. 94-295, 94th Cong., bt Sess. , 15-19 (1975); H. R. Rep. No. 
, .. 94-196, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 8-11 (1975). 
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had to modify its plan in order to implement its reapportion· 
tnent by carving out a large enough black majority in however 
inany additional districts would be necessary to satisfy the 
Beer test. There was division on the Court as to what a 
State must show to satisfy § 5; but all eight Justices who 
participated in the decision implicitly accepted the proposi-
tion that a State may tevise its reappottionment plan to 
comply with § 5 by Increasing the percentage of black voters 
in a particular district until it has produced a clear majority. 
See 44 U. S. L. W., at 4438; id., at 4439 (WHITE, J., dissent-
ing), 4443-4444 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). lndeed, the plan 
eventua.lly approved by this Court in Beer was drawn with 
the purpose of avoiding dilution of the blaock vote by at-
taining at least a 54% majority of black voters in one district 
while preventing a 90% concentration. See Beer v. United 
'States, record, at 341-342. 
The Court has taken a similar approach it~ applying § 5 
to the extension of city boundaries througp anpexation. 
Where the annexation has the effect of reducing the per-
centage of blacks in the city, the proscribed "effect" on voting 
rights can be avoided by a post-annexa.tion districting plan 
which "fairly reflects the strength of the Negro community 
as it exists after the annexation)) and whicn "would afford 
them representation reasonably equivalent to their political 
strength in the enlarged community." City of Richmond 
v. United States, 422 U. S. 35&, 310- 371 (1975). Accord, 
City of Petersburg V. um:ted States, 354 F. Supp. l021 (DC 
1972), aff'd, 410 U. S. 962 (1973). In Cjlu. of R ichmond, 
the Court approved a,n annexation which reduced the propor-
tion of blacks in the city fro~ 52%· to 42ro, because the post-
annexation ward system created four out of nine wards with 
0 0 
substantial black majorities of 64%. H~d the redistricting 
failed to "fairly reflect the strength of the Negro commu-
nity," however, it would follow fro111 the Court's decision 
that the Constitution would permit the city to modify it~ 
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plan by deliberately creating black majorities in a sufficient 
number of wards to satisfy statutory requirements. 
Implicit in Beer and City of Richmond, then, is the proposi~ 
tion that a State subject to the Voting Rights Act may 
redistrict along racial lines to purge its reapportionment 
plan of a discriminatory effect. That proposition must be 
rejected if we are to accept petitioners' view that racial 
criteria may be used, if at all. Qnly to eliminate the effects 
of a past discrimination in apportionment. However, we 
decline to hold that the Voting Rights Act, as construed 
by this Court in Beer, is an unconstitutional exercise of con~ 
gressional authority to implement the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments. Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S, 
641 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra. Rather, 
we hold that this use of racial criteria to shore up the voting 
potential of nonwhite voters in a reasonable attempt to 
comply with § 5 does not violate the Constitution. 
Based on the evidence and submissions before him,'9 the 
Attorney General refused to approve the 1972 plan for 
Kings County until the nonwhite majority in certain dis-
tricts had been sufficiently increased. It was evidently his 
judgment that only in this way could a dilution of nonwhite 
representation be prevented. Petitioners insist that, because 
the Attorney General concluded not that the 1972 plan would 
have a discriminatory effect but only that the State had 
failed to demonstrate that the plan would not ha.ve such 
an effect, there was insufficient justification for racial re-
districting. This a.rgument overlooks the central role of the l 
shift in burden of proof in the congressiona.l effort to combat 
discrimina.tory voting laws. As we said in South Carolina 
v. Katzenbach, supra, "After enduring nearly a century of 
systematic resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress 
might well decide to shift the advantage of time and inel.'ti&. 
10 SPe nn. 4 and 6, suprq, 
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from the perpetrators of the evils to the victims." 383 U. S. 
at 328. And in affirming the issuance of an injunction 
against enforcement of a state reapportionment plan for 
which the State had not demonstrated the absence of a dis-
criminatory effect, the Court stated : 
"It is well established that in a declaratory judgment 
action under § 5, the plaintiff State has the burden 
of proof. What the Attorney General's regulations do 
is to place the same burden on the submitting party 
in a § 5 objection procedure. . . . Any less stringent 
measure might well have rendered the formal declara.tory 
judgment procedure a dead letter by making available 
to covered States a far smoother path to clearance." 
Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526, 538 (1973). 
CFootnote omitted.) 
Petitioners a.lso overlook the allocation of burden of proof 
under § 5 when they suggest that the Attorney General 
should have compared the voting power of nonwhites under 
the 1972 plan with nonwhite voting power under the previous 
reapportionment in 1966, The purden was on the State to 
convince the Attorney General that its plan would not ha.ve 
the proscribed effect. There is no evidence in the present 
record, and no offer of proof by petitioners, to show whether 
the 1972 plan increased or decreased the number of non-
white majority districts in comparison with the 1966 
reapportionment. w 
Finally, petitioners object to what they describe as an 
"irrational" 65 % "quota" imposed· by the Attorney Genera.!. 
The Attorney General's letter of objection provided reasons 
for his inability to approve the 1972 plan, but did not an-
20 Petitioners take the position that. there are no disputed issues of 
fact and that their motion for sum~ary judgment. should be granted on 
the basis of the present record. Petitioners' Reply .Brief, at 17; T r. of 
Oral Arg., at 70-71. 
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nounce the criteria an acceptable plan would have to meet. 
It would have been no more appropriate for the Attorney 
General to suggest an alternative plan than it would have 
been for the three-judge court in Beer to issue a dictum de-
scribing precisely what plan would have enabled New Orleans 
to satisfy the court's view of the requirements of the Vot-
ing Rights Act. However, the nature of the modification 
required was clear from the reasons given for the objection: 
lines had to be redrawn to assign some nonwhites in ab-
normally concentrated nonwhite districts to adjoining dis-
tricts. Because several of those adjoining districts already 
contained nonwhite majorities, the task confronting the leg-
islative reapportionment committee was essentially to create 
more substantial nonwhite majorities in districts adjoining 
those with high concentrations of nonwhites. The com-
mittee had to revise the plan for resubmission in less than 
two months in order to conduct the 1974 elections on sched-
ule, and it therefore sought through informal contacts with 
Justice Department officials to ascertain exactly what per-
centages-would guarantee approval for the revised plan. On 
the basis of these discussions, the committee concluded that 
the Attorney General would view 65% as 11> substantial 
majority, and the committee proceeded to modify petitioners' 
assembly district to achieve this figure. The overall effect 
of the revisions was to smooth out the distribution of non-
all whites in Kings County but only about 55% of all non-
whites in nonwhite majority districts. The number of non-
white majority districts was not increased; but in the 1974 
plan there were no nonwhite majorities above 90% and none 
below 65% .21 
The Attorney General's insistence on increasing the size 
of the nonwhite majority in two senate districts and two 
assembly districts was within the scope of his empowered 
duties and was not inconsistent with the statute. As the 
~ 1 See text at nn . 8 and 9, supra. 
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Court indicated in Beer, 44 U. S. L. W., at 4436 n. 4, there 
is often a substantial difference between the nonwhite per-
centage of total population in a district and the nonwhite 
percentage of the voting age population. In the redistrict-
ing plan approved in Beer, for example, only one of the 
two districts with a black population majority also had a 
black majority of registered voters. /d., at 4438. Where 
the question of the existence of a discriminatory effect focuses 
on the opportunity for the election of nonwhite candida.tes, 
the percentage of eligible or registered voters by district is of 
great importance.22 No such statistics were furnished to the 
Attorney General by the State. The NAACP, intervenor in 
this action, submitted census data showing tha.t roughly 75% 
of aU whites in Kings County but only about 55% of all non-
whites were eligible to vote .. 28 The NAACP urged that dis-
tricts without significant nonwhite population majorities 
would not have nonwhite majorities among eligible voters.~~ 
22 The regulation governing submissions to the Atto111ey General for 
review of redistricting plans under § 5 "strongly urges" the submitting 
authority to include "[v]oting-age population and the number of reg-
istered voters before and after the change, by race, for the area to be 
affected by the change." 28 CFR §51.10(b)(6)(ii) (1976). 
·23 Table 2, accompanying memoralldum in support of motions to dismiss 
of applicants for intervention, record, at 264. 
u In its memorandum urging the Attorney General to object to the 
1972 plan, the NAACP argued that petitioners' assembly district, which 
in the initial figures submitted to the Attorney General was reported as 
having a liOn white majorit.y of 50.1% (subsequently revised to 61%), 
should be counted as a white majority district because of the difference 
in the percentages of whites and nonwhites eligible to vote. Record, 
at 219. 
The statistical problems in estimating the nonwhite population of the 
districts in the 1972 plan provided an additional reason for the Attorney 
General to ask for an increase in the size of the nonwhite majorities in 
certain districts. The legislature used the higher of the two sets of esti-
mates, and the actual nonwhite population may have been somewhat 
lower. See Table 3, supra, n. 8. 
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We think it was reasonable for the Attorney General to 
conclude that a substantial nonwhite population majority-
in the vicinity of 65%-would be required to achieve a non-
white majority of eligible voters. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
.;§u.punu QJ:onrt of tlp~ ~1niitb ~htf~g 
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CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL November 22 , 197 6 
Re: No. 75-104, United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh. Inc . 
v . Care 
Dear Byron: 
Please show me as not participating in this one . 
Sincerely. 
7.1'/(. 
T . M. 
Mr . Justice White 
cc : The Conference 
Nov. 23, 1976 
MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Dave Martin 
No. 75-104 United Jewish Organizations v. Carey 
As we have discussed, Justice White's cirrulated opinion 
seems to go off on an unfortunate tangent. It impliedly 
reviews the merits of the AG's decision to object xaxxke under the 
Voting Rights Act to New York's 1972 reapportionment. Finding 
his objection reasonable, the opinion essentially concludes 
that therefore petitioners' Fourteenth and Fift~nth Amendment 
rights were not violated. 
I would approach the case quite differently. Since it 
involves the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, I would 
rest the decision on this Court's precedents under th~~ 
nth• .. 
Amendments, aRaxxkexAGxxxa&£ixisR$£am&xxiRXBRiJXX&Rg&RxiallJ¥ 
bringing the AG's decision in only tangentially, for what 
it may tell us about the legislature's purpose in enacting 
the 1974 plan. 
The key Fourteenth Amendment case should be Washington v. 
Davis. The question here is whether the 1974 reapportionment 
guidance: 
412 u.s. 755. 
124; White v. Regester, 
The question in those cases was whether multi-
member legislative districts were employed "to minimize or cancel 
out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the 
voting population." itw iB ••• 'Piela •hat! i:w e:oald as t flzra 
-2-
the districts ~Ft 
A plaintiff alleging that/~ were so employed h d m~how more 
than that miRaxik¥xgaRaiaaxHx minority-supported candidates 
~ 
~Alosing elections. He must show that "this segment of 
the population is being denied access to the political system," 
403 U.S., at 155, or that "the political processes leading to 
nomination and election were not equally open to participation 
by the groop ifuestion," 412 U.S., at 766. 
The Fifteenth Amendment cases, Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 
52, and gammtiliaR Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, add 
little. They do indicate that~ if the lines amount to a "contrivance 
to segregate," 376 U.S., at 57, they are invalid. 
Applying these principles to the facts here yields a holding 
that there ix has been 
af/no constitutional violation. Taking "effect" as our starting -=-
point (Arlington Heights), there is no disprope~tionate impact 
disfavoring whites. - -
have majorities in 





districts slightly higher than their percentage of total popula-
tion~--assuming arguendo that this type of statistic is relevant. 
Looking to other possible evidence of discriminatory intent, we 
find that the legislature was indeed quite conscious of race 
when it drew the 1974 lines. But consciousness of race is not 
o.lk: ;t- ~, 
the • same as discriminatory purpo~e~ ~~ ie 8v&s ~Ka~mxx 
~ ~seri\Mi~ i$ (''~'~· 
prompt concern~ Discriminatory purpooe implies either a desire 
to harm the target groupfor at least a "contrivance 
to segregate." Nothing in the record supports a finding of 
intent to harm or ~egregate. And thes· , ; sequence of events 
bolsters a finding that the legislature's race-consciousness was 
not discriminatory. The legislature was acting in response to 
-3-
the AG's objection. Though it disagreed with his disapproval 
I'P72 
of the~ plan, it felt it did not have time to challenge the 
AG in court. Its race-consciousness stemmed from its desire 
to pass a plan that would survive the AG's scrutiny, not its 
desire to harm whites. 
The Chavis and Regester standards support this conclusion. 
Nothing in the reccrd suggests that the political processes 
in Kings County have not been equally open to the participation 
of whites. 
Somewhere I would make clear that we do not have before 
and we ex~ress no views on its validity. 
us for review the merits of the AG s decision to object,/ ~ 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATFlJ 
No. 75- 104 
United Jewish Organizations 
of Williamsburgh, Inc., 
et al. , Petitioners, 
v. 
H u~h L. Carey et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Ap .. 
peals for the Second Circuit. 
[December -, 1976] 
MR. JusTICE STEWART, concurring. 
The question presented for decision in this case is whether 
New York's use of racial criteria in redistricting Kings County 
violated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. The pe" 
titioners' contention is essentially that racial awareness in 
iegislative reapportionment is unconstitutional per se. Ac-
ceptance of their position would mark an egregious departure 
from the way this Court has in the past analyzed the consti-
tutionality of claimed discrimination in dealing with the 
elective franchise on the basis of race. 
~
The petitioners have made no showing that a racial cri-
terion was used as a basis for denying them their right to 
vote, in contravention of the Fifteenth Amendment. See 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339. They have made no 
showing that the redistricting scheme was employed as part 
of a "contrivance to segregate" ; to minimize or cancel out 
the voting strength of a minority class or interest; or other-
wise to impair or burden the opportunity of affected persons 
to participate in the political process. See Wright v. Rock-
efeller, 376 U. S. 52. 58 ; White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 : 
wJ.e. · ouisiana v. United States, 380 U. S. 145; Fortson v. Dorsey, 
~llA-A~ u -1-L ~~,,~ r.. 379 U. S. 433. 
0 _+icv- ~s • tricting plan undervalued the political power of white voter~ 
{ 
~{ J~ ~ record here cannot support a finding that the redis•l 
t_ ~ k elative to their numbers in Kings County. Cf. City of 
v.? r-c..t?-pfo·dtc . ~. , _I ~--r(-c~'"···:-ls fvlrpo wt:'d ~r .t~. Jt..r/,· ... -;-1~ f.krt..~ 
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;v 0 ?_ \)~ r~. I ' r Having failed to show that the legislative reapportionment ' I ' l I ~ ~ S' 
~~ vf~\ C-1 'T"1 'tiNt · plan had either the purpose or the effect; of discriminating ~ 1 t-1" 1 c 'I J J 
Sf tJ t,.;, i-to v. ~gainst them on the basis of their race, the petitioners have 
II ... ~ ~ Lfi'J.. t).t .('".offered no basis for affording them the constitutional relief 
'~-...... - -- 1 • l they seek. Accordingly, I join the judgment of the Court. 
(,J1: ~~ v. 
t C. :!i.., ; t..f o"!a )(). ~; 
1~\1 ~~~ (11 
) 
( 
*It is unnecessary to consider whether the position of the Department 
of Justice in this case was required or even authorized by the Voting 
Rights Act. It is enough to note that .Hwril:etrmr"ffi'rlttrHI::ci:r""1l:l'lt4--t.he_;_~ 
-~~~·~~~~~~~~~~t~~~ 
<)- 393 U. 8. 544; GefYI'giQ-V:" u-nited St~,_4..ll u-. £.:-52&;-and...that the pro-
cedures followed in this case were consistent with the Act. Congress has: 
established an exclusive forum-the District Court for the District of 
Columbia-and provided exclusive standing in the state or political sub-
division to raise the issue of substantive compliance with the Act. 42 
U. S. C. § 1973l (b). That procedure was not. invoked by New York 
here, and the issue of statt~tor:y compliance is consequently not properly· 
befor.e us .. 
~ 
!o: !fhe Chte:t Just1oe 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Kr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Blankmun 
Mr. Justice PowelV 
1st DRAFT Mr. Justice Rehnqutst 
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Mn. JusTICE STF)VENS, concurring. 
In my opinion this case raises a basic issur which cannot 
be avoided by placing decision on the Voting Rights Act. 
N C''iV York has relird on racial factors in drawing voting 
district boundaries in threr counties. This action is taken 
on the assumption that voters in thrse counties will tend to 
vote for candidates who arc members of their own race. 
\ 
On that af.:sumption, viewing the area as a whole. the plan 
minimizes the likelihood that black citizens will be under-
represented in the legislature; in this sense, it is designed 
to avoid a discriminatory effect on this class of citizens. 
On the other hand, again making the assumptio11 that 
votes will be cast along racial lines, viewing the problem 
from the point of view of particular white voters in the dis-
trict in which these 11etitioners reside, the plan minimizes 
the likelihood that they will be represented by a member 
of their own race. Therefore, the plan is designed to have 
a discriminatory effect on particular citizens in these districts. 
\ 
The basic question raised by this case is whether that delib-
erate discrimination on account of race is constitut· 
ecause race IS mere y one o severa po 1 ICal character-
istics that responsible legislators will inevitably consider when 
drawing political boundaries, I am satisfied that a plan is not 
automatically invalidated by showing that racial factors were 
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used to determine particular boundaries. More narrowly, I 
am satisfied tha.t the plan adopted by New York for these 
three counties is on<' which the State Legislature could 
have adopted independently without violating the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.. See 
Cousins v. City Coundl of City of Chicago, 466 F. 2d 830, 
848-853, 854-856 (CA7 1972) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). If 
that were not my view, howevrr, I could not uphold the plan 
on the strength of the f<'dcral statute on which the Court 
relics. 
The Court's holding that the plan is acceptable rests 
squarely on the fact that New York is a State subject to 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.' In so limiting its holding, 
the Court implicitly assumes that the federal statute-which 
was enacted to implement the Fourteenth Amendment-may 
authorize conduct which would violate that amendment if 
it "·ere not so authori7.cd. 2 I regard that assumption, and 
1 Opinion, nt 9-10, supra. 
"I believe this to be a fnir re:tding of tho Court's opinion. The fol-
lowing (Jnot:ttion is from p. 14, supra: 
"Implicit in Beer and City of Richmond, thrn, is tho propo,;ilion that 
a St:ttc subject to the Voting Rights Aet. may redistrict along rarinl lines 
to purge its rcapportionmrnt plnn of a. discriminatory cfroc1. Th:tt prop-
o,,ition must be rcjrctcd if wo nrc to n.crc11t petitioners' viow thnt rnrinl 
criteria may be usrd, if at nil, onlv to eliminate thr rffoct.'l of a p;1~t. dis-
erimination in appointmPnt.. However, we decline to hold t h:tt the Voting 
Rights Act, as construed hy this Court in Beer, is an nnconstitnt ionnl 
exercise of congressional nnthority to implement the Fouri cent h :mel Fi f-
tPrnth Amendments. Cf. Katzenbach v. l\1oTgan, 384 IT. 8. 041 (1966): 
South CaTalina v. Katzenbach. supra. Rather, we hold that thiH n~e of 
r:tci:ll criteria to ~hare up the Yoting potential of nonwhite voters in :l. 
reasonable nttempl to comply with § 5 docs not violate the Constitniion." 
This paragraph JH'o\·ides a rrtrospoc:tivc cndorscmpnt. of the application 
of rn,eial criteria in those rnsr:;, but docs not, of course, rnclor~e :l.Il~' pos-
sible usc which might be m:~dc of rarial criteria in the futmc. The 
rrm:1indrr of the Court's opinion is ::tn rxnmination of thr action of the 
New York Lcgi~laiurc in light of the dic:tatc~ of the Voting Rights :\et. 
But nowhere docs the Court purport to add res:; or dcciclo whether i he 
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therefore the Court's attempt to decide this case on a "nar-
row" rationale as untenable. 
If the Fourteenth Amendment would prevent the New 
York Legislature from drawing these lines independently, I do 
not believe that either the Congress or the Attorney General 
of the United States could remedy the constitutional defect. 
Or, to put the same thought in a slightly different way, if 
the Attorney General's benign purpose protects these bound-
aries from constitutional attack, there is no reason why the 
State Legislature could not act on the basis of precisely 
the same motivation and be equally protected from constitu-
tional attack. 
It is, of course, perfectly clear that New York did rely, 
in part, on racial factors in drawing these district boundaries 
and that such reliance has operated to the disadvantage 
of certain members of the white race. I believe the Court 
has implicitly and correctly held that such reliance does not 
necessarily invalidate the State's action. I therefore concur 
in the judgment. 
employment of racia.l criteria in dcsi~ning the scheme enacted here com-
ports with the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. In fact the Court 
specifically decline;o to address or decide that question in n. 16, at 10, 
supra. 
../ 
CHAMBERS 0 F" 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
\ 
~u:prtuu <q:curt of tqt ~t~ ~tattg 
~ag4inghm. 1fl. <q:. 2llpJ!.$ 
December 2, 1976 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 75-104 - United Jewish Organizations v. Carey 
The risk of circulating a draft in this case with 
a rationale for which there was little enthusiasm at 
conference has perhaps been verified. Although shortly 
there will be another circulation taking essentially the 
same course, but with modifications, it is doubtful that 
it will garner the necessary votes. In that event, I 
shall redo the opinion and reflect what I understand to 
be the majority view--which I share--that a State may, 
without relying on the Voting Rights Act, use racial 
considerations in distr~cting at least to the extent 




C HAI-1lJLRS OF 
J USTI CE WM -.L BRf: N N AN, J R. 
RE: No. 75-104 
Dear Byron : 
,§npumc ~t1mf trf tip! '2.1nitdl .§ bh·~; 
-~n;H> l!i n gttrn. p. c.q. ;.!tl[l)!-,:3 
December 3, 1976 
I agree with the basic approach of your present circu-
lation because I think we ought to avoid if possible reach-
ing the broader question of the constitutionalty of 
"quotaizing" districts in the reapportionment process. I 
am preparing a concurrence elaborating my views but also 
hope I may be able to join your circulation. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 
cc : The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
~u.prttttt <!Jttttrt of tqt ~ttitt~ ~g 
~M!p:ttgtott. ~. <!J. 2!Tp'!~ J 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN December 8, 1976 
Re: No. 75-104- United Jewish Organizations v. Carey 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me in your circulation of December 7. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.:§uprtlltt ~curl ttf tqt ~nitt~ ~fattg 
'J)llra.gJrittgfott. IEJ. ~· 2.0~>-1~ 
December 8, 1976 
Re: No. 7 5-l 04 - United Jewish Organizations v. Carey 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me in your circulation of December 7. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
To: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice M~rshRll 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
- --. Mr. ,Justice Powell 
?!4 Mr. ,Justice R:hnq_uist - Mr. Justice Stevens 
~· 
~ 
From: Mr. Ju8ti~e B1ennan 
Circulated~~~~ 
Recirculated: _____ _ 
SUPBEME COURT OF THE UNITED STATE! 
No. 75-104 
United Jewish Organizations 
of Williamsburgh, Inc., 
et al., Petitioners, 
v. 
Hugh L. Carey et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to th& 
United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit. 
.:::J~~~ 
~~~. 
[December -, 1976] cr.!./ -7 c.r·" ...... *"J 
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, concurring.:::~ ~~-~,( The Court effectively demonstrates that prior cases un .. questionably establish the Attorney General's expansive au. • · 
thority to oversee legislative redistricting under § 5 of the ~-_,.. ··~5:/L _. . 
Voting Rights Act. See, e. g., Georgia v. United States, ~ 
411 U.S. 526, 532 (1973); Allen v. State Board of Elections, ~ ~ --
393 U. S, 544, 566, 569 (1969). Yet this is only the first _,... 0 ~~ ~ tt-c_ 
step to analysis, for, however expansive, the breadth of that~-
authority is not without limits with respect to its effect on \{  .- a . 
white voters. Therefore, although I can subscribe to the Ac.:*-
Court's opinion, I add these words to indicate that I find · 
the roaqblocks to its reseult somewhat more difficult to 
overcome. 
The one starkly clear fact of this case is that an overt 
racial number was employed to effect petitioners' assignment 
to voting districts. In brief, following the Attorney Gen-
eral's refusal to certify the 1972 reapportionment under his 
§ 5 powers, unnamed Justice Department officials made known 
that satisfaction of the Voting Rights Act in Brooklyn would 
necessitate creation by the state legislature of 10 state As-
sembly and Senate districts with threshold nonwhite popula-
tions of 65 7o . Prompted by the necessity of preventing 
interference with the upcoming 1974 election, state officials 
complied. Thus, even though the Court correctly notes thf\.t 
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§ 5 is set in operation through prospective "screening pro-
cedures," ante, at 10, the Justice Department's unofficial 
instruction to state officials effectively resulted in an ex-
plicit process of assignment to voting districts pursuant to 
race. The result of this process was a county-wide pattern 
of districting closely approximating proportional representa~ 
tion. While it is true that this demographic outcome did 
not "underrepresent the white population" throughout the 
county, ante, at 8,-indeed, the very definition of propor .. 
tional representation precludes either under- or over-repre-
sentation-these particular petitioners filed suit to complain 
that they have been subjected to a process of classification 
on the basis of race that adversely altered their status. 
If we were presented here with a classification of voters 
motivated by racial animus, City of Richmond v. United 
States, 422 U. S. 358, 378 (1975); Wright v. Rockefeller, 
376 U. S. 52, 58 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 
339, 347 ( 1960), or with a classification that effectively 
downgraded minority participation in the franchise, Georgia 
v. United States, supra, 411 U. S. , at 534; Whitcomb v. 
Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 144 (1971), we promptly would 
characterize the resort to race as "suspect" and prohibit 
its use. Under such circumstances, the tainted apportion-
ment process would not necessarily be saved by its propor-
tional outcome, for the segregation of voters into "separate 
but equal" blocs still might well have the intent or effect 
of diluting the voting power of minority voters. See, e. g., 
City of Richmond v. United States, supra, 422 U. S. , at 378; 
Wright v. Rockefeller, supra, 376 U. S., at 53-54. It follows, 
therefore, that if the racial redistricting involved here, im-
posed with the avowed intention of clustering together 10 
viable nonwhite majorities at the expense of pre-existing > 
white groupings, is not similarly to be prohibited, the dis-
tinctiveness that avoids this prohibition must arise from 
~ither or both of two considerations~ the permissibility ,Qf 
75-104-CONCUR (B) 
UNITED JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS v. CAREY 3 
affording preferential treatment to disadvantaged nonwhites 
generally, or the particularized application of the Voting 
Rights Act in this instance. 
The first and broader of the two plausible distinctions 
rests upon the general propriety of so-called benign dis-
crimination: the challenged race assignment may be per-
missible because it is cast in a remedial context with respect 
to a disadvantaged class rather than in a setting that aims 
to demean or insult any racial group. Even in the absence 
of the Voting Rights Act, this preferential policy plausibly 
could find expression in a state decision to overcome non-
white disadvantages in voter registration or turnout through 
redefinition of electoral districts-perhaps, as here, through 
the application of a numerical rule~in order to achieve a 
proportional distribution of voting power. Neither the 
propriety, nor indeed the full significance, of such a prefer-
ential policy, however, has ever been addressed by this 
Court. I, like the Court, ante, at 15, and unlike my Brother 
STEVENS, post, am wholly content to leave this thorny ques-
tion until another day, for I a.m convinced that the exist-
ence of the Voting Rights Act makes such a decision un-
necessary and alone suffices to support an affirmance of the 
judgment before us. 
I begin with the settled principle that not every remedial 
use of race is forbidden. For example, we have authorized 
and even required race-conscious remedies in a variety of 
corrective settings. See, e. g., Swann v. Charlotte-M ecklen-
burg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 25 (1971); United 
States v. Montgomery Board of Education, 395 U. S. 225 
(1969); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 44 U. S. L. W. 
4356, 4363 (1976). Once it is established that circumstances 
exist where race may be taken into account in fashioning 
affirmative policies/ we must identify those circumstances, 
1 Of course, it could be argued that the remedial rules upheld in these 
rearlier cases acquired a.dded legitimacy because they arose in the form of 
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and, further, determine how substantial a reliance may be 
placed upon race. If resort to the 65% rule involved 
here is not to be sanctioned, that must be because the benign 
use of such a binding numerical criterion (under the Voting 
Rights Act) generates problems of constitutional dimension 
that are not relevant to other, previously tolerated race-
conscious remedies. As a focus for consideration of what 
these problems might or might not be, it is instructive to 
consider some of the objections frequently raised to the use 
of overt preferential race assignment practices. 
First, a purportedly preferential race assignment ma.y in fact 
disguise a policy that perpetuates disadvantageous treatment of 
the plan's supposed beneficiaries. Accordingly, courts might 
face considerable difficulty in ascertaining whether a given race 
classification truly furthers benign rather than illicit objectives. 
An effort to achieve proportional representation, for example, 
might be aimed at aiding a group's participation in the political 
processes by guaranteeing safe political offices, or, on the 
other ha.nd, might be a "contrivance to segregate" the group, 
1 
J. 
Wright v. Rockefeller, supra, 376 U. S., at 58, thereby I ~ 
frustrating its potentially successful efforts at coalition build- ~
ing across racial lines. Compare, e. g., the positions of the ~ 
biack plaintiffs in Wright, at 53-54, with the black inter-
judicial decrees rather than affirmative legislat5ve or executive action. I 
agrer that a court-imposed remedy to correct a ripe finding of discrim-
ination should be accorded particular respect. Yet, the role of the 
judiciary is not decisive. First, as is the case here, even a legislative 
policy of remedial action can be closely t.ied to prior discriminatory 
practices or patterns. See infra, at 9. Second, many of the criticisms 
discussed below that commonly are leveled against the benign use of racial 
remedies-e. g., the potential for arousing race consciousness and the likeli-
hood of imposing disproportionate burdens of compliance upon relatively 
~'innocent" whites-remain relevant regardless of the decisionmaker who 
imposes the remedial regime. I believe, therefore, that. the history ·Of 
equitable decrees utilizing racial criteria fairly rstablishes the broad pr.inc 
ciple that race may play a. legitlrnate role iP remedial JlOiici~. . 
' ' 
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venors, id., at 62 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Indeed, even the 
present case is not entirely free of complaints that benignity 
is not the true characteristic of the remedial redistricting. 
Puerto Rican groups, for example, who have been joined 
with black groups to establish the "nonwhite" category, 
protested to the Attorney General that their political 
strength under the 1974 reapportionment actually is 
weaker than under the invalidated 1972 districting. Appen-
dix, at 295. A black group similarly complained of the loss 
of a "safe" seat because of the inadequacy of the 65ro 
minimum figure. !d., at 296-297. These particular objec-
tions, as the Attorney General argued in his memorandum 
endorsing the 1974 reapportionment, may be ill advised and 
unpersuasive. Nevertheless, they illustrate the risk that 
what is presented as an instance of benign race assign-
ment in fact may prove to be otherwise. This concern, of 
course, does not undercut the theoretical legitimacy or useful-
ness of preferential policies. At the minimum, however, it 
does suggest the need for careful considera.tion of the 
operation of ~:~-ny racial device, even one cloaked in prefer-
ential garb. And if judicial detection of truly benign policies 
proves impossiblE} or excessively crude, that alone might 
warrant invalidating any race-drawn line. 
Second, even in the pursuit of remedial objectives, an I 
explicit policy of assignment by race may serve to stimulate 
our society's latent race consciousness, suggesting the utility 
and propriety of basing decisions on a factor that ideally 
bears no rela.tionship to an individual's worth or needs. 
See, e. g. , Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequa1 World : 
Equality for the Negro___:The Problem of Special Treat-
ment, 61 Nw. U. L. Rev. 363, 379-380 (1966). Further-
more, even preferential treatment may act to stigma.tize 
its recipient groups, for although intended to correct sys-
temic or institutional inequities, such a policy may imply 
to some the recipients' inferiority and especial need for 
'15--104-CONCU:R (B) 
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protection .2 Again , these matters would not necessarily 
speak against the wisdom or permissibility of selective, benign 
racial classifications. But they demonstrate that the con-
siderations that historically led us to treat race as a con-
stitutionally "suspect" method of classifying individuals are 
not entirely vitiated in a preferential context. 
Third, especially when interpreting the broad principles 
embraced by the Equal Protection Clause, we cannot well 
ignore the social reality that even a benign policy of as-
signment by race is viewed as unjust by many in our society, 
especially by those individuals who are adversely effected 
by a given classification. This impression of injustice may 
be heightened by the natural consequence of our governing· 
processes that the most "discrete and insular" of whites often 
will be called upon to bear the immediate, direct costs of 
benign discrimination. See e. g., Kaplan , supra, at 373-374; 
cf. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimina-
tion , 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 737- 738 (1974). Perhaps not 
surprisingly, there are indications that this case affords an ex-
ample of just such decisionmaking in operation. For exam-
ple, the intervenor NAACP takes pains to emphasize that 
the mandated 65 r(' rule could have been atta.ined through 
redistricting strategies that did not slice the Hasidic commu-. 
nity in half. State authorities, however, chose to localize 
the burdens of race reassignment upon the petitioners rather 
than to redistribute a more varied and diffused range of 
whites into predominantly nonwhite districts. NAACP· 
2 This phenomenon seem~ to have arisen with respect to policies afford-
ing preferentcia l t reatment to women : thus groups dedicated to advancing· 
the legal position of women have itppcared before this Court to challenge· 
statutes that. facially offer advantages to wom !:'n and not men. See, e. g.,. 
Kahn v. Shevin. 416 U.S. 351 (19.74). This strategy, one surmises, can 
be explained on the basis t hat even good-faith policies favoring women 
may serve t<J highlight stereotype,; concerning th e..i r supposed dependenc,y,· 
(lllc{ helr:le;;sn~. · 
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Brief, at 29-31. I am in no position to determine the ac-
curacy of this appraisal, but the impression of unfairness is 
magnified when a coherent group like the Hasidim dispropor-
tionately bears the adverse consequences of a race assignment 
policy. 
In my view, when a decisionmaker embarks on a policy 
of benign racial sorting, he must weigh the concerns that 
I have discussed against the need for effective social policies 
promoting racial • justice in a society beset by deep-rooted 
racial inequities. But I believe that Congress here ade-
quately struck that balance in enacting the carefully con;-
ceived remedial scheme embodied in the Voting Rights Act. 
However the Court ultimately decides the consbtutwt{al 
legitimacy of "reverse discrimination" pure and simple, I am 
convinced that the application of the Voting Rights Act sub-
stantially minimizes the objections to preferential treatment, 
and legitimates the use of even overt, numerical racial devices 
in electoral redistricting. 
The participation of the Attorney General, for example, 
largely relieves the judiciary of the need to grapple with the 
difficulties of distinguishing benign from malign discrimina-
tion. Under § 5 of the Act, the Attorney General in effect 
is constituted champion of the interests of minority voters, • 
and accompanying implementing regulations ensure the 
availability of materials and submissions necessary to dis., 
cern the true effect of a proposed reapportionment plan. 
See 28 CFR § 51.19. This initial right of review, coupled 
with the fact-finding competence of the Justice Department, 
substantially reduces the likelihood that a complicated re-
apportionment plan that silently furthers malign racial poli-
cies would escape detection by appropriate officials. As a 
practical matter, therefore, I am prepared to accord con-
siderable deference to the judgment of the Attorney Genera] 
that a particular districting scheme complies with the reme-
dial objectives furthered by the Voting Rights Act. 
I 
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Similarly, the history of the Voting Rights Act provides 
reassurance that, in the face of the potential for reinvigorat-
ing racial partisanship, the congressional decision to author-
ize the use of race-oriented remedies in this context was 
the product of substantial and careful deliberations. En-
acted following "voluminous legislative' ' consideration, South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 , 309 (1966) , the Voting 
Rights Act represents an unequivocal and well-defined con-
gressional consensus on the national need for "sterner and 
more elaborate measures," ibid., to secure the promise of 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments with respect 
to exercise of the franchise. Insofar as the drawing of 
district lines is a process that intrinsically involves nu-
merical calcula.tions, and insofar as state officials cha.rged 
with the task of defining electora.l constituencies are unlikely 
simply to close their eyes to considerations such as race and 
national origin,3 the resort to a numerical racial criterion as 
a method of securing compliance with the aims of the Vot-
ing Rights Act is, in my view, consistent with that consen-
sus. Whatever may be the indirect and undesirable counter~ 
educational costs of employing such far-reaching racial 
devices, Congress had to confront these considerations before 
opting for an activist race-conscious remedial role super-
vised by federal Officials. The "insidious and pervasive" evil 
8 It would be naive to suppose that racial considerations do not enter 
into apportionment decisions. A variety of motivations could produce 
'SUch a reliance upon Tace: e. g., the desire to injure a race, a conscious 
decision to distribute vot ing power among a variet.y of wdl-defined racial 
and ethnic groups or neighborhoods, or an attempt to employ race as a 
proxy for political affi liation . Cf. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735, 
753-754 (1973) . The relative difficulty of isolating these motivations in 
this closeted decisionmaking context, and the further difficulty of deciding 
which of these motives should be permissible given the realities of the 
.apport ionment process, undoubt f>dly explains § 5's prohibition of practices 
that either "have the purpose ... [or] effect of denying or abridging 
fhe right to vote on account of race Qf color , .. ," 
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of voting rights violations, id., at 309, and the "specially in-
formed legislative competence" in this area, Katzenbach v. 
Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 , 656 (1966); cf.. Morton v. Mancari, 
417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974), argue in support of the legitimacy ) 
of the federal decision to permit a broad range of race-
conscious remedial techniques, including, as here, outright 
assignment by race. 
I must, of course, address the objection expressed by a 
variety of participants in this litigation : that this reappor-
tion~ent worked the injustice of localizing the direct bur-
dens of r~:~.cial assignment upon a morally undifferentiated 
group of whites,4 and, indeed, & group that &rguably is 
peculiarly vulnerable to such injustice. This &rgument has 
both normative and emotional appe~tl , but for a variety of 
reasons I am convinced that the Voting Rights Act drains 
it of vitality. 
First, it is important to recall that the Attorney General's 
oversight focuses upon jurisdictions whose prior practices 
exhibited the purpose or effect of infringing the right to vote 
on account of race, thereby triggering § 4 of the Act, 42 
U. S. C. § 1.973 (b). This direct nexus to localities with 
a history of discriminatory practices or effects enhances the 
legitimacy of the Attorney General's remedial authority over 
individuals within those communities who benefited (as 
whites) from those earlier discriminatory voting patterns. 
Moreover, tbe obvious remedial nature of the Act and its 
enactment by an elected Congress that hardly can be viewed 
as dominated by nonwhite representatives belies any possi-
bility that the decisionmaker intended a racial insult or 
4 I find nothing in the record to suggestr-a.nd such a proposition seems: 
implausible-that the Ha.'lidim bear any unique responsibility for the 
decisions that led to discriminatory voting practices or effects in Brook-
lyn. Nor is there any cont.ention that petit.ionen:; derived special benefit3: 
from the prior discriminatory policies, other than to t he extent that the· 
'QY{lrall white voice cotJntywid.e was strengthened. 
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InJUry to those whites who are adversely affected by the 
operation of the Act's provisions. Finally, petitioners have 
not been deprived of their right to vote, a consideration that 
minimizes the detrimental impact of the remedial racial poli-
cies governing the § 5 reapportionment. True, petitioners 
are denied the opportunity to vote as a group in accordance 
with the earlier districting configuration, but they do not press 
any legal claim to a group voice as Hasidim. Petitioners 
Brief, at 6 n. 6. In terms of their voting interests, then, the 
burden that they claim to suffer must be attributable solely to 
their relegation to increased nonwhite-dominated districts. 
Yet, to the extent that white and nonwhite interests and senti-
ments are polarized in Brooklyn. the petitioners still are 
indirectly "protected" by the remaining white Assembly and 
Senate districts within the county, carefully preserved in 
accordance with the white proportion of the total county 
population. While these considerations obviously do not 
satisfy petitioners, I am persuaded that they reinforce the 
legitimacy of this remedy. 
Since I find nothing in the Court's opinion that is incon-
&is~nt with the views expressed herein, l join that opinion. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE . 
;§u.pumt <!fomi of tqt ~b ;§tafts 
'Jlfagqmghtn, ~. <!f. 2ll~~~ 
January 3, 1977 
Re: 75-104 ~ United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburg, 
Inc. v. Carey 
Dear Byron; 
I have experienced difficulty - which is not 
surprising - in this very difficult case. I hope to 
circulate a memo articulating my problems with any fixed 
"numbers" which seem to give tacit approval to a "quote" 
concept. We unanimously rejected racial balance in 
school desegregation in Swann and I fear the proposed 
disposition seems counter to that in spirit. 
I will have my thoughts ready this week. 
Regards, 
~~ 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
,• 
dm/ss 1/5/77 7S'-IO 'f 
~~ .... 
whether the reapportionment plan represents purposeful 
discrimination against white voters. Washington v. Davis, 
426 u.s. Disproportionate impact may afford evidence 
that an invidious purpose was present. Arlington Heights. 
o ....: I 
But the record here cannot support a finding that the 
redistricting plan undervalued the political power of white 
voters relative to their numbers in Kings County. Cf. 
City of Richmond . v. United States, 422 U.S. 358. Nor 
does anything in the record suggest that the political 
processes in Kings County historically have been closed 
to equal participation by white citizens. See White v. 
Regester, 412 U.S., at 766; Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 
124, 155 (19 ). ~'~ showing that the decisionmakers 
were conscious of race in making a governmental decision 
might also support a finding of discriminatory intent. 
But consciousness of race is not the as 
discriminatory purpose. Discriminatory purpose implies 
t:4. 44 -t #. i 
a desire to~arm the targe£ group or at least a desire to 
\ 
segregate. Here, despite the legislature's ~~ awareness 
in response to the position of the 
United States Department of Justice under the Voting 
~ 
Rights Act - forecloses any finding €ha& •&a he~i~~ture 
invidious purpose discriminating against 
~partL~pat~on of white voters. in the political process.* 




' ·· J.anua.ry ~!.5, 1976 




Subject to a· possible . major restructuring '' of ~Byron's 
opinion, I ... ~~lbjoin your concurrence. · ·· '. . , "-':·.~>.,~:.:· '}• 
~ '·~· :~ ') . 
What. would you think . of including .a· reference to ,, 
Washington v. Davis, and possibly Arli~ton Heights, which 
stand:· for the proposition that under te Fourteenth Amend-
, ment the . alleged ,, discrimination must be purposeful? 
.f1 ,·.t.,i:· ·~ .:: ;;!''~ ~~-· ~- l~--~;; ' if) " y;: ~ 
I enclose·~ a revised draft of the third paragraph .. of 
your opinion ~.J:hat , is one "way this thought could . be included. 
J.;· ¥!{' :r ,.,..,~· t• ~ _ti.~~- :..r ~' ., ..... ~. . 
... ~~-~ t- ·'? • ' '\ t 't -I:' ~-~ 
:'',<. ~~_ji_ -~~ .. -}. !~ 1.;~ 
~ •• ::~·i • •. Sincerely, ~~~ 
'(~ 
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Under the Fourteenth Amendment the question is whether 
the reapportionment plan represents purposeful discrimination 
against white voters. Washington v. Davis, 426 u.s. ___ • 
Disproportionate ~pact may afford evidence that an invidious 
purpose was present. Arlington Heights. But the record 
here does not support a finding of such purpose or that the 
redistricting plan undervalued the political power of white 
voters relative to their numbers in Kings County. 
City of Richmond v. United States, 422 u.s. 358. 
Cf. 
The legis-· 
lature was conscious of race when it drew the district lines, 
but such consciousness is not the equivalent of discriminatory 
intent. The clear purpose with which the New York legislature 
acted - in response to the position of the United States 
Department of Justice under the Voting Rights Act - fore-
closes any finding that it acted with the iaeidious purpose 
of discriminating against the participation of white voters 
in the political process.* 
·~. 




' .. ~. 
I have continued to be in considerable 
doubt as to the rationale in the above case. 
On the basis of what has been circulated 
to date, I have decided to join Potter's brief 
concurring opinion. I do this subject to possible 
reconsideration in the event you circulate a revised 
draft. 
Copies to the Conference 
LFP/lab 
, . . 
To: The Chief Justi ce 
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Ju.;;t_Lc;e Stavens 
From: Mr. Justice White 
Circulated : __________ _ 
Recirculated: 1-d£ z z 
Srd DRAFT ~/fft..T l'h!lt~ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATF8 ~ d+su ~ 
1•,1.1 No. 75-104 ~ """:<1.~. 
(~ ~ ~. r:r::;:: 
_ -~ l)t. United Jewish Organizations ~ ~ ~ Jr 
,-~ of Williamsburgh, Inc., On Writ of Certiorari to the~ 'I~~ 
f'V' • el 'a!., Petitioners, United States Court of Ap- • .,_ ;.. J 
~ • v, peals for the Second Circuit, fliV' J ~ 
~ • J{ugh L, Carey et al. ~-  
~·"·~· ;:ur~~~ [November -, 1976] • -t.L..t. t  · · _ 
,! ~~ ~ - Ma. JuSTICE WHIT& delivered the opinion of the Court. ~ :t::::'; 
~ Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits a state or . ~
~ · political subdivision subject to § 4 of the Act from imple- ~-t;,L..c 
~ menting a leg~slative reapportionme~1t ~nless it has obtain~d 
\A ... _ a-~ a declaratory Judgment from the District Court for the Dis-
~~· trict of Columbia, or a ruling from the Attorney General~~ .:Jk 
~~ ~ ..... J of the United States, that the reapportionment "does not • 
f~ ""-ey have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying ~ ~ 
• ~ or abridging the tight to vote on account of race or color .... " 1~~;..., -f::.t. 
~ ~ 1 ~ection 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, provides Ur-t;L.c. ~ _..,.. ~9f 
• ~ ~ t>ertment part: ~ ·;., • _ 
~ • ''Whenever .•. a State or political subdivision with respect to which • 
-,; -l . 1-the pr~hib~tions set forth in section 1973b (a) of this _title based upon 11 _ +....-# ~.:::Jt .. v·-1~~ ~ (It"'' determJ.Datlons tnade under the second sentence of sectwn 1973b (b) oi ~ - • ::::J~ 
J this title are in ' effect shall enact ot seek to administer any voting qualifi-~· -r- C 
1 
G .... .-AJt, ea.tion or prerequisite to \"6th~, oi:' .~tandard, practice, or procedure with ... ~ ~
~ • ~ respect to voting different f.totn that in force or effect on November 1, ';41\ _ fJ~  f':'. 0. ·j ~ 1968, ... such State ot subdivision lnay institute an action in the United ~
~v·~o p... States District Court f~t th.e District ?~ Columbia for a .declaratory ,.._.. 
~---~Jtudgment that such quahficatwn, preteql.llSlte, standard, practiCe, or pro- ......,.i!IIJoo"".P-A~~--~. 
 ~edure does not have the pU'I'lJOse and will llt)t have the effect of denying  .. 
or abridging the right to vote on acco'llnt ~f rac-e or color, and unless and • ·.I 
.1 • n_ "1f,..,.. until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right tJ:..• P• J 
1 ~ ~ to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, stan~ ~• .;ill-
"( u-:* ~· ~ fh!)·~ .. -~ ~o,:_se.nd 
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The question presented is whether, in the circumstances of 
this case, the use of racial criteria by the State of New York 
in its attempt to comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act and to secure the approval of the Attorney General 
violated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment. 
I 
Kings County, N. Y., together with New York (Man-
hattan) and Bronx Counties. became subject to §§ 4 and 5 
of the Act, by virtue of a determination by the Attorney 
General that a literacy test was used in these three counties 
as of November 1, 1968, and a determination by the Director 
of the Census that fewer than 50o/o of the voting-age residents 
of these three counties voted in the presidential election of 
1968.2 Litigation to secure exemption from the Act was 
unsuccessful,3 and it became necessary for New York to 
ard, pra.ctice, or procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, 
standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding 
if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has 
'been submitted 'by tbe chief legal officer or other approptiate official of 
such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney 
General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such 
submission, except that neither the Attorney General's failure to object 
nor a declaratory ·judgment entered under this sertion shall bar a o;ubse-
quent action to erijoin enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite, 
standard, practice, ·or proc~dure. Any action under this srction shall be 
heard and determined by a court of three judges ·in accordance with 
the provisions of section 2284 of Title 28 and any appeal shall lie to· 
the Supreme Court . " 
A legislative reapportionment is a "stand:1rd, practice, or procedure with 
·respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November I , 
1968," within the menning of § 5. Sre pp . 11-12, infra . 
2 See 42 U.S. C.§ 1973b (b) . 
a The State of New York brought an action to obtain a statutory 
exemption for the three countirs undrr § 4 (a) of the Act, serking it 
declaratory · ju'dgment that its literacy test had not been usrd within the 
10 years preceding the filing of the suit "for the purpose or with the 
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or 
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secure the approval of the Attorney General or of the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia for its 
1972 reapportionment statute insofar as that statute con-
cerned Kings, New York, and Bronx Counties. On Janu-
ary 31, 1974, the provisions of the statute districting these 
counties for congressional, state senate, and state assembly 
seats were submitted to the Attorney General. In accord-
ance with the regulations governing his § 5 review, the At-
torney General considered submissions from interested parties 
criticizing and defending the plan.4 Those submissions in-
cluded assertions that voting in these counties was racially 
polarized and that the district lines had been created with 
the purpose or effect of diluting the voting strength of 
color." 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a). After several years of litigation, the 
District Court for the District of Columbia denied the exemption and 
ordered the State to comply with the filing requirements of § 5. This 
Court summarily affirmed. New Yol'k on Behalf of New York County v. 
United States, 419 U. S. 888 (1974). See 510 F. 2d, at 516. 
4 Section 51.19, 28 C. F. R. provides: 
"Section 5, in providing for submission to the Attorney G€ncral as an 
alternntive to seeking a declaratory judgment from the U. S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia, imposes on the Attorney General 
what is cssent ially a judicial function. Therefore, the burden of proof on 
the submitting autJ10rity is the same in submitting changes to the Attor-
ney General as it would be in submitting changes to the District. Court 
for the District of Columbia. The Attorney General shall base his decision 
on a review of material presented by the submitting authority, relevant 
information provided by individuals or groups, and the results of any 
investigation conducted by the Department of Justice. If the Attorney 
General is satisfied that the submitted change does not have a racially 
discrimu1atory purpose or effect, he will not object to the change and wilt 
so notify the submitting authority. If the Attorney General determines 
that the submitted change hns a racially discriminatory purpose or effect, 
he will enter an objection and will so notify the submitting authority. 
If the evidence as to the purpose or effect of the cha.nge is conflicting, 
and the Attorney Grncral is unable to resolve the conflict within the 
60-day period, he shall, consistent with the above-described burden of 
proof applicable in t hr District Court, enter an objection and so notify 
the submitting authority." · 
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nonwhites (blacks and Puerto Ricans).n On April 1, 1974, 
the Attorney General concluded that, as to certain districts 
in Kings County covering the Bedford-Stuyvesant area of 
Brooklyn, the State had not met the burden placed on it 
by § 5 and the regulations thereunder to demonstrate that 
the redistricting had neither the purpose nor the effect of 
abridging the right to vote by reason of race or color.6 
Under § 5, the State could have challenged the Attorney 
General's objections .to the redistricting plan by filing a 
declaratory judgment action in a three-judge court in the 
5 The record in t.his Court contains only part of the material· :submitted 
to and considered by the Attorney General in his review of the 1972 plan. 
Includ<'d in the presrnt. record are a memorandum submitted on behalf 
of the NAACP and letters from ·everal prominent bbck and Puerto 
Rican elected officials, all opposing the plan. Not included in the record 
are materials defending the plan submitted by the reapportionment com-
mittee of the New York legislature, the state attorney general, and sev-
eral state legislators. Brief for the United States, at 8, and n. 9. 
The NAACP, the Attorney General, and the court below classified 
Puerto Ricans in New York together with blacks as a minority group 
entitled to the protections of the Voting Rights Act. Hereinafter we 
usc the term "nonwhite" to refer to blacks and Puerto Ricans, althongh 
small nnmbrrs of other nonwhite groups (such as oricntali:i) are abO> 
included in the nonwhite population statistics. 
6 The basis for the Attorney General's conclusion that "the proscribed! 
rffect may exist" as to certain state assembly and senate districts in Kings 
County wn.~ explained in his letter to the New York state authorities as, 
follows: 
"Senate district 18 appears to have an abnonnally high minority con-
centration while adjoining minority neighborhoods are significantly dif-
fused into surrounding districts. In the less populous proposed assembly 
districts, the minority population appca rs to be concentrated into dis-
tricts 53, 54, 55 and 56, while minority neighborhoods adjoining those-
district.~ are diffused into a number of other districts. . . . [Wle know 
·of no necPS!:-iity for sueh configuration and brlicve other rational alterna-
tives exist." 
The Attorney Genf'ml abo objected to the congressional districting in! 
King County and to the 8tate legislative districting in New York County .. 
The di,~t~ictin~ for these s.cat.\\ is nqt a~ i~su.e i.n thi::; litigation. 
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District of Columbia. Instead, the State sought to meet 
what it understood to be the Attorney General's objections 
and to secure his approval in order that the 1974 primary 
and general elections could go forward under the 1972 
statute.7 A revised plan, submitted to the Attorney General 
on May 31, 1974, in its essentials did not change the number 
of districts with nonwhite majorities. but did change the 
size of the nonwhite majorities in almost all of those districts. 
Under the 1972 plan. Kings County had three state senate 
districts with nonwhite majorities of approximately 91%. 
61%, and 531c; under the revised 1974 plan, there were again 
three districts with nonwhite majorities, but now all three 
were between 701c and 75% nonwhite." As for state assembly 
districts, both the 1972 and the 1974 plans provided for 
seven districts with nonwhite majorities. However, under 
the 1972 plan, there were four between 85% and 95% non-
white, and three were approximately 767o, 61%, and 52%, 
respectively; under the 1974 plan, the two smallest nonwhite 
majorities were increased to 65% and 67.5%, and the two 
largest nonwhite majorities were decreased from greater than 
7 The State was also under pressure from a. private suit to compel 
enactment of new district, lines consistent with the views of the Attorney 
General. NAACP v. New York City Board of Elections, SDNY 72 Civ. 
1460. Sec 510 F. 2d, at 517 n. o. 
8 The 1972 perecntnges are taken from Table 3, accompanying the 
memornndum in supp01t of tlte motions to dismi.<;S of the applicants for 
intervention, record at 265, except for tl1e ul% figure, which is for a· 
district only partially in Kings County. That figure is taken from the 
Brief for thr United Stat!•s, at 5:3. nne! rC'presC'nts the black nnd Purrto 
Rican populntion rather than all nonwhitr>'. Thr 1974 perrentagC's :ue· 
taken from the Interim Rc•port of tlw Joint Committee on HC'apportion-
ment, app., at 179-11\0. 
The 1974 plan crented nonwhite mnjorihes in two state sennte districts· 
that were majority white under the 1972 plan (the 17th and the 23d), 
but erented white majorities in two districts that were majorit·y nonwhite 
under the 1972 plan (the loth and. the 25th) . See Brief for the Unit,ed 
StatC'.S,. at 53.. 
75-104-0PINION 
6 UNITED JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS v. CAREY 
90% to between 80 % and 90%.0 The report of the lcgisla~ 
tive committee on reapportionment stated that these changes 
were made "to overcome Justice Department obj ections" by 
creating more "substantial nonwhite majorities" in two as~ 
sembly districts and two senate districts.10 
One of the communities affected by these revisions in the 
Kings County reapportionment plan was the Williamsburgh 
area, where about 30,000 Hasidic Jews live. Under the 1972 
plan, the Hasidic community was located entirely in one 
assembly district (61% nonwhite) and one senate district 
(37o/c nonwhite); in order to create substantial nonwhite 
majorities in these districts, the 1974 revisions split the 
Hasidic community between two senate and two assembly 
districts. A staff member of the legislative reapportionment 
committee testified that in the course of meetings and tele-
phone conversations with Justice Department officials, he 
"got the feeling . . . that 65 percent would be probably an 
approved figure" for the nonwhik population in the assembly 
district in which the Hasidic community was located, a dis~ 
trict approximately 61 %'· nonwhite under the 1972 plan.1 1 
To attain the 65 % figure, a portion of the white population , 
including part of the Hasidic community, was reassigned to 
an adjoining district. 
Shortly after the State submitted this revised redistricting 
plan for Kings County to the Attorney General petitioners 
sued on behalf of the Hasidic Jewish community of Williams-
burgh, alleging that the 1974 plan "would dilute the value 
of each plaintiff's franchise by halving its effectiveness," solely 
for the purpose of achieving a racial quota and therefore· 
0 Tablr 3, supra . n . , . app ., 266: lntrrim RPport , supra, n. R, app .. 
195 ; Brief l'or 1llC UnitPd St<tt r,.., npp ., at 54. s('(' 510 F . 2d, at 523' 
11. 21 . 
HJ Intr rim Hr port , supra, n . , app., 179; s<>e id., app., 1Rl- 1R2. 
11 Testimony of Ricl1ard S. Scola ro, execut ive director of the Joint 
Committee on R eapportionment, at hcn r ing on pla intiff's motion for pn•, 
liminary injunction , ap1>., 106; ~ c·r 510 F . ict , at .'H7, . 
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in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioners also 
alleged that they were assigned to electoral districts solely 
on the basis of race, and that this racial assignment diluted 
their voting power in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. 
Petitioners sought an injunction restraining New York offi-
cials from enforcing the new redistricting plan and a declara-
tory judgment that the Attorney General of the United 
States had used unconstitutional and improper standards in 
objecting to the 1972 plan. 
On June 20, 1974, the District Court held a hearing on 
petitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction. On July 1, 
1974, the Attorney General informed the State of New York 
that he did not object to the implementation of the revised 
plan. The Attorney General moved to be dismissed as a 
party on the ground that the relief sought against him could 
be obtained only in the District Court for the District of 
Columbia and only by a State or political subdivision subject 
to the Voting Rights Act; the State and the intervenor 
NAACP moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that 
it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
The District Court granted the motions to dismiss the com-
plaint, reasoning that petitioners enjoyed no constitutional 
right in reapportionment to separate community recogntion 
as Hasidic Jews, that the redistricting did not disenfranchise 
petitioners. and that racial considerations were permissible 
to correct past discrimination.12 377 F. Supp. , at 1165-1166. 
A divided Court of Appeals affirmed. The majority first 
held that the Attorney General must be dismissed as a party 
because the court had no jurisdiction to review his objection 
to the 1972 plan?8 After agreeing with the District Court 
12 PetitionPr~' motions for a preliminary injunction and summary judg-
ment were denied . 
18 Although petitioners did not presrnt thiH queHtion for rcvirw, they 
argue that the Attorney Grneral is properly [~ part? to this suit because-
he allegedly caused the state officials to deprive petitioners of their con~· 
!!!ti.t~.tlonal rl~11ts. Bri~f fqr Petitione~ \ a t 53- 54, n. 22 ; Petitione r~' Rrpl:f 
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think in racial terms"; because the Act "necessarily deals 
with race or color, corrective action under it must do the 
same." (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted.) The 
court held that 
"so long as a districting, even though based on racial 
considerations, is in conformity with the unchallenged 
directive of and has the approval of the Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States under the Act, at least absent 
a clear showing that the resultant legislative reappor-
tionment is unfairly prejudicial to white or nonwhite, 
that districting is not subject to challenge." 510 F. 2d, 
at 525.15 
We granted certiorari, 423 U. S. 945 (1975). We affirm. 
II 
Petitioners argue that the New York Legislature, although 
seeking to comply with the Voting Rights Act as construed 
by the Attorney General, has violated the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments by deliberately revising its reappor-
tionment plan along racial lines. I.G In rejecting petitioners' 
claims, we address four propositions: first, that whatever 
15 The dissent would have found a constitutional violation in "the 
drawing of district lines with a central and governing premise that a set 
number of districts must have a predetermined nonwhite majority of 
65% or more in order to ensure nonwl1ite control in those districts." The 
dissent pointed out that neither the Attorney General nor the State of 
New York would take responsibifity for the 65% "quota," and argued 
that there was no showing of a pre-existing wrong which could justify the 
use of a "presumptively odious" racial classification. 510 F. 2d, at 525, 
526 (Frankel , J .) . 
w The Equal Protection Clau;:e. contnined in § 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment., forbid;; any St11te to ''deny to any person within its juri,:dir-
tion the equal protection of the laws." Section 1 of the Fifteenth 
Amendment provide~; that " [t]ht> right of citizl."m; of the United State:; to 
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United Stat~ or by any State 
on acco1Jlnt of race, color, or previous condition of servttude." 
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might be true in other contexts, the use of racial criteria in 
districting and apportionment is never permissible; second, 
that even if racial considerations may be used to redraw dis~ 
trict lines in order to remedy the residual effects of past 
unconstitutional reapportionments, there are no findings here 
of prior discriminations that would require or justify as a 
remedy that white voters be reassigned in order to increase 
the size of black majorities in certain districts; third, that 
the use of a "racial quota." in redistrictiug is never accept~ 
able; and fourth, that even if the foregoing general propo~ 
sitions are infirm, what New York actually did in this case 
was unconstitutional, particularly its use of 65o/c nonwhite 
. racial quota for certain districts. The first three arguments, 
as we now explain, are foreclosed by our cases construing and 
sustaining the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act; the 
fourth we address in Parts III and IV. 
It is apparent from the face of the Act, from its legisla-
tive history, and from our cases that the Act was itself 
broadly remedial in the sense that it was "designed by Con-
gress to banish the blight of racial discrimination in 
voting .... " South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 
308 ( 1966). It is also plain, however, that after "repeatedly 
try[ing] to cope with the problem by facilitating case-by-case 
litigation against voting discrimination," id., at 313, Congress 
became dissatisfied with this approach, which required judi-
cial findings of unconstitutional discrimination in specific 
situations and judicially approved remedies to cure that dis-
crimination. Instead. Congress devised more stringent meas~ 
ures, one of which, § 5, required the covered States to seek 
the approval of either the Attorney General or of a three-
judge court in the District of Columbia whenever they sought 
to implement new voting procedures. Under ~ 4, a State 
1became subject to ~ 5 whenever it was administratively de-
termined that certain conditions which experience had proved 
,were indicative of racial discriminatio11. in voting had existed._ 
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in the area-in the case of New York, as already indicated, 
p. 2, supra, that a literacy test was in use in certain counties in 
1968 and that fewer than 50% of the voting age residents in 
these counties voted in the Presidential election that year. At 
that point. New York could have escaped coverage by under-
taking to demonstrate to the appropriate court that the test 
had not been used to discriminate within the past 10 years, an 
effort New York unsuccessfully made. See n. 3, supra. 
Given this coverage of the counties involved. it is evident 
that the Act's prohibition against instituting new voting pro-
cedures without the approval of the Attorney General or the 
three-judge District Court is not dependent upon proving 
past unconstitutional apportionments and that in operation 
the Act is aimed at preventing the use of new procedures 
until their capacity for discrimination has been examined by 
the Attorney General or by a court. Although recognizing 
that the 11stringent new remedies," including § 5, were 11an 
uncommon exercise of congressional power," we nevertheless 
sustained the Act as a "permissibly decisive" response to "the ( 
extraordinary stratagem of contriving new rules of various 
kinds for the sole purpose of perpetrating voting discrimina-
tion in the face of adverse federal court decrees. " South t 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, 383 U. S., at 334-335 (foot-
note omitted). 
It is also clear that under § 5, new or revised reapportion-
ment plans are among those voting procedures, standards or 
practices that may not be adopted by a covered State with-
out the Attorney General or a three-judge court ruling that 
the plan 11does not have the purpose and will not have the 
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account 
of race or color." In Alle11 v. State Board of Elections, 
supra, 011 which the Court of Appeals relied below, we held 
that a change from district to at-large voting for county 
supervisors had to be submitted for federal approval under 
§ 5, because of the potential for a "dilution" of minority 
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voting power which could ''nullify [its] ability to elect the 
candidate of [its] choice .... " 393 U. 8., at 569. When it re• 
newed the Voting Rights Act in 1970 and again in 1975, 
Congress was well aware of the application of ~ 5 to redis~ 
tricting. In its 1970 extension, Congress relied on findings 
by the United States Commission on Civil Rights that the 
newly gained voting strength of minorities was in danger of 
being diluted by redistricting plaus that divided miuority 
communities among predominantly white districts.n In 
1975, Congress was unmistakenly cognizant of this new phase 
in the effort to eliminate votiug discrimination. Former 
Attorney Genera1 Katzenbach testified that § 5 "has had its 
broadest impact ... in the areas of redistricting and reap-
portionment," and the Senate and House reports recommend-
"ing the extension of the Act referred specifically to the Attor .. 
17 The findings of the Commission's 18-month study, contained in its 
1968 report, Political Participation, at 21-39, were endorsed in a state-
ment submitted in the course of the Senate debates by t€n out of seven-
teen Senat€ Judiciary Committee members, who proposed and succrss-
fully supported the critical amendment that extended § 5. The findings 
were repeatedly referred to during the Senate and House hr.arings held 
in 1969 and 1970 in connection with the extension. E. g., Hearings on 
H. R. 4249, H. R. 5538, and Similar Proposals (Voting Rights Act. Ex9 
tension) ' before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House CommitteP on the 
Judiciary , 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 3-.4 (1969) (statement of Rep. McCul-
loch) ; id., at ·17 (testimony of Howard Glickstein, Acting Staff Di-
rector, United States Commission on Civil Rights); id., at 150 (testimony 
' of Thomas E. Harris, Associate General Counsel, AFL-CIO); Hearings 
on S. 818, S. 2456, etc. (Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965) 
before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Jucliciary, 9lst Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 47 (1969) (testi-
mony of Frankie Freeman, Member, United States Commi;;sion on Civil 
Rights) ; id., at 132 (testimony of Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. , General Counsel, 
·Leadership Conference on Civil Rights): id., a.t 427 (statement of Howar<l 
' Glickst.ein); id., at 516--518 (testimony of Daviq Norman, Deputy Assist~ 
I\llt Attorm·~· General, Civil Rlf;ht ;; D1v1s10n , ll . S Drpt. of Justice) . 
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ney General 's role in screening redistricting plans to protect 
the opportunities for nonwhites to be elected to public office.18 
As the Court of Appeals understood the Act and our 
decision in Allen, compliance with the Act in reapportion-
ment cases would often necessitate the use of racial con-
siderations in drawing district lines. That the Court of 
Appeals correctly read the Act has become clearer from later 
cases. 
In Beer v. United States, 425 1J. S. 130 (1976), the Court 
considered the question of what criteria a legislature reap-
portionment must satisfy under ~ 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act to demonstrate that it does not have the "effect" of 
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ment by carving out a large enough black majority in however j 
many additional districts would be necessary to satisfy the 
Beer test. There was division on the Court as to what a 
State must show to satisfy § 5; but all eight Justices who 
participated in the decision implicitly accepted the proposi. 
tion that a State may revise its reapportionment plan to 
comply with § 5 by increasing the percentage of black voters 
in a particular district until it has produced a clear majority. 
See 425 U. S .. at 141-142; id. , at 144 (WHITE, J., dissent~ 
in g) , 158-161 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Indeed. the plan 
eventually approved by this Court in Beer was drawn with 
the purpose of avoiding dilution of the black vote by at-
taining at least a 54% majority of black voters in one district 
while preventing a 901o concentration. See B eer v. United 
States, app. 341-342. 
The Court has taken a similar approach in applying § 5 
to the extension of city boundaries through annexation. 
Where the annexation has the effect of reducing the per-
centage of blacks in the city, the proscribed "effect" on voting 
rights can be avoided by a post-annexation districting plan 
which "fairly reflects the strength of the N r:gro community 
as it exists after the annexation" and which "would afford 
[itl representation reasonably equivalent to [itsj political 
strength in the enlarged community." City of Richmond 
v. United States, 422 U. S. 358, 370- 371 (1975) . Accord , 
City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021 (DC 
1972) , aff'd, 410 U. S. 962 (1973). In City of Richmond, 
the Court approved an annexation which reduced the propor-
tion of blacks in the city from 52 ~,{ to 427o . because the post~ 
annexation ward system created four out of nine wards with 
substantial black majorities of 64%. Had the redistricting 
failed to "fairly reflect the strength of the Negro commu-
nity," how·ever, it would follow from the Court's decision 
that the Constitution would permit the city to modify its 
plan by deliberately creating black majorities in a sufficient. 
tmmber of wards to sati~fy statutory requirement&. 
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Implicit in Beer and City of Richmond, then, is the propo-
sition that the Constitution does not prevent a State subject 
,to the Voting Rights Act from deliberately creating or pre-
serving black majorities in pa.rticular districts in order to 
ensure that its reapportionment plan complies with § 5. 
That proposition must be rejected and § 5 held unconstitu-
tional to that extent if we are to accept petitioners' view that 
racial criteria may never be used in redistricting or that they 
may be used. if at all, only as a specific remedy for past 
unconstitutional apportionments. We are unwilling to over-
turn our prior cases, however. Section 5, and its authoriza-
tion for racial redistricting where appropriate to avoid 
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. are 
constitutional. Contrary to petitioners' first argument, 
neither the Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth Amendment man-
dates any per se rule against using racial factors in districting 
and apportionment. Nor is petitioners' second argumen1 j..(_: 
valid. The permissible use of racial criteria is not confine '1 -.S 
to elin~iuating the effects of past discriminatory districting o ~. ~ 
apportwnment.10 (...) 
10 Prtitioners nlso insist tluLt , because the Attorney General concluded 
not thnt the 1972 plan would ha.w a di,;criminator~· effect but only that 
the Statr had failrd to drmonstratr that tlw plan would not have suelr 
an rffrct, thrrr wa::< insufticirnt justification for racial rrdistricting. Thi:;· 
argumrnt overlooks thr central role of the shift in burden of proof in 
the congrrssional pffort to combat discriminatory voting laws. Our c~tse:,; · 
h:we upheld this shift. As we s~tid in South Carolina \'. Katzenbach. 
su.pm, "Aft<'r enduring nefLrly a century of oystematic rrsistance to thr· 
Fifteenth Amenclmrnt,, Congrrss might wrll drcidr to shift thE' advantage 
of timr and inertia from the prrprtrator~ of thE' E'vils to thE' victim~ . "· 
38:3 F. S., at :328. And in affirming thr issuance. of an injunction against 
enforcement of a statr rrapportionmrut plan for which thr State had not· 
drmon~tratrcl thr absenrr of :t discriminator~· rffrct, the Court stntrd: 
"It is well t>titablishPd that. in a drclar:ltor~· judgment action undrr 
§ 5, thP plaintiff Statr hao thr burdrn of proof. Whnt thr Attornry 
Genrral's regul11tion~ do is to pla.ce thr Hamr burden on thr submitting· 
p11rt~· in n § 5 objection procE'clurr. . . . Any lrss stringrnt mrasurP 
might wrll havP :~:rnderrcl tlw formal clPdaratory judgmrnt prorNlure u" 
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Moreover, in the process of drawing black majority dis~ 
tricts in order to comply with ~ 5. the State must decide how 
substantial those majorities must be in order to satisfy the 
Voting Rights Act. The figure used in drawing the Beer 
plan, for example, was 545fc of registered voters.~" At a 
minimum and by definition, a "black majority district" must 
be more than sorr black. But whatever the specific per~ 
centage, the State will inevitably arrive at it as a necessary 
means to ensure the opportunity for the election of a black 
representative and to obtain approval of its reapportionment 
plan. Unless we adopted an unconstitutional construction of 
§ 5 in Beer and City of Richmond, a reapportionment cannot 
violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment merely be-
cause a State uses specific numerical quotas in establishing a 
certain number of black majority districts. Our cases under 
§ 5 stand for at least this much. 
III 
Having rejected these three broad objections to the use of 
racial criteria in redistricting under the Voting Rights Act, 
we turn to the fourth question, which is whether the racial 
criteria New York used in this case-the revision of the 1972 
plan to create 65% nonwhite majorities in two additional 
senate and two additional assembly districts-were constitu-
tionally infirm. We hold they are not, on two separate 
grounds. The first is addressed in this Part III, the second 
in Part IV. 
The first ground is that petitioners have not shown, or 
offered to prove, that New York did more than the Attorney 
General was authorized to require it to do under the non~ 
retrogression principle of Beer, a principle that as we have 
dead lett~r b~· making availablr to coverrd State, 11 far :;moother path 
to clearance. '' GeoTgia Y. United States, 411 lJ, S. 526, 538 (19n). 
(Footnote omitted.) 
:2(1 See p. 14, supra, 
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already indicated this Court has accepted as constitutionally 
valid. Under Beer, the acceptability of New York's 1972 
reapportionment for purposes of ~ 5 depends on the change 
in nonwhite voting strength in comparison with the previous 
apportionment, which occurred in 1966. Yet there is no evi-
dence in the record to show whether the 1972 plan increased 
or decreased the number of senate or assembly districts with 
substautial nonwhite majorities of 657{. For all that peti-
tioners haw alleged or proved, the 1H74 revisions may have 
accomplished nothing more than the restoration of uomvhite 
voting strength to 1966 levels.~' To be successful in their 
constitutional challenge to the racial criteria used in New 
York's revised plan. petition~ must show that minority voting ~r 
strength was increased in comparison with the 1966 appor-
tionment; otherwise the challenge amounts to a constitu-
tional attack on compliance with the statutory rule of 
nonretrogression. 
In the absence of any evidence regarding nonwhite voting 
strength under the 1966 apportionment, the creation of sub-
stantial nonwhite majorities in approximately 30% of the 
senate and assembly districts in Kings County was reasou-
ably related to the constitutionally valid statutory mandate 
of maintaining uonwhite voting strength. The percentage of 
districts with nonwhite majorities was less than the percentage 
of no11whites in the county as a whole (35% ). The size of the 
nonwhite majorities in those districts reflected the need to tah 
account of the substantial difference between the nonwhite 
percentage of the total population in a district and the non-
21 It is trtte, of course, that Bee1· was decidPd a ftrt· pE'titiourrs movrd 
for summar~· judgmE'nt in the District Court and aftrr thr Comt of 
Appt>als affirmrd thE' Di,.;trict Court '~ drnial of that motion and dismis&'ll 
of tlw action . But whilr relying on Beer in this Court, petitioner~ take 
-the position t.hnt thE're arr no disputed i;,;suE's of tlw fact and that thE>ir 
motion for summary judgment should br gnmtrcl on the basis of the 
present rt>cor<:t Prt.itiout>t:<' Heply Brirf, at 17 ; Tr. of Oral Arg., at i0-71~ 
75-104-0PINION 
18 UNITED JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS v. CARNEY 
white percentage of the voting age population.22 Because. as 
the Court said in Beer, the inquiry under ~ 5 focuses ultimately 
on "the position of racial miuorities with respect to their effec~ 
tive exercise of the electoral franchise, 425 U. S., at 141, 
the percentage of eligible voters by district is of great impor-
tance to that inquiry.:~s In the redistricting plan approved in 
Beer, for example. only one of the two districts with a black 
population majority also ha.d a black majority of registered 
voters. /d., at 142. We think it was reasonable for the 
Attorney General to conclude in this case that a substan~ 
tia1 nonwhite population majority-in the vicinity of 65%-
would be required to achieve a uonwhite majority of eligible 
voters. 
: Petitioners have not shown that New York did more than 
~ccede to a position taken by the Attorney General that was 
authorized by our constitutionally permissible construction of 
§ 5. New York adopted the 1974 plan because it sought to 
comply with the Voting Rights Act. This has been its 
primary defense of the plan, which was sustained OtJ that 
basis by the Court of Appeals. Because the Court of Ap-
22 The NAACP, intervenor in this action, submitted census data. to the 
Attorney General showing that roughly 75o/c of all whites in Kings 
County but only about 55% of all nonwhites were eligible to vote. App. 
2_64. The NAACP urged that dist.ricts without signific.ant nonwhite popu-
lation majorities would not have nonwhite majorities among eligible 
voters. See, e. g., app. 219. 
The statistical problems in es timating the nonwhite population of the 
di::;trict;.; in thP 1972 plan provided an additional rea::;on for the Attorney 
· Genera.] to a:;k for an increase in the ::;ize of the nonwhite majorities in 
certain district;;. 'I11e legislat.ure Uf<Pd the higher of the two ::;ets of e_,; ti ~ 
mates, and thP actual nonwhite population may have bePn somewhat 
· lower . Sw npp. 265. 
:~a The regulation governing submi::;sions to the Attorne~· General for 
review of redistricting plan~ undPr § 5 "::;trongly urges" the ::;ubmitting 
atlthorit·:v to include "r v l oting-agc• population and the number of rcg-
iste.red voterr( brfore and after the change, by race. for the nrea to b~ 
affected by th~J change." 28 CFR § 51.10 (b) (6) (ii) (1976). 
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peals was essentially correct, its judgment may be affirmed 
without addressing the additional argument by New York 
1111d by the United States that. wholly aside from New York's 
;obligation under the Voting Rights Act to preserve minority 
voting strength in Kings County, the Constitution permits 
it to draw district lines deliberately in such a way that the 
, percentage of districts with a nonwhite majority roughly 
approximates the percentage of nonwhites in the county. 
IV 
This additional argument. however. affords a second. and 
independent, ground for sustaining the particulars of the 
1974 plan for Kings County. Whether or not the plan was 
authorized by or was in compliance with § 5 of the Vot-
ing Rights Act. New York was free to do what it did as 
long as it did not violate the Constitution , particularly the 
Fourteenth and Fifteerith Amendments; and we are con-
vinced that neither Amendment was infringed. 
There is no doubt that in preparing the 1974. legislation, 
the State deliberately used race in a purposeful manner. 
But New York was seeking to comply with a federal statute 
prohibiting racial discrimination in voting; its plan repre-
sented no racial slur or stigma with respect to whites or any 
other race; and we discern no purposeful discrimination vio-
lative of the Fourteenth Amendment or any abridgment of 
the right to vote on account of race within the meaning of 
the Fifteenth Amendment. 
It is true that New York deliberately increased the non-
white majorities in certain districts in order to el!_hance the 
opportunity for election of nonwhite representatives from 
those districts. Nevertheless, there was no fencing out of 
the white population from participation in the political proc-
esses of the county, and the plan did not minimize or un-
fairly cancel out white voting strength. Compare White v. 
Regester, 4.12 U. S. 7 55, 765--767 ( 1973) , and Gomillion v. 
75-104-0PINION 
!!0 UNITED JEWISH OROA~IZ.A!TIONS v. CARNEY 
Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960), with Gaffney v. CurnmingB, 
412 U. S. 735, 751-754 ( 1973). Petitioners have not objected 
to the impact of the 1974 plan on the representation of white 
voters in the county or in the State as a whole. As the 
Court of Appeals observed, the plan left white majorities in 
approximately 70f, of tlw assembly and senate districts in 
Kings CoUI1ty, which had a countywide population that was 
65o/t- white. Thus, even if voting in the county occurred 
strictly according to race. whites would not be underrepre~ 
sented relative to their share of the population. 
In individual districts where nonwhite majorities were 
increased to approximately 65 o/r , it became more likely. given 
racial bloc voting, that black candidates would be_ elected 
instead of their white oppm1ents, and it became less likely 
that white voters would be represented by a member of 
their own race; but as long as whites in Kings County, as a 
-group. were provided with fair representation. we cannot con-
clude that there was a cognizable discrimination against 
whites or an abridgement of their right to vote on the grounds 
of race.2 ' Furthermore. the individual voter in the district. \ 
. with a nonwhite majority has no constitutional complaint I 
merely because his candidate has lost out at the polls and his 
district is represented by a person for whom he did not vote. 
Some candidate. along with his supporters. always loses. See 
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124. 153- 160 (1971) . 
Where it occurs, voting for or against a candidate because 
plan is in n district more lik(·)~· to return n nonwhite rPpresentntive will ' N 'Z) - t::Lt 
~·We al:;o note that the white voter who ns a result of the 19i4J 
be re resented , to the extent. that voting continues to follow racial line-: , -• .t a. ~~ .... 
bYJegislator;; elected from majority whitE' districts. The effect of the · ~ 
renpportionment on whitf'S in districts where nonwhite majorities have · en··~~ ~ .- o-t 
<7V'- ...., "'· ~~ 
bet>n increased is thus mitigatt>d by the pr«'servation of white majority ~ ~ -
districts in the rest of the county. See I\'ote, 25 Stan. L. Rev. 84, 8-i· /'...P J  (til1'~ 
( 1972) . Of course, if voting doC's not follow racial lines, the white voter • ~~ ;,_ ...._,. ~~. • ...., ~ 
has !itt!<> reason to complain that the percentage of nonwhih•s in his:: - ~ ..J 
dj:strict has been increased,. .L "" Ll"""J._;..). ~ 
vcQ . 
~· -~ -..4~ tJ 
tyv'-P' ~ .... ¥ ~' 
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of his race is an unfortunate practice. But it is not rare; 
. and in any district where it regularly happens, it is unlikely 
that any candidate wil1 be elected who is a member of the 
race that is in the minority in that district. However 
. disagreeable this result may be. there is no authority for the 
proposition that the candidates who are found racially unac-
ceptable by the majority, and the miuority voters supporting 
those candidates, have had their Fourteenth or Fifteenth 
Amendment rights infringed by this process. Their position 
is similar to that of the Democratic or Republican minority 
that is submerged year after year by the adherents to the 
majority party who tend to vote a straight party line. 
It does not follow, however. that the State is powerless 
to minimize the consequences of racial discrimination by 
voters when it is regularly practiced at the polls. In Gaffney 
v. Cumntings, supra, the Court upheld a districting plan 
"drawn with the conscious intent to ... achieve a rough 
approximation of the statewide political strengths of the 
Democratic and Republican Parties." 412 U. S., at 752. 
We there recognized that districting plans would be vulner-
able under our cases if "racial or political groups have been 
fenced out of the political process and their voting strength 
invidiously minimized." Id., at 754 (emphasis added); but 
that was not the case there, and no such purpose or effect 
may be ascribed to New York's 1974 plan. Rather, that plan 
can be viewed as seeking to alleviate the consequences of 
racial voting at the polls and to achieve a fair allocation of 
political power betweeu white and nonwhite voters iu Kings· 
County. 
In this respect New York's revision of certain district lines· 
is little different in kind from the decision by a State in 
which a racial minority is unable to elect representatives· 
from multimember districts to change to single-member dis-· 
~ricting for the purpose of increasing minority representation. 
'This change mi~ht sub~tantially increase minority repre-· 
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sentation at the expense of white voters, who previously 
elected all of the legislators but with single-member districts 
could elect no more than their proportional share. If this 
intentional reduction of white voting power would be consti-
tutiona.Uy permissible, as we think it. would be. we think it 
also permissible for a State, employing sound districting prin-
ciples such as compactness and population equality, to at-
tempt to prevent racial minorities from being repeatedly out-
. voted by creating districts that will afford fair representation 
to the members of those racial groups who are sufficiently 
numerous a.nd whose residential patterns afford the opportu-
. nity of creating districts iu which they will be in the 
majority. 
As the Court said in Gaffney, 
"(C]ourts have [no] constitutional warrant to invalidate 
a statto plan. otherwise within tolerable population limits, 
because it undertakes, not to minimize or eliminate the 
political strength of any group or party, but to recognize 
it and. through districting. provide a rough sort of pro-
portional representa.tiou in the legislative halls of the 
State." Ibid. 
New York was well within this rule when, under the cir-
cumstances present in Kings County, it amended its 1972 
plan in au effort to comply with the Voting Rights Act pro-
hibition against "denying or abridging the right to vote on 
account of race or color." u ; 
The judgment is 
Affirmed. 
2~ PE>titioners seE'k to distingui:::h Gaffney on thE' ground that Nt>w 
York'8 usE' of racial critt>ria. was not the product of " reas01wd choice'~ 
by the statE' legislature but rather was coE>rced by federal officials. But 
we do not think that thi;; otherwi:;e constitutionally f)('1'111issiblc plan. 
was rl'lldl'red unconstitutional ml'rely becausl' New York adopt<"d it t01 
~;omply with a f(~_l'ral stah).tc, 
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January 28, 1977 
Re: No. 75-104 - United Jewish Organizations v. Carey 
Dear Byron: 
As one moves from Part I through Part IV of your third 
draft of this opinion, the Voting Rights Act undergoes much 
the same metamorphosis as did the Cheshire cat. This suits 
me fine, and if you could see your way clear to adopt the 
following suggestions, or their substance, so as to do away 
with even the grin in Part IV, I will join Parts I and IV. ---In the second full paragraph on page 19 omit the 
reference to the fact that "New York was seeking to comply 
with the federal statute prohibiting racial discrimination 
J.n voting." 
On page 22, omit the reference in the last full sentence 
"to comply with the Voting Rights Act prohibition against 
'denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race 
or color.', and replace it with some sort of language such 
as "accomplish such a result". 
Sincerely, ~ 
vfl 
Mr. Justice White 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~ 
No. 75-104 
United Jewish Organizations 
of Williamsburgh, Inc., 
et al., Petitioners, 
v. 
Hugh L. Carey et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to thtl 
United States Court of Ap .. 
peals for the Second Circuit, 
[December -, 1976] 
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, concurring. 
I join Parts I, II, and III of Mr. JuSTICE WHITE's opinion. 
Part II effectively demonstrates that prior cases firmly estab-
lish the Attorney General's expansive authority to oversee 
legislative redistricting under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 
See, e. g., Georgia. v .. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 532 (1973); 
Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 566, 569 
(1969). Part III establishes to my satisfaction that as a 
method of securing compliance with the Voting Rights Act, 
the 65% rule applied to Brooklyn in this instance was not 
arbitrarily or casually selected. Yet, because this case car-
ries us further down the road of race-centered remedial 
devices than we have heretofore traveled- with the serious 
questions of fairness that attend such matters- ! offer this 
further explanation of my position. 
The one starkly clear fact of this case is that an overt 
racial number was employed to effect petitioners' assignment 
to voting districts. In brief, following the Attorney Gen-
eral's refusal to certify the 1972 reapportionment under his 
§ 5 powers, unnamed Justice Department officials made known 
that satisfaction of the Voting Rights Act in Brooklyn would 
necessitate creation by the state legislature of 10 state As-
sembly and Senate districts with threshold nonwhite popula-
tions of 657'o.. Proml_)ted by the ne~ssit:y of preventing 
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interference with the upcoming 1974 election, state officials 
complied. Thus, the Justice Department's unofficial in-
struction to state officials effectively resulted in an explicit 
process of assignment to voting districts pursuant to race. 
The result of this process was a cow1~-wide pattern 
of districting closely approximating proportional representa-
tion. While it is true that this demographic outcome did 
not "underrepresent the white population" throughout the 
county, ante, a.t 8,-indeed, the very definition of propor-
tional representation precludes either under- or over-repre-
sentation-these particular petitioners filed suit to complain 
that they have been subjected to a process of classification 
on the basis of race that adversely altered their status. 
If we were presented here with a classification of voters 
motivated by racial animus, City of Richmond v. United 
States, 422 U. S. 358, 378 ( 1975); Wright v. Rockefeller, 
376 U. S. 52, 58 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 
339, 347 ( 1960), or with a classification that effectively 
downgraded minority participation in the franchise , Georgia 
v. United States, supra, 411 U. S., at 534; Whitcomb v. 
Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 144 (1971), we promptly would 
characterize the resort to race as "suspect" and prohibit 
its use. Under such circumstances, the ta.inted apportion-
ment process would not necessarily be saved by its propor-
tional outcome, for the segregation of voters into "separate-
but equal" blocs still might well have the intent or effect 
of diluting the voting power of minority voters. See, e. g., 
City of Richmond v. United States, supra, 422 U. S., at 378; 
Wright v. Rockefeller, supra, 376 U. S., at 53-54; infra, at 5. 
It follows. therefore, that if the racial redistricting involved 
here, imposed with the avowed intention of clustering to-
gether 10 viable nonwhite majorities at the expense of pre-
existing white groupings, is not similarly to be prohibited, the 
distinctiveness that avoids this prohibition must arise from 
~~~het or both of twQ ~Qnsideratious: the permissibility of 
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affording preferential treatment to disadvantaged nonwhites 
generally, or the particularized application of the Voting 
Rights Act in this instance. 
The first and broader of the two plausible distinctions 
rests upon the general propriety of so-called benign dis-
crimination: the challenged race assignment may be per-
missible because it is cast in a remedial context with respect 
to a disadvantaged class rather than in a setting that aims 
to demean or insult any racial group. Even in the absence 
of the Voting Rights Act, this preferential policy plausibly 
could find expression in a state decision to overcome non-
white disadvantages in voter registration or turnout through 
redefinition of electoral districts-perhaps, as here, through 
the application of a numerical rule--in order to achieve a 
proportional distribution of voting power. Such a decision, 
in my view, raises particularly sensitive issues of doctrine and 
policy. 1 Unlike Part IV of MR. JusTICE WHITE's opinion, I 
1 Part IV limits its endorsement of proportional distribution of voting 
power to instances where the voters arl:' polarized along racial lines and 
where the State intk'nds "no racial slur or stigma with respect to" any 
race. Ante, at 19. I a!Iree that without such qualifications, the position 
taken in Part IV plainly would be intolerable. Yet, even as so limited, 
problems remain that, in my view, merit further consideration. For ex-
ample, questions concerning the polarization of voters and the motives of 
the state policymakers may place formidnble factfinding responsibilities 
on the courts. Such responsibilities, I believe, are greatly lessened when 
the Voting Rights Act is involved. See infra, at 8. Furthermore, I am 
not at. rest with the notion that a "cognizable discrimination" cannot be 
found so long as whites "as a group rare] provided with fair representa-
tion .... " Ante , at 20. While voting may differ from other activitieR 
or entitlements in that one group of voters often derives benPfits in-
directly from a legislator serving a different constituency-and to that 
Pxtent I agree that the adverse effl'cts of a racial division arE' "mihgated," 
compare ante, at 20 n. 24 with infra, at ll-I am not ;satisfied that 
this vicarious benefit fullr answers the Hasidim's romplaint of injustice. 
Finally, I have serious doubt;; that the Court's acceptance of political-
11arty apportiomnl'nt in Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735, 751-754 
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am wholly content to leave this thorny question until another 
day, for I am convinced that the existence of the Voting 
Rights Act makes such a decision unnecessary and alone 
suffices to support an affirmance of the judgment before us. 
I begin with the settled principle that not every remedial 
use of race is forbidden. For example, we have authorized 
and even required race-conscious remedies in a variety of 
corrective settings. See, e. g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 25 (1971); United 
States v. Montgomery Board of Education, 395 U. S. 225 
(1969); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 44 U. S. L. W. 
4356, 4363 ( 1976); ante, at 14. Once it is established that 
circumstances exist where race may be taken into account in 
fashioning affirmative policies/ we must identify those cir, 
cumstances, and, further, determine how substantial a reli-
ance may be placed upon race. If resort to the 65o/r rule 
involved here is not to be sanctioned, that must be because 
the benign use of such a binding numerical criterion (under 
the Voting Rights Act) generates problems of constitutional 
dimension that are not relevant to other, previously tolerated 
(1973), nece·s11ril~· applies io apportionment by race. Politic11l affilia- I-:-
tion is the hystone of the political trade. Race. ideally, is not. 
~Of course, it could be suggested that the remedial rules upheld in 
these earlirr cases acquired added legitimacy bec11use they arose in tht> 
form of judicial decrees rather th11n affirmative legislative or executive 
action. Arguably, a court-impm;fld remrdy to correct 11 ripe finding of dis-
crimination should be accorded particular rr.spect. Yet, the role of the 
judici:uy is not, decisive. First, as is the case here, even a legislative 
policy of rcmrdial action can be closely t.ied to prior discriminatory 
practices or patterns. See infra, at 10. Second. many of the criticisms 
di cussed below that commonly are le\'cled aga.inst the benign usc of racial 
remedies--e. IJ., t110 potential for arousing race consciousness 11nd the likeli-
hood of imposing disproportionate burdens ~f compliance 'Upon relatively 
J'innocent" whites-remain relevant regardless of the decisionmaker whQ\ 
imposes the remedial regime. I believe, theTefore, that the history of 
equitable decrees 'l'ltilizing racial criteria fairly establishes tbe broad prin-. 
.ciplt> that race may ~lay a legitimate role in remedial policle!'!. 
j 
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race-conscious remedies. As a focus for consideration of what 
these problems might or might not be, it is instructive to 
consider some of the objections frequently raised to the use 
of overt preferential race assignment practices. 
First, a purportedly preferential race assignment may in fact 
disguise a policy that perpetuates disadvantageous treatment of 
the plan's supposed beneficia.ries. Accordingly, courts might 
face considerable difficulty in ascertaining whether a given race 
classification truly furthers benign rather than illicit objectives. 
An effort to achieve proportional representation, for example, 
might be aimed at aiding a group's participation in the political 
processes by guaranteeing safe political offices, or, on the 
other hand, might be a "contrivance to segregate" the group, 
Wright v. Rockefeller, supra, 376 U. S., at 58, thereby 
frustrating its potentially successful efforts at coalition build- I ~,V, , 
ing across racial lines. Compare, e. g., the positions of The Y V 
black pla.intiffs in Wright, at 53-54, with the black inter-
venors, id., at 62 (Douglas, J. , dissenting). Indeed, even the 
present case is not entirely free of complaints that benignity 
is not the true characteristic of the remedial redistricting. 
Puerto Rican groups, for example, who have been joined 
with black groups to establish the "nonwhite" category, 
protested to the Attorney General that their political 
strength under the 1974 reapportionment actually is 
weaker than under the invalidated 1972 districting. Appen-
dix, at 295. A black group similarly complained of the loss 
of a "safe" seat because of the inadequacy of the 65 % 
minimum figure. !d., at 296-297. These particular objec-
tions. as the Attorney General argued in his memorandum 
endorsing the 1974 reapportionment, may be ill advised and 
unpersuasive. Nevertheless, they illustrate the risk that 
what is presented as an instance of benign race assign-
ment in fact may prove to be otherwise. This concern, of 
course, does not undercut the theoretical legitimacy or useful-
ne.s.s of preferential policies. At the minimum, however, it 
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does suggest the need for careful consideration of the 
operation of any racial device, even one cloaked in prefer-
ential ga.rb. And if judicial detection of truly benign policies 
proves impossible or excessively crude, that alone might 
warrant invalidating any race-drawn line. 
Second, even in the pursuit of remedial objectives, an 
explicit policy of assignment by race may serve to stimulate 
our society's la.tent race consciousness, suggesting the utility 
and propriety of basing decisions on a factor that ideally 
bears no relationship to an individual's worth or needs. 
See, e. g., Kaplan, Equal Justice in a.n Unequal World: 
Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special Treat-
ment, 61 Nw. U. L. Rev. 363, 379-380 (1966). Further-
more, even preferential treatment may act to stigmatize 
its recipient groups, for although intended to correct sys-
temic or institutional inequities, such a policy may imply 
to some the recipients' inferiority and especial need for 
protection." Again, these matters would not necessarily 
speak against the wisdom or permissibility of selective, benign 
racial classifications. But they demonstrate that the con-
siderations that historically led us to treat race as a con-
stitutionally "suspect" method of classifying individuals are 
not entirely vitiated in a preferential context. 
Third, especially when interpreting the broad principles 
embraced by the Equal Protection Clause, we cannot well 
ignore the social reality that even a benign policy of as-
signment by race is viewed as un,just by many in our society, · 
especially by those individuals who are adversely effect<'d· 
a This phenomenon seems to have arisen with rrspect to policies afford-
ing preferential trent mont to women: thus groups dedicated to advancing · 
the legal position of women have appeared before this Court to challenge· 
stn,tutes that facially offer advantage::; to women and not men. See, e. g., 
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U. S. 351 (1974) . This strategy, one surmises, can 
be explained on the basis that even good-faith policit'S favoring women 
may serve to highlight stereotypes concerning their supposed dependency:· 
~t)d. llell!lcssness_. · - · 
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by a given classification. This impression of injustice may 
be heightened by the natural consequence of our governing 
processes that the most "discrete and insular" of whites often 
will be called upon to bear the immediate, direct costs of 
benign discrimination. See e. g., Kaplan , supra, at 373.--374; 
cf. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimina-
tion , 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 737-738 (1974). Perhaps not 
surprisingly, there are indications that this case affords an ex-
ample of just such decisionmaking in operation. For exam· 
ple, the intervenor NAACP ta.kes pains to emphasize that 
the mandated 65% rule could have been attained through 
redistricting strategies that did not slice the Hasidic commu. 
nity in half. State authorities, however, chose to localize 
the burdens of race reassignment upon the petitioners rather 
than to redistribute a more varied and diffused range of 
whites into predominantly nonwhite districts. NAACP 
Brief, at 29-31. I am in no position to determine the ac· 
curacy of this appraisal, but the impression of unfairness is 
magnified when a coherent group like the Hasidim dispropor-
tionately bears the adverse consequences of a race assignment 
policy. 
In my view, when a decisionmaker embarks on a policy 
of benign racial sorting, he must weigh the concerns that 
I have discussed against the need for effective social policies 
promoting racial justice in a society beset by deep-rooted 
racial inequities. But I believe that Congress here ade-
quately struck that balance in enacting the carefully con-
ceived remedial scheme embodied in the Voting Rights Act. 
However the Court u1timately decides the constitutional 
legitimacy of "reverse discrimination" pure and simple, I am 
convinced that the application of the Voting Rights Act sub. 
stantially minimizes the objections to preferential treatment, 
and legitimates the use of even overt, numerical racial devices· 
in electoral redistricting. 
The participtttiQn of the Attorney General, for example,. 
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largely relieves the judiciary of the need to grapple with the 
difficulties of distinguishing benign from malign discrimina-
tion. Under § 5 of the Act, the Attorney General in effect 
is constituted champion of the interests of minority voters, 
and accompanying implementing regulations ensure the 
availability of materials and submissions necessary to dis-
cern the true effect of a proposed reapportionment plan. 
See 28 CFR § 51.19. This initial right of review, coupled 
with the fact-finding competence of the Justice Department, 
substantially reduces the likelihood that a complicated re-
apportionment plan that silently furthers malign racial poli-
cies would escape detection by appropriate officials. As a 
practical matter, therefore, I am prepared to accord con-
siderable deference to the judgment of the Attorney General 
that a pa.rticula.r districting scheme complies with the reme-
dial objectives furthered by the Voting Rights Act. 
Similarly, the history of the Voting Rights Act provides 
reassurance that, in the face of the potential for reinvigorat-
ing racial partisanship, the congressional decision to author-
ize the use of race-oriented remedies in this context was 
the product of substantial and ca.reful deliberations. En-
acted following "voluminous legislative" consideration , South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 , 309 (1966), the Voting 
Rights Act represents an unequivocal and well-defined con-
gressional consensus on the national need for "sterner and 
more elaborate measures," ibid. , to secure the promise of 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments with respect 
to exercise of the franchise. Insofar as the drawing of 
district lines is a process that intrinsically involves nu-
merical calculations, and insofar as state officials charged 
with the task of defining electoral constituencies are unlikely 
simply to close their eyes to considerations such as race and 
national origin/ the resort to a numerical racial criterion M 
4 It would be naive to suppA that racial considerations do not enter 
•into u;pportionment decisiow. A variety of motiva tions could produc~ 
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a method of securing compliance with the aims of the Vot-
ing Rights Act is, in my view, consistent with that consen-
sus. Whatever may be the indirect and undesirable counter-
educational costs of employing such far-reaching racial 
devices, Congress had to confront these considerations before 
opting for an activist race-conscious remedial role super-
vised by federal officials. The "insidious and pervasive" evil 
of voting rights violations, id., at 309, and the "specially in-
formed legislative competence" in this area, Katzenbach v. 
Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 656 (1966); cf., Morton v. Mancari, 
417 U. S. 535, 555 (1974), argue in support of the legitimacy 
of the federal decision to permit a broad range of race-
conscious remedial techniques, including, as here, outright 
assignment by race. 
This leaves, of course, the objection expressed by a 
variety of participants in this litigation: that this reappor-
tionment worked the injustice of localizing the direct bur-
dens of racial assignment upon a mora.lly undifferentiated 
group of whites," and, indeed, a group that plausibly is 
peculiarly vulnerable to such injustice. This argument has 
·both normative and emotional appeal, but for a variety of 
such a reliance upon race: e. g., the desire to injure a race, a conscious 
decision to distribute voting power among a variety of well-defined racial 
and ethnic groilps or neighborhoods, or an attempt to employ race as a 
proxy for political affiliation. Cf. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735, 
753-754 (1973). The relative difficulty of isolating these motivations in 
this closeted decisionmaking context, and the further difficulty of drciding 
which of these motives sl1ould be permissible given the realities of the 
apportionment process, undoubtedly explains § 5's prohibition of pmctices 
that either "have the purpose ... [or) effect of denying or abridging 
the right to vote on account of race or color ... ·." 
5 I find nothing in the record to suggest-and such a proposition seems 
implausible-that the Hasidim bear any unique responsibility for the 
decisions that led to discriminatory voting practices or effects in Brook-
lyn. Nor is there any contention that petitioners derived special benefits 
from the prior discriminatory policies, other than to the extent that the 
'oVerall white voice county-wide was strrngthrncd. 
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reasons I am convinced that the Voting Rights Act drains 
it of vitality. 
First, it is important to recall that the Attorney General's 
oversight focuses upon jurisdictions whose prior practices 
exhibited the purpose or effect of infringing the right to vote 
on account of race, thereby triggering § 4 of the Act, 42 
U. S. C. § 1973 (b). This direct nexus to localities with 
a history of discriminatory practices or effects enhances the 
legitimacy of the Attorney General's remedial authority u over 
individuals within those communities who benefited (as 
whites) from those earlier discriminatory voting patterns. 
Moreover, the obvious remedial nature of the Act and its 
enactment by an elected Congress that hardly can be viewed 
as dominated by nonwhite representatives belies any possi-
bility that the decisionmaker intended a racial insult or 
injury to those whites who are adversely affected by the 
operation of the Act's provisions. 7 Finally, petitioners have 
not been deprived of their right to vote, a consideration that 
minimizes the detrimental impact of the remedial racial poli-
cies governing the § 5 reapportionment. True, petitioners· 
6 It i. true that. invoking jurisdiction under the Voting Rights Act 
doPS not require an actual finding of purposeful discrimination._ 
~ Nonetheless, as Mr. JusTICE WHITE's opinion notes, Congre~s 
enacted the Act with "broadly remedial" objective;; in mind, ante, at 10, 
and the conditions that activtlte § 4 are those " which rxperience had 
proved were indicative of racial discrimination in voting," id ., at 10-11. 
Indeed, these discriminatory effects often would afford probative evidence 
of purposeful discrimination. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Housing Development Corp., -- U. S. --, -- (1976). 
7 In this regard, it is important that , notwithstanding the worrisome 
suggest.ions of the intervenor, supra, iii 7, petitioners themselves do· 
not protest that their treatment under thr 1974 plan WiiS motivatrd by 
anti-semitism. See, e. g .. Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidis- . 
<'rimination Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 17 (1976). Indeed, it is undeni- . 
able that the Hilsidic communlt~· is contiguous to several nonwhite neigh-
borhoods, and, therefore, under~tandably is a candidatr for redistricting; 
givrn the gonl of creating 10 viable nonwhite voting mnjorities .. 
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are denied the opportunity to vote as a group in accordance 
with the earlier districting configuration, but they do not press 
any legal claim to a group voice as Hasidim. Petitioners 
Brief, at 6 n. 6. In terms of their voting interests, then, the 
burden that they claim to suffer must be attributable solely to 
their relegation to increased nonwhite-dominated districts. 
Yet, to the extent that white and nonwhite interests and senti-
ments are polarized in Brooklyn, the petitioners still are 
indirectly "protected" by the remaining white Assembly and 
Senate districts within the county, carefully preserved in 
accordance with the white proportion of the total county 
population. While these considerations obviously do not 
satisfy petitioners, I am persuaded that they reinforce the 
legitimacy of this remedy. 
Since I find nothing in the first three parts of Mr. JusTICE 
WHITE's opinion that is inconsistent with the views expressed 
herein, I join those parts. 
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Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits a state or 
political subdivision subject to § 4 of the Act from imple-
menting a legislative reapportionment unless it has obtained 
·a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, or a ruling from the Attorney General 
of the United States, that the reapportionment "does not 
have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying 
or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color ... • " 1 
1 Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, provides in 
pertinent part: 
'"Whenever . . . a State or political subdivision with respect to which 
the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b (a) of this title based upon 
determinations made under the second sentence of section 1973b (b) of 
this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualifi-
ea.tion or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with 
respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 
1968, ... such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory' 
,judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or _pro-
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The question presented· is whether, in the circumstances of 
this case, the use of racial criteria by the State of New York 
in its attempt to comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act and to secure the approval of the Attorney General 
violated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment. 
I 
Kings County, N. Y., together with New York (Man-
hattan) and Bronx Counties, became subject to §§ 4 and 5 
of the Act, by virtue of a determination by the Attorney 
General that a literacy test was used in these three counties 
as of November 1, 1968; and a determination by the Director 
of the Census that fewer than 50% of the voting-age residents 
of these three counties voted -in the presidential election of 
1968.2 Litigation to secure exemption from the Act was 
unsuccessful/ and it became necessary for New York to 
cedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying 
or abridging the right to vot.e on account of race or color, and unless and 
until the court enters such judglllent no person shall be denied the right 
to vote for failure to comply with ·such qualification, prerequisite, stand-
ard, practice, or procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, 
standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding 
if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has 
been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of 
such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney 
General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such 
submission, except that neither the Attorney General's failure to object 
nor a declaratory judgment entered under this section shall bar a subse-
quent action to enjoin enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite, 
standard, practice, or procedure. Any action under this section shall be 
heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with 
the provisions of section 2284 of Title 28 and any appeal shall lie to 
the Supreme Court." 
A legislative reapportionment is a "standard, practice, or procedure with 
respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 
1968," within the meaning of § 5. See pp. 11-12, ·infra. 
2 See 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (b) . 
8 The State of New York brought an action to obtain a statutory 
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secure the approval of the Attorney General or of the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia for its 
1972 reapportionment statute insofar as that statute con-
cerned Kings, New York, and· Bronx Counties. On Janu-
ary 31, 1974, the provisions of the statute districting these 
counties for congressional, state senate, and state assembly 
seats were submitted to the Attorney General. In accord-
ance with the regulations governing his § 5 review, the At-
torney General considered submissions from interested parties 
criticizing and defending the plan.4 Those submissions in-
exemption for the three counties under § 4 (a) of the Act, seeking a 
declaratory judgment that its literacy test had not been used within the 
10 years preceding the filing of the suit "for the purpose or with the 
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or 
co.Ior." 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a). After several years of litigation, the 
District Court for the District of Columbia denied the exemption and 
ordered the State to comply with the filing requirements of § 5. This 
Court summarily affirmed. New York on Behalf of New York County v. 
United States, 419 U. S. 888 (1974). See 510 F. 2d', at 516. 
4 Section 51.19, 28 C. F. H.. provides: 
"Section 5, in providing for submission to the Attorney General as an 
alternative to seeking a declaratory judgment from the U. S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia, imposes on the Attorney General 
what is essentially a judicial function. Therefore, the burden of proof on 
the submitting authority is the same in submitting changes to the Attor-
ney General as it would be in submitting changes to the District Court 
for the District of Columbia. The Attorney General shall base his decision 
on a review of material presented by the submitting authority, relevant 
informa.tion provided by individuals or groups, and the results of any 
investigation conducted by the Department of Justice. If the Attorney 
General is sa.tisfied that the submitted change does not have a racially 
discriminatory purpose or effect, he will not object to the change and will 
so notify the submitting authority. If the Attorney General determines 
that the submitted change has a racially discriminatory purpose or effect, 
he will enter an objection and will so notify the submitting authority. 
If the evidence as to the purpose or effect of the change is conflicting, 
and the Attorney General is unable to resolve the conflict within the 
60-day period, he shall, consistent with the above-described burden of 
proof applicable in the District Court, enter an objection and so notify 
the submitting authority." 
f 
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eluded assertions that voting· in these counties was racially 
polarized and that the district lines had been created with 
the purpose or effect of diluting the voting strength of 
nonwhites (blacks and Puerto Ricans).5 On April 1, 1974, 
the Attorney General concluded that, as to certain districts 
in Kings County covering the Bedford-Stuyvesant area of 
Brooklyn, the State had not met the burden placed on it 
by § 5 and the regulations thereunder to demonstrate that 
the redistricting had neither the purpose nor the effect of 
abridging the right to vote by reason of race or color.6 
5 The record in this Court contains only part of the materials submitted 
to and considered by the Attorney General in his review of the 1972 plan. 
Included in the present record are a memorandum submitted on behalf 
of the NAACP and letters from several prominent black and Puerto 
Rican elected officials, all opposing the plan. Not included in the record 
are materials defending the plan submitted by the reapportionment com-
mittee of the New York legislature, the state attorney general, and sev-
eral state legislators. Brief for the United States, at 8, and n. 9. 
The NAACP; the At,torney General, and the court below classified 
Puerto Ricans in New York together with blacks as a minority group 
entitled to Lhe protections of the Voting Rights Act. Hereinafter ,we 
use the term "nonwhite" to refer to blacks and Puerto Ricans, although 
small numbers of other nonwhite groups (such as orientals) are also 
included in the nonwhite population statistics. 
6 The basis for the Attorney General's conclusion that "the proscribed 
effect may exist" as to certain state assembly and senate districts in Kings 
County was explained in his letter to the New York state authorities as 
follows: 
''Senate district 18 appears to have an abnormally high minority con-
centration while adjoining minority neighborhoods are significantly dif-
fused into surrounding districts. In the less populous proposed assembly 
districts, the minority population appears to be concentrated into dis-
tricts 53, 54, 55 and 56, while minority neighborhoods adjoining those 
districts are diffused into a number of other districts. . . . [W]e know 
of no necessity for such configuration and believe other rational alterna-
tives exist." 
The Attorney General also objected to the congressional districting in 
Kings County and to the state legislative districting in New York County. 
The districting for these seats is not at issue in this litigation. 
75-104-0PINION 
UNITED JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS v. CAREY 5 
Under § 5, the State could have challenged the Attorney 
Seneral's objections to the redistricting plan by filing a 
declaratory judgment action in a three-judge court in the 
District of Columbia. Instead, the State sought to meet 
what it understood to be the Attorney General's objections 
and to secure his approval in order that the 1974 primary 
and general elections could go forward under the 1972 
statute.7 A revised plan, submitted to the Attorney General 
on May 31, 1974, in its essentials did not cha.nge the number 
of districts with nonwhite majorities, but did change the 
size of the nonwhite majorities in almost aU of those districts. 
Under the 1972 plan, Kings County had three state senate 
districts with nonwhite majorities of approximately 91%, 
61 7o, and 537o; under the revised 1974 plan, there were again 
three districts with nonwhite majorities, but now all three 
were between 70% and 75% nonwhite.8 As for state assembly 
districts, both the 1972 and the 1974 plans provided for 
seven districts with nonwhite majorities. However, under 
the 1972 plan, there were four between 85% and 95% non-
white, and three were approximately 76%, 61%, and 52%, 
7 The State was also under pressure from a private suit to compel 
enactment of new district lines consistent with the views of t.he Attorney 
General. NAACP v. New York City Board of Elections, SDNY 72 Civ. 
1460. See 510 F. 2d, at 517 n. 6. 
8 The 1972 percentages are taken from Table 3, accompanying the 
memorandum in support of the motions to dismiss of the applicants for 
intervention, record at 265, except for the 61% figure, which is for a 
district only partially in Kings County. That figure is taken from the 
Brief for the United States, at 53, and represents the black and Purrto 
Rican population rather than all nonwhites . The 1974 percentages are 
taken from the Interim Report of the .Joint Committee on Reapportion-
ment, app., at 179-180. 
The 197 4 plan created · nonwhite majorities in two state senate districts 
that were ma,jority white under the 1972 plan (t.he 17th and the 23d), 
but created white majorities in two districts that were majority nonwhite 
under the 1972 plan (the 16th and. the 25th). See Brief for the United 
States, at 53: 
75-104-0PINION' 
~ UNITED JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS v. CAREY · 
respectively; under the 1974 plan, the two smallest nonwhi~ 
majorities were increased · to 65% and 67.5 %, and the two 
largest nonwhite majorities were decreased from greater than 
90% to between 80% and 90%.0 The report of the legisla-
tive committee on reapportionment stated that these changes 
were made "to overcome Justice Department objections" by 
creating more "substantial nonwhite majorities" in two as-
~mbly districts and two senate districts.10 
One of the communities affected by these revisions in the 
Kings County reapportionment plan was the Williamsburgh 
area, where about 30,000 Hasidic Jews live. Under the 1972 
plan, the Hasidic community was located entirely in one 
assembly district (61% nonwhite) and one senate district 
(i37% nonwhite~ ) in order to create substantial nonwhite 
majorities in these districts, the 1974 revisions split the 
Hasidic community between two senate and two assembly 
d;istricts. A staff member-of the legislative reapportionment 
committee testified that in the course of meetings and tele-
phone conversations with Justice Department officials, he 
"got the feeling ... that 65 percent would be probably an 
approved figure" for the nonwhite population in the assembly 
d~strict in which the Hasidic community was located, a dis-
trict approximately 61 7'o· nonwhite under the 1972 plan.11 
To attain the 65 % figure, a portion of the white population, 
including part of the Hasidic community, was reassigned to 
aJl adjoining district. 
Shortly after the State submitted this revised redistricting 
ptan for Kings County to the Attorney General, petitioners 
sued on behalf of the Hasidic Jewish community of Williams-
0 Table 3, supra, n. 8, app., 266 ; Interim Report, supra, n. 8, app., 
195; Brief for the United Sta.tes, app., at 54. See 510 F. 2d, at 523 
n. 21. 
~0 Interim Report , supra, n. 8, app. , 179 ; see id., app., 181- 182. 
11 Testimony of Richard S. Scolaro, executive director of the Joint 
Committee on Reapportionment, at hearing on plaintiff 's motion for pre-
liminary injunction, app., 106; :see 510 F. 2d, at 517 . 
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burgh, alleging that the 1974 plan "would dilute the value 
of each plaintiff's franchise by halving its effectiveness," solely 
for the purpose of achieving a racial quota and therefore 
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioners also 
alleged that they were assigned to electoral districts so·lely 
on the basis of race, and that this racial assignment diluted 
their voting power in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. 
Petitioners sought an injunction restraining New York offi-
cials from enforcing the new redistricting plan and a declara-
tory judgment that the Attorney General of the United 
States had used unconstitutional and improper standards in 
objecting to the 1972 plan. 
On June 20, 1974, the District Court held a hearing on 
petitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction. On July 1, 
1974, the Attorney General informed the State of New York 
that he did not object to the implementation of the revised 
plan. The Attorney General moved to be dismissed as a 
party on the ground that the relief sought against him could 
be obtained only in the District Court for the District of 
Columbia and only by a State or political subdivision subject 
to the Voting Rights Act; the State and the intervenor 
NAACP moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that 
it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
The District Court granted the motions to dismiss the com-
plaint, rea.soning that petitioners enjoyed no constitutional 
right in reapportionment to separate community recogntion 
as Hasidic Jews, that the redistricting did not disenfranchise 
petitioners, and that racial considerations were permissible 
to correct past discrimination.1 2 377 F. Supp. , at 1165--1166. 
A divided Court of Appeals affirmed. The majority first 
held that the Attorney General must be dismissed as a party 
because the court had no j'urisdiction to review his objection 
12 Petitioners' motions for a preliminary injunction and summary judg-
ment were denied. 
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to the 1972 plan.13 After agreeing :with the District Court 
that petitioners had no constitutional right to separate com-
munity recognition in reapportionment-a holding not chal-
lenged by petitioners here 14-the Court of Appeals went on 
to address petitioners' claims as white voters that the 1974 
plan denied them equal protection of the laws and abridged 
their right to vote on the basis of race. The court noted 
that the 1974 plan left approximately 70% of the senate and 
assembly districts in Kings County with white majorities~ 
given that only 65% of the population of the county was 
white, the 1974 plan would not underrepresent the white 
population, assuming that voting followed racial lines. 510 
F. 2d., at 523, and n. 21. Petitioners thus could not claim 
that the plan canceled out the voting strength of whites 
as a racial group, under this Court's decisions in White 
v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), and Whitcomb · v. Chavis, 
403 U. S. 124 (1971). The court then observed that the 
case did not present the question whether a legislature, 
"starting afresh," could draw lines on a racial basis so as to 
bolster nonwhite voting strength, but rather the "narrower" 
question whether a State could use racial considerations in 
~rawing lines in an effort to secure the Attorney General's 
approval under the Voting Rights Act. 510 F. 2d, a.t 524. The 
court thought this question answered by this Court's decision 
in Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544,569 (1969), 
18 Although petitioners did not present this question for review, they 
argue that the Attorney General is properly a party to this suit because 
he allegedly caused the state officials to deprive petitioners of their con-
stitutional rights. Brief for Petitioners, at 53-54, n. 22; Petitioners' Reply 
Brief, at 5 n. 1. In view of our disposition of the case, we do not reach 
this issue. 
14 In their brief in this Court , petitioners state: "[We do notl contend 
that there is any right-constitutional or statutory-for permanent recog-
nition of a community in legislative apportionment. Our argument is, 
r&-ther, that the history of the area demonstrates that there could b~ 
and in fact was-no reason other than race to divide the community at 
this time." Brief for Petitioners, at 6 n. 6. · (Emphasis in original.) 
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where a change from district to at-large voting for county 
supervisors was held to be covered by § 5 of the Act. The 
court below reasoned that the Act contemplated that the 
Attorney General and the state legislature would have "to 
think in racial terms"; because the Act "necessarily deals 
with race or color, corrective action under it must do the 
same." (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted.) The 
court held that 
"so long as a districting, even though based on racial 
considerations, is in conformity with the unchallenged 
directive of and has the approval of the Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States under the Act, at least absent 
a clear showing that the resultant legislative reappor-
tionment is unfairly prejudicial to white or nonwhite, 
that districting is not subject to challenge." 510 F. 2d, 
at 525.1 ~ 
We granted certiorari, 423 U. S. 945 (1975). We affirm. 
II 
Petitioners argue that the New York Legislature, although 
seeking to comply with the Voting Rights Act as construed 
by the Attorney General, has violated the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments by deliberately revising its reappor-
tionment plan along racial lines. 1u In rejecting petitioners, 
15 The dissent would have found a. constitutional violation in "the 
drawing of district lines with a cent raJ and governing premise that a set 
number of districts must have a predetermined nonwhite majority of 
65% or more in order to ensure nonwhite control in those districts." The 
dissent pointed out that neither the Attorney General nor the State of 
New York would take responsibility for the 6S% "quota," and argued 
that there was no showing of a pre-existing wrong which could justify the 
·use of a "presumptively odious1' racial classification. 510 F. 2d, at 525, 
526 (Frankel, J.). 
10 The Equal Protection Clau~e. contained in § 1 of the Fourtrcnth 
Amendment, forbids any State to '·deny to any prrson within its jurisclic-
·tibn the rqual protrrtion of the law,;." Srrtion 1 of the Fifteenth 
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claims, we address four propositions: first, that whatever. 
might be true in other contexts, the use of racial criteria if\ 
districting and apportionment is never permissible; second,. 
that even if racial considerations may be used to redraw dis-. 
trict lines in order to remedy the residual effects of past. 
unconstitutional reapportionments, there are no findings here 
of prior discriminations that would require or justify as a 
remedy that white voters be reassigned in order to increase 
the size of black majorities in certain districts; third, that 
the use of a "racial quota" in redistricting is never accept-_ 
able; and fourth, that even if the foregoing general propo-. 
sitions are infirm) what New York actually did in this case 
was unconstiwtional, particularly its use of 65'fo nonwhite 
racial quota for certain districts. The first three arguments, 
as we now explain, are foreclosed by our cases construing and_ 
sustaining the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act; the 
fourth we address in Parts III and IV. 
It is apparent from the face of the Act, from its legisla-
tive history, and from our cases that the Act was itself 
broadly remedial in the sense that it was "designed by Con:. 
gress to banish the blight of racial discrimination in 
voting .... " South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301,, 
308 (1966). It is also plain , however, that after "repeatedly 
try[ing] to cope with the problem by facilitating case-by-case; 
litigation against voting discrimination ," id., at 313, Congress 
became dissatisfied with this approach, which required judi:. 
cial findings of unconstitutional discrimination in specific 
situations and judicially approved remedies to cure that dis:. 
crimina.tion. Instead. Congress devised more stringent meas:. 
ures, one of which, § 5, required the covered States to seek 
the approval of either the Attorney General or of a three:. 
judge court in the District of Columbia whenever they sough~ 
Amendment provides t-hat " [t]hE' right of citiz E'n ~ of the Unit.f'd States t~ 
vote shall not be dcnied or abridged by thE' United States or b~· any StatE'. 
e.!l account of race, color, or previou · c~nd_it ion of llcn ·itude." -
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to implement new voting procedures. Under § 4, a State 
became subject to § 5 whenever it was administratively de. 
termined that certain conditions which experience had proved 
were indicative of racial discrimination in voting had existed 
in the area-in the case of New York, as already indicated, 
p. 2, supra, tha.t a literacy test was in use in certain counties in 
1968 and that fewer than 50% of the voting age residents in 
these counties voted in the presidential election that year. At 
tha.t point, New York could have escaped coverage by under-
taking to demonstrate to the appropriate court that the test 
had not been used to discrimina.te within the past 10 years, an 
effort New York unsuccessfully made. See n. 3, supra. 
Given this coverage of the counties involved, it is evident 
that the Act's prohibition against instituting new voting pro-
cedures without the approval of the Attorney General or the 
three-judge District Court is not dependent upon proving 
past unconstitutional apportionments and that in opera.tion 
the Act is aimed at preventing the use of new procedures 
until their capacity for discrimination has been examined by 
the Attorney General or by a court. Although recognizing 
that the "stringent new remedies," including § 5, were "an 
uncommon exercise of congressional power," we nevertheless 
sustained the Act as a "permissibly decisive" response to "the 
extraordinary stratagem of contriving new rules of various 
kinds for the sole purpose of perpetrating voting discrimina-
tion in the face of adverse federal court decrees." South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, 383 U. S., at 334-335 (foot-
note omitted). 
It is also clear that under § 5, new or revised reapportion-
ment plans are among those voting procedures, standards or 
practices that may not be adopted by a covered State with· 
out the Attorney General or a three-judge court ruling that 
the plan "does not have the purpose and will not have the 
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account 
'Of race or color." In Allen v. State Board of Elections, 
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supra, on which the Court of Appeals relied below, we held 
. that a change from district to at-large voting for county 
supervisors had to be submitted for federal approval under 
§ 5, because of the potential for a "dilution" of minority 
voting power which could "nullify [its] ability to elect the 
candidate of [its] choice ... , ." 393 U.S., at 569. When it re-
newed the Voting Rights Act in 1970 and again in 1975, 
Congress was well aware of the application of § 5 to redis-
tricting. In its 1970 extension, Congress relied on findings 
by the United States Commission on Civil Rights that the 
newly gained voting strength of minorities was in danger of 
;being diluted by redistricting plans that divided minority 
communities among predominantly white districts. 17 In 
1975, Congress was unmistakenly cognizant of this new phase 
in the effort to eliminate voting discrimination. Former 
Attorney General Katzenbach testified that § 5 "has had its 
broadest impact . . . in the areas of redistricting and reap-
17 The findings of the Commission's 18-month study, contained in its 
1968 report, Political Participation, at 21-39, were endorsed in a state-
ment submitted in the course of the Senate debates by ten out of seven-
teen Senate Judiciary Committee members, who proposed and success-
fully supported the critical amendment that extended § 5. The findings 
were repeatedly referred to during the Senate and House hearings held 
in 1969 and 1970 in connection with the extension. E. g., Hearings on 
H. R. 4249, H. R. 5538, and· Similar Proposals (Voting Rights Act Ex-
tension) before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess:, 3:...4 (1969) (statement of Rep. McCul-
loch); id., at 17 (testimony of Howard Glickstein, Acting Staff Di-
rector, United States Commission on Civil Rights); id., at 150 (testimony 
of Thomas E. Harris, Associate General Counsel, AFL-CIO); Hearings: 
on S. 818, S. 2456, etc. (Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965) 
before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 47 (1969) (testi-
mony of Frankie Freeman, Member, United States Commission on Civil 
Rights); id., at 132 (testimony of Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., General Counsel, 
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights); id., at 427 (statement of Howar<l 
Glickstein); id., at 516-518 (testimony of David Norman, Deputy Assist-
~tnt Attorney General, Civil Rights Divi&ion, U. S. Dept. of Justice). 
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portionment," and the Senate and House reports recommend .. 
, jng the extension of the Act referred specifically to the At tor .. 
ney General's role in screening redistricting plans to protect 
the opportunities for nonwhites to be elected to public office.18 
As the Court of Appeals understood the Act and our 
decision in Allen, compliance with the Act in reapportion-
ment cases would often necessitate the use of racial con-
siderations in drawing district lines. That the Court of 
Appeals correctly read the Act has become clearer from later 
cases. 
In Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976) , the Court 
considered the question of what criteria a legislature reap• 
portionment must satisfy under § 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act to demonstrate that it does not have the "effect" of 
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race. 
Beer established that the Voting Rights Act does not permit 
the implementation of a reapportionment that "would lead 
to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with 
respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise." 
/d., at 141. This test was satisfied where the reapportion-
ment increased the percentage of districts where members of 
racial minorities protected by the Act were in the majority. 
See ibid. But if this test were not met, clearance by the 
Attorney General or the District Court for the District of 
Columbia could not be given, and the reapportionment could 
not be implemented. 
The reapportionment a.t issue in Beer was approved by 
this Court, because New Orleans had created one councilmani~ 
'district with a majority of black voters where none existed 
before. But had there been districts with black majoriti~ 
under the previous law and had New Orleans in fact de-
creased the number of majority black districts, it would hav~ 
18 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
'94th Cong., 1st Sess., 124 (1975) (testimony of Nicholas Katzenbach) ~ 
S. Rep. No. 94-295, 94th Cong. , 1st Sess. , 15-19 (1975) ; H. R. Rep. No: 
'9~196, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 8-11 (1975) . 
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had to modify its plan in order to implement its reapportion-
ment by carving out a large enough black majority in however 
many additional districts would be necessary to satisfy the 
Beer test. There was division on the Court as to what a 
State must show to satisfy § 5; but all eight Justices who 
participated in the decision implicitly accepted the proposi-
tion that a State may revise its reapportionment plan to 
comply with § 5 by increasing the percentage of black voters 
in a particular district until it has produced a clear majority. 
See 425 U. S. , at 141- 142; id., at 14.4 (WHITE, J. , dissent-
ing) , 158-161 (MARSHALL, J:, dissenting). Indeed, the plan 
eventually approved by this Court in Beer was drawn with 
the purpose of avoiding dilution of the bla,ck vote by at-
taining at least a 54% majority of black voters in one district 
while preventing a 90% concentration. See B eer v. United 
States, app. 341- 342. 
The Court has taken a similar approach in applying § 5 
to the extension of city boundaries through annexation. 
Where the annexation has the effect of reducing the per-
centage of blacks in the city, the proscribed "effect" on voting 
rights can be avoided by a post-annexation districting plan 
which "fairly reflects the strength of the Negro community 
M it exists after the annexation" and which "would afford 
[it] representation reasonably equivalent to [its] political 
strength in the enlarged community." City of Richmond 
v. United States, 422 U. S. 358, 370- 371 (1975) . Accord, 
City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F . Supp. 1021 (DC 
1972), aff'd; 410 U. S. 962 (1973). In City of Richmond, 
the Court approved an annexation which reduced the propor-
tion of blacks in the city from 52% to 42%, because the post-
annexation ward system created four out of nine wards with 
SJ.Ibstantial black majorities of 64%. Had the redistricting 
failed to "fairly reflect the strength of the Negro commu-
nity," however, it would follow from the Court's decision 
that the Constitution would permit the city to modify its 
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plan by deliberately creating black majorities in a sufficient 
number of wards to satisfy statutory · requirements. 
Implicit in Beer and City of Richmond, then, is the propo· 
sition that the Constitution does not prevent a State subject 
to the Voting Rights Act from deliberately creating or pre-
serving black majorities in particular districts in order to 
ensure that its reapportionment plan complies with § 5. 
That proposition must be rejected and § 5 held unconstitu-
tional to that extent if we are to accept petitioners' view that 
racial criteria may never be used in redistricting or that they 
may be used, if at all, only as a specific remedy for past 
unconstitutional apportionments. We are unwilling to over .. 
turn our prior cases, however. Section 5, and its authoriza• 
tion for racial redistricting where appropriate to avoid 
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, are 
constitutional. Contrary to petitioners' first argument, 
neither the Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth Amendment man-
dates any per se rule against using racial factors in districting 
and apportionment. Nor is petitioners' second argument 
valid. The permissible use of racial criteria is not confined 
to eliminating the effects of past discriminatory districting or 
apportionmen t.19 
19 Petitioners also insist that, because the Attorney General concluded 
not that the 1972 plan would have a discriminatory effect but only that 
the State had failed to demonstrate that the plan would not have such 
an effect, there was insufficient justification for racial redistricting. This 
argument overlooks the central role of the shift in burden of proof in 
the congressional effort to combat discriminatory voting laws. Our cases 
have upheld this shift. As we said in South Carolina v. Katzenbach. 
supra, "After enduring nearly a century of systematic resistance to the 
Fifteenth Amendment, Congress might well decide to shift the advantage 
of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evils to th(' ,·ictims.'' 
383 U. S., at 328. And in affirming the issuance of an injunction against 
enforcement of a state reapportionment plan for which the State had not 
demonstrated the absence of a discriminatory effect, the Court stated: 
"It is well established that in a declara.tory judgment action under 
§."5, the plaintiff State has the burden of proof. What the Attorney 
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Moreover, in the process of drawing black majority dis-
tricts in order to comply with § ·5, the State must decide how 
substantial those majorities must be in order to satisfy the 
Voting Rights Act. The figure used ·in drawing the Beer 
plan, for example, was 54o/o of registered voters.20 At a 
minimum and by definition, a "black majority district" must 
be more than 50% black. But whatever the specific per-
centage, the State will inevitably arrive at it as a necessary 
means to ensure the opportunity for the election of a black 
representative and to obtain approval of its reapportionment 
plan. Unless we adopted an unconstitutional construction of 
§ 5 in Beer and City of Richmond, a reapportionment cannot 
violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment merely be-
cause a State uses specific numerical quotas in establishing a 
certain number of black majority districts. Our cases under 
§ 5 stand for at least this much. 
III · 
Having rejected these three broad objections to the use of 
racial criteria in redistricting under the Voting Rights Act, 
we turn to the fourth question, which is whether the racial 
criteria New York used in this case-the revision of the 1972 
plan to create 65% nonwhite majorities in two additional 
senate and two additional assembly districts-were constitu-
tionally infirm. We hold they are not, on two separate 
grounds. The first is addressed in this Part III, the second 
in Part IV. 
The first ground is that petitioners have not shown, or 
offered to prove, that New York did more than the Attorney 
General's regulations do is to place the same burden on the submitting 
party in a § 5 objection procedure. . . . Any less stringent measure 
might well have rendered the formal declaratory judgment procedure a 
dead letter by making available to covered States a far smoother path 
to clearance." Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526, 538 (1973), 
(J[ootnote omitted .) 
w See p. 14, supra. 
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General was authorized to require it to do under the non-
retrogression principle of Beer, a principle that as we have 
already indicated this Court has accepted as constitutionally 
valid. Under Beer, the acceptability of New York's 1972 
reapportionment for purposes of § 5 depends on the change 
in nonwhite voting strength in comparison with the previous 
apportionment, which occurred in 1966. Yet there is no evi-
dence in the record to show whether the 1972 plan increased 
or decreased the number of senate or assembly districts with 
substantial nonwhite majorities of 659fo. For all that peti-
tioners have alleged or proved, the 1974 revisions may have 
accomplished nothing more than the restoration of nonwhite 
voting strength to 1966 levels."1 To be successful in their 
constitutional challenge to the racial criteria used in New 
York's revised plan, petitioners must show at a minimum that 
minority voting strength was increased under the 1974 plan 
in comparison with the 1966 apportionment; otherwise the 
challenge amounts to a constitutional attack on compliance 
with the statutory rule of nonretrogression. 
In the absence of any evidence regarding nonwhite voting 
strength under the 1966 apportionment, the creation of sub-
stantial nonwhite majorit.ies in approximately 309fo of the 
senate and assembly districts in Kings County was reason-
ably related to the constitutionally valid statutory mandate 
of maintaining nonwhite voting strength. The percentage of 
districts with nonwhite majorities was l('SS than the percentage 
of nonwhites in the county as a whole (35 %• ). The size of the 
honwhite majorities in those districts reflected the need to take 
21 It is true, of course, that Beer was decided after petitioners moved 
for summary judgment in the District Court and after the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the District Court's denial of that motion and dismissal 
of the action. But while relying on Beer in this Court, petitioners take 
the position that there are no disputed issues of the fact and that their 
motion for summn.ry judgment should be granted on the basis of the I 
present record. Petitioners' Reply Brief, at 13-14, 17 ; Tr. of Oral Arg., 
at 70-71. 
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account of the substantial difference between the nonwhite 
percentage of the total population in a district and the non-
white percentage of the voting age popula.tion.22 Because, as 
the Court said in Beer, the inquiry under§ 5 focuses ultimately 
on "the position of racial minorities with respect to their effec-
tive exercise of the electoral franchise, 425 U. S., at 141, 
the percentage of eligible voters by district is of great impor..: 
tance to that inquiry.23 In the redistricting plan approved in 
Beer, for example, only one of the two districts with a black 
population majority also had a black majority of registered 
voters. /d., at 142. We think it was reasonable for the 
Attorney General to conclude in this case that a substan-
tial nonwhite population majority-in the vicinity of 65%-
would be required to achieve a nonwhite majority of eligible 
voters. 
\ Petitioners have not shown that New York did more than 
.accede to a position taken by the Attorney General that was 
authorized by our constitutionally permissible construction of 
§ 5. New York adopted the 1974 plan because it sought to 
comply with the Voting Rights Act. This has been its 
22 The NAACP, intervenor in this action, submitted census data to the 
Attorney General showing that roughly 75% of all whites in Kings 
County but only about 55% of all nonwhites were eligible to vote. App. 
264. The NAACP urged that districts without significn.nt nonwhite popu-
~tion majorities would not have nonwhite majorities among eligible 
voters. See, e. g., app. 219. 
The statistical problems in estimating the nonwhite population of the 
d,istricts in the 1972 plan provided an additional reason for the Attorney 
General to ask for an increase in the size of the nonwhite majorities in 
certain district-s. The legislature used the higher of the two $ets of estift 
mates, and the actual nonwhite population may have been somewhat 
lower. See app. 265. 
23 The regulation governing submissions to the Attorney General for 
review of redistricting plans under § 5 "strongly urges" the submitting 
authority to include " [ v] oting-age population and the number of reg-
istered voters before and after the change, by race, for the area. to be 
. affected by the change." 28 CFR § 51.10 (b) (6) (ii) ( 1976). 
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primary defense of the plan, which was sustained on that 
basis by the Court of Appeals. Because the Court of Ap-
peals was essentially correct, its judgment may be affirmed 
without addressing the additional argument by New York 
and by the United States that, wholly aside from New York's 
.obligation under the Voting Rights Act to preserve minority 
voting strength in Kings County, the Constitution permits 
it to draw district lines del!berately in such a way that the 
percentage of districts with a nonwhite majority roughly 
approximates the percentage of nonwhites in the county. 
IV 
This additional argument, however, affords a second, and 
independent, ground for sustaining the particulars of the 
1974 plan for Kings County. Whether or not the plan was 
authorized by or was in compliance with § 5 of the Vot-
ing Rights Act, New York was free to do what it did as 
long as it did not viola.te the Constitution, particularly the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments; and we are con-
vinced that neither Amendment was infringed. 
There is no doubt that in preparing the 1974 legislation, 
the State deliberately used race in a purposeful manner. But/ 
its plan represented no racial slur or stigma with respect to 
whites or any other race, and we discern no discrimination vio-
lative of the Fourteenth Amendment or any abridgment of 
the right to vote on account of race within the meaning of 
the Fifteenth Amendment. 
It is true that New York deliberately increased the non-
white majorities in certain districts in order to enhance the 
opportunity for election of nonwhite representatives from 
those districts. Nevertheless, there was no fencing out of 
the white population from participation in the political proc-
esses of the county, and the plan did not minimize or un-
fairly cancel out white voting strength. Compare White v. 
Re(Jester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-767 ( 1973) , and Gomillion v. 
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Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960), with Gaffney v. Cummings, 
412 U.S. 735, 751-754 (1973). Petitioners have not objected 
to the impact of the 1974 phm on the representation of white 
voters in the 'county or in the State as a whole. As the 
.Court of Appeals observed, the plan left white majorities in 
approximately 70% of the assembly and senate districts in 
Kings County, which had a countywide population that was 
65% white. Thus, even if voting in the county occurred 
.strictly according to race, whites would not be underrepre-
. sen ted relative to their share of the population. 
In individual districts where nonwhite majorities were 
increased to approximately 65%, it became more likely, given 
. racial bloc voting, that black candidates would be elected 
instead of their white opponents, and it became less likely 
. that white voters would be represented by a member of 
their own race; but as long as whites in Kings County, as a 
group, were provided with fair representation, we cannot con-
. elude that there was a cognizable discrimination against 
whites or an abridgement of their-right to vote on the grounds 
, of race.24 Furthermore, the individual voter in the district 
, with a nonwhite maj"ority has no constitutional complaint 
merely because his candidate has lost out at the polls and his 
district is represented by a person for whom he did not vote. 
Some candidate, along with his supporters, always loses. See 
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 15:>---160 (1971). 
Where it occurs, voting for or against a candidate because 
24 We also note that the white voter who as a result of the 1974 
plan is in a district more likely to return a nonwhite representative will 
be represented, to the extent that voting continues to follow raciaJ lines, 
by legislators elected from majority white districts. The effect of the 
reapportionment on whites in districts where nonwhite majorities have 
been increased is thus mitigated by the preservation of white majority 
districts in the rest of the county. See Note, 25 Stan. L. Rev. 84, 87 
(1972). Of course, if voting docs not follow racial lines, the white voter 
has little reason to complain that the percentage of nonwhites in his 
district has been increa&ed. 
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of his race is an unfortuna-te practice. But it i~ not rare; 
~tnd in any district where it regularly happens, it is unlikely 
that any candidate will be elected who is a member of the 
race that is in the minority in that district. However 
. disagreeable this result may be, there is no authority for the 
proposition that the candidates who are found racially unac-
ceptable by the majority, and the minority voters supporting 
those candidates, have had their Fourteenth or Fifteenth 
Amendment rights infringed by this process. Their position 
is similar to that of the Democratic or Republican minority 
that is submerged year after year by the adherents to the 
majority party who tend to vote a straight party line. 
It does not follow, however, that the State is powerless 
to minimize the consequences of racial discrimination by 
voters when it is regularly practiced at the polls. In Gaffney 
v. Cummings, supra, the Court upheld a districting plan 
"drawn with the conscious intent to .. . achieve a rough 
approximation of the statewide political strengths of the 
Democratic and Republican Parties." 412 U. S. , at 752. 
We there recognized that districting plans would be vulner-
able under our cases if "racial or political groups have been 
fenced out of the political process and their voting strength 
invidiously minimized." Id., at 754 (emphasis added); but 
that was not the case there, and no such purpose or effect 
may be ascribed to New York's 1974 plan. Rather, that plan 
can be viewed as seeking to alleviate the consequences of 
racial voting at the polls and to achieve a fair allocation of 
political power between white and nonwhite voters in Kings 
'County. 
In this respect New York's revision of certain district lines 
is little different in kind from the decision by a State in 
which a racial minority is unable to elect representatives 
from multimember districts to change to single-member dis• 
tricting for the purpose of increasing minority representation. 
·This change might substantially increase minority repre• 
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sentation at the expense of white voters, who previously 
elected all of the legislators but with single-member districts 
could elect no more than their proportional share. If this 
intentional reduction of white voting power would be consti .. 
tutionally permissible, as we think it would be, we think it 
also permissible for a State, employing sound districting prin-
ciples such as compactness and population equality, to at~ 
tempt to prevent racial minorities from being repeatedly out-
. voted by creating districts that will afford fair representation 
to the members of those racial grqups who are sufficiently 
numerous and whose residential patterns afford the opportu. 
nity of creating districts in which they will be in the 
majority. 
As the Court said in Gaffney, 
"[C]ourts have [no] constitutional warrant to invalidate 
a state plan, otherwise within tolerable population limits, 
because it undertakes, not to mini,mize or eliminate the 
political strength of any group or party, but to recognize 
it and, through districting, provide a rough ~ort of pro-
portional representation in the legislative halls of the 
State." Ibid. 
New York was well within this rule when, under the cir- I 
cumstances present in Kings County, it amended its 1972 
plan. 2 ~ 
The judgment is 
Affirmed. 
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL took no part in the considera.tion I 
or decision of this case. 
25 Petitioners seek to distinguish Gaffney on the ground that New 
York's use of racial criteria was not the product of "reasoned choice" 
by the state legislature but rather was coerced by federal officials. But 
we do not think that this otherwise constitutionally prrmissible plan 
was rendered unconstitutional merely because New York adopt<'cl it to 
comply with a federal statute. 
'it 










Please,, join me ~ your concurring opinion. 
Mr. Justice '.:stewart 
'±•o;.!, 
lfp/ss 





No. 75-104 United Jewish Organization 
Carey 
Dear Byron: 
I have concluded that Potter's concurring opinion 
best reflects my thinking about this troublesome case. 
It also leaves me more options for the future. 
Accordingly, I am asking Potter to join me in his 
concurrence. 
I am not unaware of your substantial efforts to ····, 
accommodate our divergent views. It will not afford you 
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